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iI focused at intervals as the great
dome loomed up through the
smoke. Glares of many ﬁres and
sweeping clouds of smoke kept
hiding the shape. Then a wind
sprang up. Suddenly, the shining
cross, dome and towers stood out
like a symbol in the inferno. The
scene was unbelievable. In that
moment or two I released my
shutter.
Herbert Mason
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Preface
The present essay is an unabashed exercise in historically informed, speculative
metaphysics. Its aim is to gain insight into the nature of sensory presentation.
Allow me to explain why it should be historically informed and in what sense the
metaphysics developed herein is speculative.
One of the fundamental issues dividing contemporary philosophers of percep-
tion is whether perception is presentational or representational in character (see,
for example, the recent collection devoted to this topic Brogaard 2014 and Camp-
bell and Cassam 2014). To claim that perception is presentational in character is
to claim that it has a presentational element irreducible to whatever intentional
or representational content it may have. So conceived, the object of perception is
present in the awareness afforded by the perceptual experience and is thus a con-
stituent of that experience. Representationalists deny that perception has such an
irreducible presentational element, claiming, instead, that the object of perception
is exhaustively speciﬁed by its intentional or representational content. If there is
indeed a presentational element to perception, then, according to the represen-
tationalist, this is because sensory presentation is either reducible to the exercise
of an intentional or representational capacity or otherwise essentially involves the
exercise of such a capacity (see, for example, Chalmers 2006; McDowell 2008;
Searle 2015). There are two aspects of this debate. On the one hand, there are
arguments on one side or the other urging that perception must be conceived in
presentational or representational terms. One the other hand, there is a more pos-
itive, constructive aspect, where, taking for granted one’s preferred conception,
one goes on to develop detailed theoretical accounts of perceptual experience.
Representationalists have been more active in this latter task. And unsurpris-
ingly so. For suppose one took sensory presentation to be an indispensable aspect
of perceptual experience and further held, in a Butlerian spirit, that it was reducible
to no other thing. What positive account could one give of sensory presentation,
so conceived? Since it is irreducible, no positive account could take the form of a
reduction. So no causal or counterfactual conditions on sensory representations,
understood independently of perception, could be jointly necessary and sufficient
for the presentation, in sensory experience, of its object. One might specify the
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relational features of presentation in sensory experience, but notmuch insight into
the nature of sensory presentation is thereby gained. The tools of contemporary
analytic metaphysics would seem not to leave one much to work with, at least in
the present instance. So it can seem that if one maintains that perceptual experi-
ence involves an irreducible presentational element, all that one can do is press the
negative point that sensory presentation, an indispensable element of perceptual
experience, is reducible to no other thing.
I believe that perception has an irreducible presentational element. And yet I
hoped to learn something positive about the metaphysics of sensory presentation.
If there was, in fact, anything further to be learned, I could not limit myself to the
tools of contemporary analytic metaphysics. The present metaphysics is histori-
cally informed, at least in part, as a result of looking for tools more adequate to
the task at hand. There is a real question about how such borrowings should be
understood, if they are not simply an invitation to roll back philosophical thinking
about perception to some earlier period. Before we are in a position to address that
question, let us ﬁrst address two additional motives to look to historical material
in thinking about the nature of sensory presentation.
Putnam (1993, 1994, 1999) has described the present metaphysical orthodoxy
in the philosophy of mind as “Cartesianism cum materialism” (compare Merleau-
Ponty’s 1967 related charge of “psuedo-Cartesianism”). While it is easy to ﬁnd
dissenters to either the Cartesian or materialist elements of that orthodoxy, it is
equally easy to appreciate the way in which Putnam’s description is apt. That
it is apt, shows that, despite its technical sophistication and being informed by
twenty-ﬁrst century psychology, contemporary philosophy of mind is still working
within a seventeenth century paradigm. After an initial collaboration (Hilbert and
Kalderon, 2000), as I continued to work on color and color perception (Kalderon,
2007, 2008, 2011a,b,c), it became increasingly clear that I was defending an anti-
modern conception of color and perception. The conception of color defended
was anti-modern in that the colors were in noway secondary, butmind-independent
qualities that inhere in material bodies. The conception of color perception was
anti-modern in that it was not conceived as a conscious alteration of a perceiv-
ing subject but rather as the presentation of instances of mind-independent color
qualities located at a distance from the perceiver. The anti-modern metaphysics
provided an additional motive to look to historical, and in particular, pre-modern
sources. Doing so was a means of self-consciously disrupting habits of mind incul-
cated by the modern paradigm that has reigned for four centuries.
There is a third additional motive for the turn to historical sources, one ﬂowing
from themethodology pursued in the present essay. Given our presupposition that
sensory presentation is irreducible, and leaving to one side what form a positive
account of sensory presentation could take if it is not, indeed, a reduction of some
vsort, how are we to proceed? How can one gain insight into the nature of the
irreducible presentational element of perceptual experience? My thought, not at
all original, was to proceed dialectically, by considering puzzles about the nature of
sensory presentation. As it happens, there are a number of historically salient such
puzzles that are useful for a metaphysician proceeding dialectically to consider
(for a detailed historical discussion of at least one of these see Kalderon 2015).
Moreover, many of these puzzles are pre-modern though have been obscured by
the prevailing modern paradigm.
It can often happen, in the course of dialectical argument, that the insights of
one’s predecessors are not only preserved but transformed. Thus, it can happen
that a respected predecessor was right to hold a certain opinion but only on an
understanding as of yet unavailable to them. That is one way, at least, in which
the insights of our predecessors may be transformed even as they are preserved
in the course of dialectical argument. This bears on the question of how such
historical borrowing are to be understood. There is no real possibility of rolling
back philosophical thinking to the ﬁfth century bc, say, just as there is no real
possibility of living “the life of a Bronze Age Chief, or a Medieval Samurai,” in our
present historical circumstances, as Williams (1981, 140) reminds us. In deploying
ancient or Scholastic concepts in a contemporary metaphysical inquiry new sense
is accrued, and such borrowings become a kind of concept formation (Moore, 2012,
587–8). New sense is accrued when an ancient or Scholastic concept is applied
to novel problems that arise in a theoretical and historical context distinct from
the one in which the concept was originally formed. Compare Bergson’s (1912a)
retroﬁtting the concepts of Stoic physics in the development of his philosophical
psychology. If we are to take it at all seriously, it can only be understood as amethod
of concept formation. Moreover, novel concepts are what are needed if one hopes
to contribute to, if not indeed effect, a Kuhnian revolution against the prevailing
modern paradigm.
That the present metaphysical inquiry proceeds dialectically bears on its spec-
ulative character. In proceeding dialectically, in taking puzzles about the nature
of sensory presentation as a guide to uncovering its nature, the present essay is
aporetic and exploratory. Its conclusions necessarily fall short of apodeictic proof.
This, at any rate, should be obvious since the conclusion of dialectical argument
hardly constitutes an a priori demonstration, drawing, as it may, upon the testi-
mony of the many and the wise, as well as any empirical evidence as may be rele-
vant.
Self-proclaimed naturalistic metaphysicians sometimes lampoon their oppo-
nents as engaging in a priori reasoning from the armchair. But eschewing reduc-
tionism about sensory presentation while pursuing insight into its nature by pro-
ceeding dialectically, no a priori demonstration is offered. Nor indeed could there
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be if the ambition is to contribute to, if not indeed effect, a Kuhnian revolution.
Demonstrations are only possible at the stage of normal science. Demonstrations
require a stable conceptual framework, about which there is widespread and non-
collusive agreement, in which to take place. Part of the present task is to disrupt
just such a framework.
A more speciﬁc task provides a fourth motivation for why the present meta-
physical inquiry should be historically informed. I have long been puzzled by the
primordial and persistent tactile metaphors for sensory awareness, even for non-
tactile modes of sensory awareness such as vision and audition. Such imagery
persists even among those who would eschew any explanation of perception in
terms of, or on analogy with, tactile perception. Thus, in a remarkable passage,
Brian O’Shaughnessy, a careful, independent thinker, warns against taking such
tactile metaphors too literally but cannot restrain himself from deploying such a
metaphor in describing the contrasting conception:
I think there is a tendency to conceive of attentive contact [my empha-
sis], which is to say of perceptual awareness, as a kind of palpable or
concrete contact of the mind with its object. And in one sense of these
terms, this belief is surely correct. … However, there is a tendency—or
perhaps an imagery of a kind that may be at work in one’s mind—to
overinterpret this “concreteness,” to think of it as in some way akin to,
as a mental analogue of, something drawn from the realm of things—a
palpable connection of some kind, rather as if the gaze literally reach
out and touched its object. (O’Shaughnessy, 2003, 183)
And M.G.F. Martin has observed that “content” is a metaphor of assimilation—to
have a content is to be, in a way, its container, containment being itself a mode
of assimilation, as is grasping. Moreover, Martin also notes the way in which this
imagery is in tension with the theoretical role content plays in representationalist
theories of perception. For surely what is contained within a perception is its
object, but the content of that perception is not the object of perception. Rather,
the object of that perception is what is represented by its content (Martin, 1998).
I wanted to understandwhy contemporary philosophers apply tactilemetaphors
for sensory awareness unselfconsciously, indeed, unconsciously—even when such
imagery ultimately fails to cohere with their espoused doctrine. One explanation,
to be pursued throughout this essay, is that without reducing perception generally
to sensation by contact, there is, nonetheless, a way in which tactile metaphors
for sensory presentation are apt. Moreover, if tactile metaphors for perception
generally are apt in the way that I shall suggest they are, then the resulting con-
ception of perception is anti-modern, or so shall I argue. But if it is, then the
unconscious tendency to apply tactile metaphors for sensory awareness, even if it
is in tension with one’s stated doctrine, is subject to a psychoanalytic explanation,
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hence rendering the present essay a psychoanalytic narrative. It is the return of the
repressed. Or more speciﬁcally, the return of what has been repressed by the mod-
ern paradigm. Our unconscious use of tactile metaphors for sensory awareness is
the vestigial remnant of a vivid sense of the Manifest Image of Nature and our
perceptual relation to it not utterly extinguished by four centuries of modernity.
Grasping is at the center of a semantic ﬁeld of tactile metaphors for sensory
awareness loosely organized as modes of assimilation (chapter 1.1). I attempt to
understand what, if anything, makes grasping an apt metaphor for sensory aware-
ness more generally by undertaking a phenomenological investigation into grasp-
ing or enclosure understood as a mode of haptic perception. The idea is that if we
better appreciate how grasping presents itself from within haptic experience, we
will be in a better position to understand what, if anything, makes grasping an apt
metaphor for perception generally. Moreover, in undertaking this phenomeno-
logical investigation we shall freely draw upon empirical and historical sources.
Empirical psychology has a lot to teach us about the phenomenology of haptic ex-
perience. But so does the testimony of our respected predecessors and the puzzles
that arise both within and without the endoxa.
Moreover, there is reason why a phenomenological investigation into haptic
experience whose ultimate aim is to uncover the aptness of tactile metaphors for
perception generally should take the form of a conceptual genealogy. In looking
at earlier occurrences of such metaphors, when they were more strongly etched in
light and shadow, one can get a better sense of whatmade them live for these earlier
thinkers and, by extension, a better sense of the power they continue to exercise
over us. At any rate, it is almost impossible to get anywhere merely by examin-
ing the unselfconscious metaphors deployed by contemporary philosophers—they
are lifeless in their hands. Much better to examine earlier occurrences of these
metaphors, when they were more strongly and vividly felt, to get a sense of their
power and persistent aptness.
Thinking our way to the future by thinking our way through the past may strike
some as hopelessly anachronistic. In my defense I only say that, here, I am follow-
ing Ricoeur (2004, xvii), in exercising “the right of every reader, before whom all
the books are open simultaneously.”
The present use of historical material contrasts with the use of historical ma-
terial in my previous book. Form without Matter, was an essay in the philosophy
of perception written in the medium of historiography. Though an essay in the
philosophy of perception, like the ancient commentators, I primarily worked ex-
egetically. While the present essay is historically informed in the ways that I have
described, I do not, however, primarily work exegetically. In the present essay, I
am driven less to understand the history of my subject matter than to speculatively
resolve certain puzzles concerning it. In the present essay, then, selective histori-
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cal reﬂection is in the service of, and subordinate to, this larger aim in speculative
metaphysics. Towards this end, I have endeavoured, less to interpret and exposit
our predecessors, than to speak to them across the ages like colleagues (see Ryle
1971, 10-11).
The present essay is an exercise in historically informed speculativemetaphysics.
I have explained in what sense it is speculative and in what sense it is historically
informed. But in what sense is it metaphysics? Consider the central question to be
pursued in the present essay: What is it for the object of perception to be present
in the perceiver’s experience of it? This is a metaphysical question. It concerns
what it is to be something. Speciﬁcally, it concerns what is it to be present in per-
ceptual experience. In asking what it is to be something, one asks a metaphysical
question, even should the thing, whose being one is inquiring into, turn out to be
mental. “But metaphysics concerns extra-mental reality!”, one might object. One
might, but the objection is not very cogent. Substance dualism is a metaphysical
thesis. That there are two mutually exclusive kinds of substances is, straightfor-
wardly, a metaphysical thesis. And it remains one, even when one of these kinds
of substances turns out to be essentially thinking and hence mental.
The results of the present inquiry may strike analytically inclined philosophers
to be more in line with continental metaphysics. And while the present essay is
self-consciously a departure from the prevailing orthodoxy of analyticmetaphysics,
it remains true to, and is a staunch defense of, what has been a central tenet of an-
alytic metaphysics from its inception, namely, realism. And while it is true that
recent continental thinkers have recovered for themselves a form of realism, the
present perceptual realism is more in line with Cook Wilson (1926) than Meillas-
soux (2008). Moreover, continental philosophers will quickly recognize that the
present essay defends, in Heideggerian terminology, a metaphysics of presence.
The present conception of sensory presentation is thus fundamentally at odds with
conceptions of perception developed within the phenomenological tradition. To
be honest, I care little for such categories. And in what follows I have drawn freely
from a variety of sources.
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Chapter 1
Grasping
1.1 TheDawn of Understanding
In a justly famous scene from 2001: A Space Odyssey, set to Richard Strauss’ Also
Sprach Zarathustra, a hominid ancestor, squatting among the skeletal remains of
a tapir, reaches out and tentatively grasps a femur. It is telling that this is how
Stanley Kubrick chose to dramatize the initial transformation, induced by an alien
obelisk, of our hominid ancestors, that eventually gives rise to space-exploring hu-
manity in the twenty-ﬁrst century. Not only does our hominid ancestor grasp the
femur, but they grasp as well an important application. Squatting among the skele-
tal remains, femur in hand, our hominid ancestor taps the bones in exploratory
manner. Each strike of the femur grows in force until ﬁnally, in a crescendo of
activity, they smash the tapir’s skull to pieces. Our hominid ancestor has reached
a crucial insight, that an implement, such as the femur, might transform tapir into
prey. Moreover, the application generalizes. The femur might also be used as a
weapon against competing groups of hominids. The acquired technology thus has
political consequences. What is presently important, however, is the connection
between grasping and cognition. We say we have grasped a situation when we
have understood it. And philosophers are prone to speak of thinkers grasping the
thoughts they think. Kubrick dramatizes the connection between grasping and
cognition by having our hominid ancestor’s grasping the femur among the tapir’s
skeletal remains be the primal scene of a dawning understanding.
We have grasped a situation when we have understood it. We have a grip on
it. If the understanding in question is practical, we might say that we have mat-
ters in hand. And we touch upon subjects for discussion. Nor are tactile metaphors
conﬁned to forms of higher cognition and their expression in rational discourse.
They persist, as well, in our description of perceptual awareness. Not only do we
speak of recognizing an object that we see as grasping the object present in our
1
2 CHAPTER 1. GRASPING
perceptual experience, but the presentation in experience is itself a kind of grasp-
ing. In perceiving an object we apprehend it. In this way, perception puts us in
contact with its object. The tactile metaphors for perceptual awareness tend, on
the whole, to be modes of assimilation, and ingestion is a natural variant (see John-
ston 2006b; Price 1932), as when we drink in the scene. Thus, for example, Peter
John Olivi and Jacopo Zabarella use the Latin imbibere, to drink in, to describe per-
ceptual apprehension. Our hominid ancestor, looking up from the tapir’s remains,
takes in the scene before them. Indeed this metaphor is inscribed into the history
of the English language—“perception” derives from the Latin perceptiomeaning to
take in or assimilate (Burnyeat, 1979, 102). If in looking up from the tapir’s remains,
they see the obelisk, then, in a manner of speaking common among contemporary
philosophers, the obelisk is the content of our hominid ancestor’s perception. But if
the obelisk is the content of their perception then their perception of it is its con-
tainer. To bring something into view so that it ﬁgures in the content of perception
would be to contain it within that perception. But containment itself is a mode of
assimilation.
Even granting the primordial and persistent use of tactile metaphors for per-
ception and cognition more generally, one may wonder whether grasping is really
at the center of the semantic ﬁeld ofmetaphors for sensory presentation. Grasping
may involve contact, but not all contact involves grasping, not even all perceptual
modes of contact. Some elements of the semantic ﬁeld, such as talk of “contact”,
are logically independent of grasping. And this can raise the following worry. Per-
haps for something to be present in sensory experience is for the perceiver to be
in perceptual contact with it. If so, perhaps it is contact, and not grasping, that is
the central metaphor for sensory presentation. Grasping, on this interpretation, is
something further than the object of perception being presented in the perceiver’s
experience. Perhaps to grasp what we are in perceptual contact with is to recognise
what perception presents us with.
The logical observation that occasioned this worry does not force upon us the
alternative reading where contact is sensory presentation and grasping recognition
(though, as we have observed, the metaphor of grasping can have such uses). That
there can be perceptual contact without grasping is consistent with contact being
an important component of grasping that is at the center of the semantic ﬁeld.
Thus, for example, Broad (1952) uses both “contact” and “prehension” for sensory
presentation presumably because prehending the object of perception involves be-
ing in contact with it. Talk of contact captures the visceral immediacy of sensory
presentation, its force and vivacity. Moreover, talk of contact emphasizes the ex-
istence of an external limit determined by that with which we are in contact, the
experience of which, as we shall see, plays an important role in sensory presen-
tation. Talk of grasping, on the other hand, captures other important aspects of
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perceptual presentation, speciﬁcally, that it is apt to think of perception as a mode
of assimilation. Moreover, it will emerge that the objectivity of perception is best
understood in terms of perception formally assimilating to its object in the sense
that it does. In this way, the full justiﬁcation for the claim that grasping is at the
center of a semantic ﬁeld of metaphors for sensory presentation consists in the
fruits that it will bear.
What makes tactile metaphors for perception apt? Tactile metaphors for per-
ceptual awareness, even for non-tactile modes of awareness such as vision and au-
dition, are primordial and persistent. Most contemporary philosophers of percep-
tion apply them unselfconsciously, indeed, unconsciously. That they do is a testa-
ment to the power of suchmetaphors. Understanding the power they have over us,
understanding what makes them so compelling, we may gain insight into the ob-
ject of these metaphors. In understanding what makes grasping an apt metaphor
for perception generally, if it is indeed one, we may gain insight into the nature of
sensory presentation. Or so I suggest.
We shall begin with a phenomenological investigation into the nature of grasp-
ing, a form of haptic touch. The investigation is phenomenological in that it seeks
to uncover how grasping, understood as a mode of haptic perception, presents
itself from within tactile experience. It is phenomenological because the object
of investigation is restricted to perceptual appearances and not because of any
methodology deployed in pursuing that investigation. The investigation thus need
not involve “bracketing”, nor need it conﬁne itself to the deliverances of introspec-
tion in determining the nature of haptic appearance (for discussion of the reliabil-
ity of introspection see Schwitzgebel 2008; Bayne and Spener 2010). In trying to
understand how grasping, understood as a mode of haptic perception, presents
itself from within tactile experience, we may avail ourselves of empirical and his-
torical resources. Once we have a better understanding of how grasping presents
itself from within tactile experience, we will be in a better position to understand
why grasping also presents itself as an exemplar of sensory presentation more gen-
erally.
We may avail ourselves of empirical resources since phenomenology is some-
thing about which discoveries can be made. As Hilbert (2005) and Phillips (2012)
argue, psychophysics can contribute to our understanding of perceptual phenomenol-
ogy. Similarly, we might reasonably expect empirical research to reveal important
aspects of the phenomenology of haptic perception. Indeed, as Fulkerson’s (2014)
argues at length, there is much to learn about the phenomenology of haptic per-
ception from its empirical study.
In investigating the phenomenology of haptic perception, not onlymaywe avail
ourselves of empirical resources, but we may also avail ourselves of historical re-
sources. If I am right that our unselfconscious, indeed, unconscious, use of tactile
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metaphors for perception is best explained by their persistent aptness, then look-
ing at early historical examples of these metaphors, when they were more vivid
and strongly felt, promises to shed light on those aspects of the phenomenology
of haptic experience that makes them apt.
Grasping may be an apt metaphor for perception generally, and to that extent
at least, an exemplar of sensory presentation, but it does not follow that all per-
ception is a form of touch. One may grant that tactile metaphors for perceptual
awareness are in some sense apt while eschewing any such reductive explanatory
ambition. Such ambitions were rife in Greek antiquity. Thus Lindberg (1977, 39)
observes that in the ancient world “the analogy of perception by contact in the
sense of touch seemed to establish to nearly everybody’s satisfaction that contact
was tantamount to sensation, and it was not apparent that further explanation was
required.” Aristotle criticizes this reductive explanatory strategy. Conceiving of
non-tactile modes of perceptual awareness on the model of touch will only seem
explanatory insofar as touch is antecedently understood to be an unproblematic
mode of perception. However, Aristotle’s belaboring and not always completely
resolving the aporiai concerning touch in De anima 2 11 undermines that assump-
tion (Derrida, 2005; Kalderon, 2015). And if further explanation is required, then
we can no longer simply assume that contact is tantamount to sensation. Never-
theless, Aristotle accepts the aptness of the metaphor. Perception, for Aristotle,
remains a mode of assimilation. Aristotle deﬁnes perception as the assimilation of
sensible form without the matter of the perceived particular (De anima 2 12 424a18–
23, 2 5 418a3–6 ). So acceptance of the aptness of the metaphor carries with it
no commitment to any such reductive explanatory ambition. Grasping may be
apt metaphor for perception, even for non-tactile modes of perceptual awareness,
such as vision and audition, without perception being reduced to a form of touch.
Indeed, if perception reduced to touch, then what strikes us as tactile metaphors
for perception generally would, in truth, be no metaphors at all.
1.2 Haptic Perception
Grasping is a form of haptic touch. Haptic touch involves active exploration of
the tangible object. This can involve a range of different stereotypical exploratory
activities often combined in sequence. The different stereotypical exploratory ac-
tivities are suited to presenting different ranges of tangible qualities. Thus to dis-
cern the texture of an object the perceiver may deploy lateral movement across its
surface. Holding a stone in their hand, our hominid ancestor may feel the rough-
ness of the stone by rubbing their thumb across its surface. And its hardness may
be felt by applying pressure to it. According to the taxonomy of Lederman and
Klatzky (1987), grasping is a distinctive exploratory activity that they describe as
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“enclosure”. Grasping an object allows the perceiver to discern a different range
of tangible qualities. If texture is perceived by lateral motion and hardness by
applying pressure, grasping or enclose makes volume and global shape available
in tactile experience. Other stereotypical exploratory activities include: “static
contact”—passively resting one’s hand on an externally supported object, with-
out an effort to mold to its contours, to determine its temperature, “unsupported
holding”—holding the object without external support, and without molding, to
determine the object’s heft or weight often involving a “weighing” motion, “con-
tour following”—a smooth, nonrepetitive tracing of the contours of the object,
“part motion test”—moving a part of the object independently of the whole, and
“speciﬁc function test”—moving the object in such a way as to perform various
functions. Though these stereotypical exploratory activities are optimized for
determining a speciﬁc range of tangible qualities, they can also determine other
tangible qualities, though perhaps less well, with less tactual acuity. Thus while
grasping or enclosure may present the overall shape of the object, to determine its
exact shape the perceiver must use contour following. Grasping however, like con-
tour following, is relatively general in the range of tangible qualities it can present.
Thus, grasping is itself a way of applying pressure to an object and, hence, a way
of perceiving its hardness, as well as other of the object’s tangible qualities such as
temperature, moistness, vibration, a metallic feel, and so on. (I say “metallic feel”
rather than “metallic”, since non-metallic things can have a metallic feel, there to
be felt if only we grasp them.) Not only are these stereotypical exploratory ac-
tivities optimized to determine a speciﬁc range of tangible qualities that vary in
generality, but they can also be chained together to provide the perceiver with a
more complete proﬁle of the corporeal aspects of the object under investigation.
With enclosure, Lederman and Klatzky write:
…the hand maintains simultaneous contact with as much of the enve-
lope of the object as possible. Often one can see an effort to mold
the hand more precisely to object contours. Periods of static enclosure
may alternate with shifts of the object in the hand(s). (Lederman and
Klatzky, 1987, 346–7)
The quoted passage brings out several important features of grasping, understood
as a mode of haptic perception.
First, grasping a rigid, solid body involves the hand’s maintaining simultaneous
contact with as much of its overall surface as possible. Grasping is thus a kind of
incorporation. Recall, what unites the various tactile metaphors for perception,
even for non-tactile modes of perceptual awareness such as vision and audition, is
that they tend to bemodes of assimilation, and grasping exempliﬁes this pattern. It
may not be as complete an incorporation as the variant, ingestion, but it remains a
clear mode of assimilation nonetheless. In maintaining simultaneous contact with
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as much of its overall surface as possible, the hand assimilates to the contours of
the object. As we shall see, that the grasping hand assimilates to the object grasped
is a manifestation of the objectivity of that haptic perception. This is part of what
it makes it an apt metaphor for perceptual presentation more generally.
Second, not only does the grasping hand assimilate to the overall shape and
volume of the object grasped, but, as Lederman and Klatzky (1987) observe, ef-
fort is typically exerted to mold the hand more precisely to the object’s contours.
So grasping or enclosure involves not only the hand’s conﬁguration in maintaining
simultaneous contact with the overall surface of the object, but the force of the
hand’s activity as well. Not only is this force exerted in achieving the end of mold-
ing the hand more perfectly to contours of the object grasped (on the preparatory
reach involved in grasping see Jones and Lederman 2006, chapter 6), but it is ex-
erted as well in the end’s achievement—maintaining simultaneous contact with the
overall surface of the object requires continued effort to sustain. This is physiolog-
ically and phenomenologically signiﬁcant. It is physiologically signiﬁcant in that
the activation of different sets of receptors are coordinated in haptic perception
(see Hatwell et al. 2003, chapter 1 and Fulkerson 2014, chapter 3, for discussion).
Grasping or enclosure will involve not only cutaneous activation but also the dis-
tinct sets of activations involved in kinesthesis, motor control, and our sense of
agency. Moreover, this is reﬂected in our phenomenology. We feel the force with
which we grip the object as well as the object’s overall shape and volume.
Third, there is tendency, in grasping or enclosure, to shift the object period-
ically in one’s hands. What explains this? Begin with Lederman’s and Klatzky’s
(1987) observation that there is a tendency for perceivers to exert effort to mold
their hand more precisely to the contours of the object grasped. In grasping an
object, the grasping hand in this way assimilates to the overall shape and volume
of the object grasped. Consider grasping a solid, rigid body, such as a stone. In
grasping a stone, our hominid ancestor extends their hand’s activity, they tighten
their grasp, until they can no more. Since the stone is solid, it resists penetration.
Since it is rigid, it maintains its overall shape and volume even when in the ho-
minid’s grasp. Contrast the way the overall shape and volume of an elastic body,
such a sponge, deforms as it is squeezed. With the stone in its grip, the hand of
our hominid ancestor assimilates to the overall shape and volume of the stone. Of
course, hands are unevenly shaped and imperfectly elastic. This means that an
effort to mold one’s hand to a rigid, solid body thus disclosing its overall shape
and volume will most likely be imperfectly realized. There may be some areas of
the object’s surface that the grasping hand does not conform to. Haptic percep-
tion is thus partial in something like Hilbert’s (1987) sense. Perception is partial
if the object of perception is not wholly present in the awareness of it afforded
by perceptual experience. There may be more to the object of perception, even
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in its sensible aspects, than is determined in any given perception. The tendency
to shift the grasped object in our hands compensates for this partial and imper-
fect disclosure. In shifting the object in one’s hand, an area that the hand did not
previously conform to may become accessible to touch. Successive grips and the
manner in which the object moves in one’s hands as one shifts between them may
provide a better overall sense of the shape and volume of the rigid, solid body.
I have offered an explanation of the tendency, observed by Lederman and
Klatzky (1987), for the perceiver to shift the object of haptic exploration peri-
odically in their hands in terms of the partiality of haptic perception. That ex-
planation is incomplete. Active exploration of the object of haptic investigation
could only be motivated to compensate for its partial and imperfect disclosure if
the perceiver has the sense, perhaps instinctive, that there is more to the corpo-
real nature of the object than is disclosed in their grasp. This is the allure of the
tangible—the sense, or premonition, that, at any given moment, the body exceeds
what is disclosed to us by touch. Our tactile sense of a body’s “thingness”—its
concrete particularity—consists, in part, in this allure. (Compare Harman’s 2005,
141–144, discussion of allure; though, for Harman, allure carries with it, not only
the suggestion of hidden depths, but inaccessibility as well.) Without this primi-
tive sense that there are further tangible aspects of the body as of yet unfelt, the
partiality of haptic perception, by itself, could not explain the tendency for per-
ceivers to shift the object of haptic investigation periodically in their hands. The
partial and imperfect character of haptic disclosure must itself be disclosed in the
haptic experience that affords it.
The explanation is incomplete in another way. In periodically shifting the ob-
ject in their hands to compensate for the partial and imperfect disclosure of the
object grasped, the perceiver’s haptic experience exhibits perceptual constancy (on
the importance of constancy phenomena to understanding perception see Smith
2002; Burge 2010).
Very often, objects in the scene before us are somehow perceived to be con-
stant or uniform or unchanging in color, shape, size, or position, even while their
appearance with respect to these features somehow changes. This is a familiar and
pervasive fact about perception, even if it is notoriously difficult to describe ac-
curately let alone adequately account for. Perceptual constancy is not conﬁned to
vision. Importantly, it is exhibited in haptic perception as well. Thus, for exam-
ple, our haptic experience of roughness exhibits perceptual constancy (Yoshioka
et al., 2011). The texture of a stone picked up by our hominid ancestor will feel
rough, and just as rough, when felt with a quick motion as when felt with a slow
motion, even though feeling the stone’s rough texture with a quick motion does
not feel the same as with a slow motion. Other forms of haptic perception exhibit
perceptual constancy as well.
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Grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, itself ex-
hibits perceptual constancy. Thus, the perceiver feels the constant overall shape
and volume of the object even though it feels different in successive grips. What
the perceiver feels in moving the object between successive grips changes through-
out this process, but the object disclosed by this haptic exploration is not Protean
in character. If the object were changing its overall shape and volume in the process
of the perceiver’s handling it, then shifting the object could be no compensation
for the partial and imperfect disclosure of the object grasped. If the object were
Protean, and the perceiver shifted it in their hands, then its overall shape and vol-
ume would change, and the opportunity to feel what was unfelt would be forever
lost.
In grasping, understood as a mode of haptic perception, the perceiver attends
only to the constant tangible qualities it presents, in the case of a rigid, solid body,
the perceiver attends to its constant overall shape and volume, as well as other con-
stant tangible qualities that grasping may disclose. Though there may be a felt dif-
ference in changing patterns of intensive sensation in handling the object (chang-
ing patterns of pressure and thermal sensation, say), haptic experience presents the
constant overall shape and volume of the object. Of course, different aspects of
the overall shape and volume may be present at different times, given the different
ways the body is being handled. Sensory presentation being partial, the perceiver
may now feel this corner and now that. But these presented aspects of the overall
shape of a rigid, solid body are experienced as stable aspects of a body that retains
its shape, despite the perceiver’s handling, because of the self-maintaining forces
at work in its constitution. So the tendency, observed by Lederman and Klatzky
(1987), for the perceiver to periodically shift the object in their hands is not only
explained by the partiality of haptic perception, but could only be so explained
if the haptic experience this behavior gives rise to exhibits perceptual constancy.
(Compare Matthen’s 2015 discussion of the construction of isotropic perceptual
models in active perception.)
Allow me to make two further observations about this passage, though now
about issues that are merely implicit.
First, grasping is an activity and so is spread over time. It has duration. Not
only does our hominid ancestor tentatively reach out and grasp the tapir’s femur
from amongst its skeletal remains—an event with duration—, but its grasp must
be actively maintained over a period of time. Maintaining simultaneous contact
with the overall surface of a rigid body, or some non-insigniﬁcant portion of it, is
a state sustained by activity. In this regard, it is like Ryle’s (1949, 149) example of
keeping the enemy at bay, or Kripke’s (1972/1980) example of the connection be-
tween heat and molecular motion. The state thus obtains for the duration of the
sustaining activity. Moreover, in coming to perceive its overall shape and volume,
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the perceiver may shift the object in their hand. The tactile sense of an object’s
overall shape or volume is disclosed by such activity. And since activity has dura-
tion, it is disclosed over time. The presentation of the overall shape and volume of
an object in tactile experience is itself spread over time like the activity that dis-
closes it. One potential lesson, then, for the metaphysics of sensory presentation,
is that the object of perception may be disclosed over time, that its presentation
in perceptual experience may have duration.
Second, that the grasping hand assimilates to the overall shape and volume of
the object grasped is potentially epistemically signiﬁcant. The full case for this will
have to wait (section 1.5 and chapter 6.1), but we can begin to get a sense of why
this might be so. A rigid, solid body has a certain overall shape and volume prior to
being grasped. Moreover, it is sufficiently rigid and solid to maintain that overall
shape and volume even when grasped. In making an effort to more precisely mold
the hand to the contours of the rigid, solid object, the hand thus takes on, to an
approximate degree, the overall shape and volume of the object grasped. That is to
say, the hand takes on a certain conﬁguration determined by the hand’s anatomy,
the activity of the hand, and the overall shape of the object grasped. And with the
hand so conﬁgured, the shape of its interior approximates the overall shape of the
object grasped. Moreover, the hand, so conﬁgured, encompasses a region of a cer-
tain volume itself determined by the hand and the volume of the object grasped.
And the volume of the region that the hand encompasses approximates the vol-
ume of the object grasped. That is the point of making an effort to more precisely
mold the hand to contours of the rigid object. In engaging in such haptic activity,
in molding one’s hand more precisely to the contours of the object, one ensures
that the overall shape and volume of the object had prior to being grasped, and
maintained in being grasped, explains, in part, the hand’s conﬁguration in grasping
the object and the force that needs to be exerted to maintain that conﬁguration.
Suppose that it is our hand’s conﬁguration in grasping and the force that needs
to be exerted in maintaining that conﬁguration that discloses the overall shape
and volume of the object. If so, at least in the present instance, haptic percep-
tion is dependent, in some appropriate sense, upon proprioception, kinesthesis,
our capacity for motor activity, and our sense of agency (for relevant discussion
see O’Shaughnessy 1989, 1995; Martin 1992; Fulkerson 2014; we will discuss this
dependency in the next chapter). Since the object’s overall shape and volume ex-
plains the hand’s conﬁguration and force, if the object eludes the hand’s grasp, then
that conﬁguration and force would not have occurred. If the object is absent, there
is nothing for the hand to assimilate to. Perhaps the objectivity of grasping, under-
stood as a mode of haptic perception, consists in the grasping hand’s assimilating
to the tangible qualities of the object had prior to grasping.
Against this suggestion, it might be objected that, at least for certain grasp-
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ings, it is possible for the object to be absent and yet the hand to be in a duplicate
conﬁguration. However, a felt difference would remain. Maintaining the hand’s
conﬁguration in the absence of the object requires different muscle activity since
the perceiver can no longer rely on pressing against the rigid body in maintaining
that conﬁguration. The different pattern of activation of receptors in muscles and
joints will result in a felt difference. Compare leaning against a wall with making
as if to lean against a wall. Sustaining that posture in the absence of the supporting
wall can be difficult to do. Miming is an acquired skill. As Jacques Tati demon-
strates in Cours du Soir, it can be taught and learned. So in the case of duplicate
conﬁguration, where the hand takes on the conﬁguration it would have had if it
were grasping the object, while the hand’s conﬁguration has been maintained in
the absence of the object, there is a felt difference in the force exerted.
That the grasping hand assimilates to the contours of the object grasped is po-
tentially epistemically signiﬁcant. It is, if not the source of that haptic perception’s
objectivity, then its manifestation. In grasping an object, the hand assimilates to
the object’s contours. If in grasping an object, the hand’s conﬁguration and force
discloses the object’s overall shape and volume, and that conﬁguration and force
would not have occurred in the absence of the object grasped, then our tactile ex-
perience would not be as it is when we haptically perceive if that object were in
fact absent. While not yet proof against a Cartesian demon, one can begin to see
the potential epistemic signiﬁcance of the effort exerted in more precisely mold-
ing one’s hand against the contours of the object grasped. It is the means by which
certain tangible qualities of an external body are disclosed in our grasp. We shall
return to this issue in section 1.5 and again in chapter 6.1.
1.3 The ProtagoreanModel
Wehave undertaken to uncover how grasping, understood as a mode of haptic per-
ception, presents itself from within tactile experience. The investigation is phe-
nomenological in the sense that the object of investigation is restricted to percep-
tual appearances. Moreover, we have engaged in a phenomenological investigation
into the nature of grasping, understood as a mode of haptic perception, in order
to understand what makes grasping an apt metaphor, if it is, of perception more
generally, including non-tactile modes of perception. Perhaps part of the aptness
of the metaphor consists in providing a model for sensory presentation more gen-
erally. On the basis of our discussion of Lederman and Klatzky (1987), we are now
in a position to sketch, to a ﬁrst approximation, the contours of such a model. It
is usefully compared, if only to highlight the differences, with the conception of
perception that Socrates attributes to Protagoras.
In the Theaetetus 156 a–c, Socrates elaborates the Secret Doctrine of Protagoras
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by providing an account of perception as the contingent outcome of active and
passive forces in conﬂict. Grasping as a mode of haptic perception can seem to
approximate to that account. At the very least, the felt shape and volume of the
object grasped is determined by conﬂicting forces. On the one hand, there is the
force exerted in molding the handmore precisely to the contours of the rigid, solid
body. On the other hand, there are the self-maintaining forces of the rigid, solid
body itself. A rigid, solid body, such as a stone picked up by a hominid ancestor, is
no mere sum of matter. It has a form or material structure determined by forces
that are the categorical bases for its rigidity and solidity (Johnston 2006a; compare
also Leibniz’s and Kant’s dynamical theories of matter). Haptic perception is the
joint upshot of the force exerted by the grasping hand and the self-maintaining
forces of the object grasped. There remains a crucial difference, however, from
the account elaborated by Socrates. The overall shape and volume of the object
and our haptic perception of them are not “twin births” as Protagoras maintains:
Motion has two forms, each an inﬁnite multitude, but distinguished by
their powers, the one being active and the other passive. And through
the intercourse and mutual friction of these two there comes to be an
offspring inﬁnite in multitude but always twin births, on the one hand
what is perceived, on the other, the perception of it, the perception in
every case being generated together with what is perceived and emerg-
ing along with it. (Plato, Theaetetus 156 a–b; Levett and Burnyeat in
Cooper 1997, 173–4)
Aristotle’s criticism of Protagoras often ﬁts the following pattern: An impor-
tant concession is made to Protagoras, only for Aristotle to argue that the conces-
sion can only be accepted on an understanding unavailable to the Protagorean (see,
for example, Metaphysica   5 1010b30–1011a2 and see Kalderon 2015, chapter 2.1.1,
for discussion). In appropriating the Protagorean model, we shall be following
Aristotle’s lead.
Begin with the way in which haptic perception, as so far described, differs from
the conception of perception that ﬁgures in the Secret Doctrine. The forces that
determine the object’s rigidity and solidity are sufficient to maintain the object’s
overall shape and volume within the hand’s grasp. So the perceived tangible qual-
ities of the external body inhere in that body prior to being perceived, whereas in
the account attributed to Protagoras, the perceived object comes into being with
the perceiver’s perception of it. One might concede to Protagoras that the pre-
sentation of the object’s overall shape and volume in tactile experience and the
perceiver’s feeling its overall shape and volume are, in fact, “twin births”. It is at
least the case that if overall shape and volume are not present in tactile experience
then they are not felt, and if they are not felt, they are not present in tactile ex-
perience, at least not in that way. But not only is this consistent with perceptual
12 CHAPTER 1. GRASPING
realism, but it is only intelligibly sustained against the background of a realistmeta-
physics. If a tangible quality’s presentation in tactile experience is explained, in
part, by that quality inhering in the object perceived, then the object must possess
this quality prior to perception. There is a connection, then, between explanatory
priority and objectivity (this, I argue, is Aristotle’s view, Kalderon 2015). At least
with respect to grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception,
this perceptual realism is sustained by the force of the hand’s activity in conﬂict
with the self-maintaining forces of the object grasped. At the very least, the force
of the hand’s activity ensures that the tangible quality determined by the object’s
self-maintaining forces explains the hand’s conﬁguration and force and the haptic
experience these give rise to. Explaining how this may be so is the task of this
chapter and the next.
The model of perception that has emerged from our phenomenology of haptic
perception is realist and not at all relativist. Nevertheless, it remains apt to de-
scribe it as Protagorean, given the way that perception is the joint upshot of forces
in conﬂict. To highlight this consider the following. The Protagorean model, as
presently understood, is neither an extramission theory nor an intramission the-
ory. The distinction between extramission and intramission theories arises in the
historiography of perception (see, for example, Lindberg 1977, 3–67). The distinc-
tion is an historian’s classiﬁcation of accounts of perception. Very roughly, whereas
intramission theories emphasize the passive reception of the effects, from with-
out, of the object of perception, extramission theories emphasize, instead, outer-
directed activity, such as the emanation of a visual ray in Euclid’s geometrical op-
tics. This rough characterization of the distinction is incomplete but suffices to
mark the differences with the Protagorean model (a more complete characteri-
zation of extramission is given in chapter 5). The Protagorean model is not ade-
quately described as either extramissive or intramissive but contains elements of
each. The Protagorean model is neither extramissive nor intramissive, but is per-
haps better described as interactionist (for ancient interactionism see Squire 2016).
Like the extramission theory, the Protagorean model emphasizes outer-directed
activity of the perceiver in the disclosure of the object of perception. Like the
intramission theory, the Protagorean model emphasizes that not only does the
perceiver act, but that the perceiver is acted upon, as well. The perception of
what is there, prior to perception, is the joint upshot of forces in conﬂict. On the
Protagorean model, then, perception is determined by the interaction of the per-
ceiver and the object perceived and is thus more aptly deemed interactionist than
by either of the traditional categories of the historiography of perception.
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1.4 Assimilation
So far in our discussion of grasping or enclosure we have established at least one
claim about the metaphysics of sensory presentation, that sensory presentation is
of such a nature that its objects may be disclosed over time. Broad (1952) took
this dynamical aspect of sensory presentation to be conﬁned to haptic perception.
This is, at best, an exaggeration. If sounds and their sources, if not their audible
qualities such as pitch and timbre, are spread over time, then it is at least natural to
think that their presentation in auditory experience is itself disclosed over time.
Moreover, there is reason to think that the presentation in visual experience of
color qualities may itself be spread over time, at least some of the time. Thus as
Broackes observes:
in order to tell what colour an object is, we may try it out in a number
of different lighting environments. It is not that we are trying to get it
into one single ‘standard’ lighting condition, at which point it will, so
to speak, shine in its true colours. Rather, we are looking, in the way
it handles a variety of different illuminations (all of which are more or
less ‘normal’), for its constant capacity to modify light. (Broackes, 1997,
215)
And similar claims connecting color perception to activity with duration have been
made by Noë (2004) and Matthen (2005). Notice that perceived colors belong to
a distinct ontological category than sounds and their sources. Sounds and their
sources may be particulars like perceived colors, but whereas perceived colors are
quality instances, sounds and their sources are events or processes. This claim is
controversial. Further defence of it is given in chapters 3 and 4. For the moment,
however, let us suppose the controversial claim to be true, if only to observe a con-
sequence of it. Suppose that sounds and their sources that we hear are events or
processes whereas the colors that we see are quality instances, but that each may
be disclosed over time in our perceptual experience of them. So the fact that sen-
sory presentation is spread over time need not be a consequence of the temporal
mode of being of its object, as when a quality instance is disclosed over time. Thus
our phenomenological investigation into grasping understood as a mode of haptic
perception has made vivid at least one claim about the metaphysics of sensory pre-
sentation, that the presence of the object of perceptionmay be disclosed over time
in perceptual experience, that sensory presentation may have duration. Moreover,
this holds not only for the sensory presentation at work in haptic perception, but
plausibly, as well, for the sensory presentation at work in other sensory modalities
such as audition and vision.
Though a small claim about the metaphysics of sensory presentation, it has
signiﬁcant consequences. To take but one example, consider the claim that our
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ordinary experience of the natural environment is nothing more than a Grand Il-
lusion. When our hominid ancestor turns, and looks, and sees, they are seemingly
presented with a richly detailed scene of the alien obelisk set against a cloudy dawn
sky. And this is true of the experience of twenty-ﬁrst century humanity as well.
When we visually perceive something, we are seemingly presented with a richly
detailed scene. However, empirical research into change and inattentional blind-
ness has suggested to some psychologists and philosophers that this aspect of our
phenomenology is illusory (see, for example, Blackmore et al. 1995; Simons and
Chabris 1999). Our visual experience may present itself as the presentation of a
richly detailed scene, but, in fact, at any given moment, we are at best visually
presented with a detail of some fragment of that scene.
In at least some cases, the reasoning for the Grand Illusion hypothesis may be
resisted, for it seems to presuppose that experience only presents what could be
present at any given moment. But if perceptual experience may disclose its object
over time, then the claim that visual perception presents a richly detailed scene
is consistent with the claim that, at any given moment, visual perception at best
presents a fragment of that scene, so long as the richly detailed scene is understood
to be disclosed over time and not present at a moment. Some of the arguments,
then, if not all of them, for the Grand Illusion hypothesis turn on denying this
claim about the metaphysics of sensory presentation—that sensory presentation
may be a kind of disclosure with duration. (For recent relevant discussion see, inter
alia, Noë 2004, Campbell and Cassam 2014, 72–74)
Our ﬁrst claim about the metaphysics of sensory presentation involved a literal
feature of grasping or enclosure. Grasping is a mode of haptic perception, and the
presentation of its object is spread over time. That observation suffices to estab-
lish that sensory presentation may be a kind of disclosure with duration. Consider
now another feature of grasping or enclosure, that the grasping hand assimilates to
the rigid, solid body in its grasp. The hand’s assimilating to the overall shape and
volume of the object grasped is a manifestation, if not the source, of that haptic
perception’s objectivity. This, I suggested, is part of what makes grasping or en-
closure an apt metaphor for sensory presentation more generally. It is important
to get clearer about what this assimilation amounts to, and how it may be general-
ized, if assimilation is genuinely part of what makes grasping an apt metaphor for
sensory presentation.
Grasping, understood as a mode of haptic perception, is, like the variant meta-
phor, ingestion, a kind of incorporation. This can suggest that the mode of assimi-
lation is material—that it is a taking in, or incorporation, of a material body. Thus,
for example, in eating an olive, the matter of the olive is taken in and presented to
the organ of taste and thereby tasted. But while some forms of sensory perception
involvematerial assimilation such as tasting, not all do. Vision and audition involve
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the material assimilation of no thing. So if the assimilation at work in grasping or
enclosure is part of what makes it an apt metaphor for sensory presentation gen-
erally, it must be understood in some other way.
Perhaps, the assimilation at work in grasping or enclosure is notmerelymaterial
but formal. Whereasmaterial assimilation involves the taking in, or incorporation,
of a material body, formal assimilation involves the assimilation of nothing mate-
rial. Formal assimilation, instead, involves taking on the form, if not the matter, of
an object, by becoming like it, at least in some respect. In grasping or enclosure,
the hand formally assimilates to the contours of the object grasped. The interior
of the hand thus approximates to the overall shape of the object, and the volume
it encloses approximates to the object’s volume. The shape of the interior of the
hand is similar to the overall shape of the object, and the volume of the region
it encloses is similar to the volume of that object. Perhaps, in this way, the hand
assimilates the tangible form of the object grasped, by becoming like it. However,
while our hand may be warmed when feeling the warmth of an object, our eyes
do not become red when viewing a traditional English phone booth. Such a view,
however, has been attributed to Aristotle by Slakey (1961), Sorabji (1974), and Ev-
erson (1997). I have my doubts (Kalderon, 2015). Thus Theophrastus, Aristotle’s
student and successor at the Lyceum, in inquiring into his master’s deﬁnition of
perception as the assimilation of form without matter, similarly judged it absurd
if it is the sense organ that is meant to become like the object of perception, and
this prompted Theophrastus to understand Aristotle’s deﬁnition in some other
way, in a commentary now lost though reported by Priscian in Metaphrasis 1.3–8
and referred to by Themistius, In de anima 3 5 108. Regardless of how Aristotle is
best interpreted, if Theophrastus is right that it is absurd that the eye becomes red
in seeing a red thing, then formal assimilation can seem no better off than material
assimilation in this regard.
However, this latter problem for assimilation understood formally, if not ma-
terially, may be avoided by means of a small generalization. In grasping an object,
where is the overall shape and volume that you feel? If grasping is a mode of haptic
perception, then surely they are in the object that you grasp. Now, where is your
haptic experience of that object? In your head? That answer seems so implausible
on its face that only a philosopher could believe it. If anywhere, it seems more
reasonable to suppose, at least initially, that it is closer to where the overall shape
and volume are felt, in your handling of the object. Perhaps in trying to come to an
understanding of formal assimilation at work in grasping or enclosure that may be
generalized to other sensorymodalities, we focussed too closely on the shape of the
interior of the hand and the volume it encloses. If our haptic experience is where
we handle the object grasped, perhaps the similarity obtains not only between the
hand and certain tangible qualities of the object, but between the haptic experi-
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ence that the hand’s activity gives rise to and the tangible qualities presented in
it. Haptic experience, like perceptual experience more generally, has a conscious
qualitative character. Perhaps, in grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of
haptic perception, the phenomenological character of haptic experience formally
assimilates to the tangible qualities presented in it. And, arguably at least, this fea-
ture, suitably qualiﬁed, is generalizable to other sensory modalities as well—that in
sensory perception quite generally, the phenomenological character of perceptual
experience formally assimilates to the object presented in it.
Before considering whether that generalization partly grounds the aptness of
grasping or enclosure as a metaphor for sensory presentation, even for non-tactile
modes of perceptual awareness such as vision and audition, let us look closer at
formal assimilation at work in haptic perception. Earlier we noted that haptic
perception, like perception generally, is partial. The partial character of grasping,
understood as a mode of haptic perception, explained the tendency, observed by
Lederman and Klatzky (1987), for the perceiver to shift the object of haptic ex-
ploration periodically in their hands. Such behavior compensates for the partial
and imperfect disclosure of the overall shape and volume of the object grasped.
Successive grips and the manner in which the object moves in one’s hands provide
a more complete proﬁle of the corporeal aspects of the object under investiga-
tion. If the successive grips disclose different aspects of the object’s overall shape
and volume, then they provide something like different haptic perspectives on the
object grasped.
While talk of “perspective” derives from the case of vision, a clear analogue of
that notion ﬁnds application in the haptic case. To the extent that it does, then
talk of “haptic perspective”, while in a sense visuocentric, is not pejoratively so (on
visuocentrism in philosophy of perception see O’Callaghan 2007, for the critique
of “occularcentrism” in twentieth century French thought see Jay 1994).
To appreciate this, let us ﬁrst get clearer on some salient features of visual per-
spective. Our hominid ancestor, looking up from the skeletal remains of the tapir,
sees the alien obelisk. In seeing the obelisk, our hominid ancestor has a perspec-
tive on it. Their perspective occurs in a space that encompasses the object seen,
the alien obelisk. The space is extrapersonal. It is also ego-centrically structured.
Thus, from our hominid ancestor’s perspective, there are things to the left of the
alien obelisk and to the right of it. At least for things that exist independently of
our awareness of them, such as the obelisk, multiple perspectives on it are possi-
ble. (This is part of the reason we cannot have a perspective on a headache or a
phosphene.) For there to be multiple perspectives on a thing, not only is it neces-
sary that it should exist independently of our awareness, but it should be complex
as opposed to simple. Importantly, more or less of an object may be disclosed in
the multiple perspectives on it. Perspectives can reveal things to the perceiver’s
1.4. ASSIMILATION 17
view, but they can equally obscure things. That aspect of the alien obelisk that is
presented to our hominid ancestor’s perspective is hidden from view from another
perspective, when viewed from behind, say. So not only can we have multiple per-
spectives on things that are independent of our awareness of them, but perspec-
tives can reveal what was potentially hidden from view. Compelled by curiosity,
our hominid ancestor approaches the alien obelisk and cautiously moves around it.
In so doing, the obelisk is presented to different perspectives on it adopted by our
hominid ancestor in their cursory investigation. There are better and worse per-
spectives on the obelisk. Our hominid ancestor initially approaches to the obelisk
to get a better view. Moreover, the obelisk appears different, when presented to
these different perspectives, though our hominid ancestor can perceive the con-
stant unaltered obelisk that persists in their experience of it despite these variable
appearances.
All of these features ﬁnd analogues in the haptic case. There will be differences,
of course, but enough of a pattern may be found that warrants talk of haptic per-
spectives. Just as visual perspectives occur in an ego-centrically structured space,
haptic perspectives occur in an ego-centrically structured space. Though, as we
shall see, while, visual perspectives occur in an extrapersonal space, haptic per-
spectives occur in a peripersonal space. Just as there are multiple perspectives on
complex visible objects that are independent of our visual awareness of them, there
are multiple perspectives on complex tangible objects that are independent of our
haptic awareness of them. Moreover, like visual perspectives, haptic perspectives
may disclose aspects of a thing’s corporeal nature hidden from other haptic per-
spectives. Just as there are better and worse perspectives on the visible features
of things, there are better and worse haptic perspectives on the tangible features
of the object of haptic investigation. And a perceiver’s haptic perspective on the
object of haptic investigation is manifest in its haptic appearance. A body will feel
differently when presented to different haptic perspectives.
Suppose a rigid, solid body is irregularly shaped, then it potentially feels dif-
ferent in successive grips. And in the case of contour following, different paths
may be followed, and at different rates, giving rise to different progressions of
intensive sensation, themselves constituting different haptic perspectives on the
constant contour of the object of haptic investigation. In a part motion test on
a set of keys, the perceiver may pick up a single key and move it to the left or to
the right. They may even lift it straight up and jiggle the keys thus performing
a speciﬁc function test. And we may pinch, squeeze, and pull on the object of
haptic investigation and these distinct activities provide us with distinct haptic
perspectives on that object.
Like visual perspective, haptic perspective occurs in an ego-centrically struc-
tured space. However, whereas visual perspective presents visible aspects of ex-
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trapersonal space, haptic perspective presents tangible aspects of peripersonal space.
(Deleuze’s and Guattari’s 1987, chapter 14 discussion of smooth and striated space
makes an interesting comparison here.) Peripersonal space is the space within
which the perceiver may immediately act with their limbs. The representation of
peripersonal space is thus linked with our motor capacity and our sense of agency.
There is some evidence that human psychology operates with a representation of
peripersonal space distinct from a representation of extrapersonal space (Halligan
and Marshall, 1991). Grasping, contour following, part motion and speciﬁc func-
tion tests are all activities taking place in peripersonal space. So distinct haptic
activities that constitute distinct haptic perspectives on the object under investi-
gation occur in an ego-centrically structured peripersonal space. (See, for exam-
ple, Benedetti’s 1985 explanation of the Aristotle Illusion—so called, because it
was ﬁrst described by Aristotle inMetaphysica  6 and De Insomniis 2—from which
Benedetti 1985, 524 concludes that “tactile stimuli are located in the body refer-
ence system according to the only available kinesthetic information, namely, the
limit of the ﬁngers’ range of action”.) Like visual perspectives on objects that exist
independently of our visual awareness of them, there are multiple haptic perspec-
tives on objects that exist independently of our haptic awareness of them. That
is to say that there are multiple ways to interact with the object of haptic inves-
tigation in peripersonal space. Moreover, different events in peripersonal space,
different haptic interactions with the external body, disclose different tangible
aspects of that body. So the haptic activities occurring in an ego-centrically struc-
tured peripersonal space can disclose previously hidden aspects of the object of
haptic investigation. As we have seen, different sterotypical exploratory activities
occurring in peripersonal space are suited to presenting different ranges of tangible
qualities. Moreover, different stereotypical exploratory activities may determine
the same tangible quality though with different tactile acuity. There are thus bet-
ter and worse haptic perspectives on the tangible features of things. Moreover,
different haptic perspectives, different ways of interacting with the object of hap-
tic investigation in peripersonal space, give rise to different haptic appearances of
the same object. A body may be experienced as retaining its overall shape and
volume throughout the perceiver’s handling of it, but it feels different in different
grips.
This perspectival relativity bears on our understanding of the formal assimi-
lation at work in grasping understood as a mode of haptic perception. In haptic
perception, the tangible qualities of the object are presented to the perceiver’s
haptic perspective on that object—the distinctive way they are handling that ob-
ject in the given circumstances—and this is reﬂected in the conscious character
of their haptic experience. So with respect to grasping or enclosure understood
as a mode of haptic perception, the doctrine of formal assimilation should be un-
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derstood as the claim that the phenomenological character of haptic experience
formally assimilates to the tangible qualities presented to the perceiver’s haptic
perspective. Naïve realists and disjunctivists accept something like this view if
not the Peripatetic vocabulary with which I have described it. Thus naïve realists
and disjunctivists are prone to speak of the phenomenological character of percep-
tual experience being shaped by the object as presented to the perceiver’s partial
perspective (seeMcDowell 1998; Martin 2004; Fish 2009; Kalderon 2011c; see also
Nagel’s 1979 conception of perceptual experience as contrasted with Jackson 1982).
It might be objected that haptic experience formally assimilating to the tan-
gible qualities presented in it is absurd on its face. Perhaps in grasping a cube,
my hand will approximate to a cube shape, but is it really the case that my expe-
rience is cube shaped, even approximately? The claim that in seeing an English
phone booth my visual experience becomes red seems even worse than the view
literalists attribute to Aristotle, that in seeing the phone booth my eye becomes
red. What does it even mean for an experience to be cubical or red? A point that
Theophrastus also makes (Priscian, Metaphrasis 1.3–8). Although, something like
this conclusion was embraced by William Crathorn in his commentary on Lom-
bard’s Sentences: “A soul seeing and intellectively cognizing color is truly colored,”
(Quaestiones super librum Sententiarum q. 1 concl. 7 Pasnau 2002, 288); thus prompting
Robert Holcot to compare the soul, as Crathorn conceived of it, to a chameleon
(see Pasnau 1997, chapter 1.1 for discussion).
It is important in this regard to recognize that the posited similarity need not
be exact. It is only on that assumption that the similarity involved in formal assim-
ilation involves the sharing of qualities. But if we abandon that assumption, then
there is a clear sense in which, in color vision say, in seeing the phone booth, the
conscious qualitative character of my color experience depends upon and derives
from the qualitative character of the color presented in that experience relative to
my perspective on it in the circumstances of perception (for defense of this claim
see Kalderon 2008, 2011a,c). And similarly we might say that in haptic perception,
the conscious qualitative character of haptic experience depends upon and derives
from the tangible qualities present in that experience relative to the perceiver’s
perspective on the object of haptic investigation, the distinctive way that they are
handling it in the circumstances of perception.
Consider again the claim that haptic experience only formally assimilates to
the tangible object it presents relative to the perceiver’s haptic perspective. The
perspectival relativity of formal assimilation bears on the inexactness of the sim-
ilarity between experience and its object. The assimilation is formal in that, not
only the shape of the interior of the hand and the region it encloses is similar to
the overall shape and volume of the object, but the haptic experience, its conscious
qualitative character, is similar to the tangible object at least as it is presented to
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the perceiver’s haptic perspective. However, this does not require that the simi-
larity be exact. The perspective relativity of formal assimilation nicely brings this
out. Thus an irregularly-shaped, rigid, solid body, thanks to the self-maintaining
forces that constitute the categorical bases of its rigidity and solidity, maintains
its overall shape and volume despite progressive handling and the successive grips
with which it is held. But that same shape feels different with different grips. If
the phenomenological character of haptic experience were wholly determined by
the tangible qualities presented in it, then we would be hard pressed to explain
why this should be so.
Earlier I claimed that the partiality of haptic perception only explained the
tendency, observed by Lederman and Klatzky (1987), for the perceiver to period-
ically shift the object in their hands if the haptic experience this behavior gives
rise to exhibits perceptual constancy. One of the philosophical challenges posed
by perceptual constancy is to adequately describe and explain the phenomenology
of stability and ﬂux. In cases of perceptual constancy, a constant unaltered object
of perception is presented though its appearance varies. In explaining perceptual
constancy, it is not enough to determine the constant object of perception. That
object continues to present itself unchanged even though its appearance may vary
with a change in the perceiver’s perspective or circumstances of perception. In de-
termining only the constant object of perception, one explains the phenomenol-
ogy of stability at the expense of the contribution to our phenomenology of ﬂux
(for discussion in the color case, see Cohen 2008; Hilbert 2005; perhaps Fulker-
son 2014, 98, falls prey to this error in his account of haptic perceptual constancy,
chapter 2.2). Even if, in the case of grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of
haptic perception, we attend only to the constant overall shape and volume of the
object grasped, these feel differently in different successive grips. Accommodating
the contribution of ﬂux to our phenomenology of grasping or enclosure requires
acknowledging that haptic presentation, like sensory presentation more generally,
is perspective relative.
Haptic experience formally assimilates to its object, relative to the perceiver’s
haptic perspective on it, the distinctive way that they are handling that object in
the circumstances of perception. Suppose that this feature of haptic perception
generalizes to other modes of perception—that, in general, perceptual experience
formally assimilates to its object, relative to the perceiver’s partial perspective. The
resulting conception of perception would be, to that extent at least, anti-modern.
One fundamental feature of the early modern conception of perception is the de-
nial of the formal assimilation of perception to its object, even relative to the per-
ceiver’s partial perspective. For at least with respect to, in Peripatetic vocabulary,
the proper objects of perception, there is nothing in the external object that re-
sembles the perceiver’s perceptual experience of it. Secondary qualities are the
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eighteenth-century avatar of Aristotelian proper objects. And there was some-
thing like an early modern consensus that there is nothing in the external object
that resembles our experience of secondary qualities. That is one of the lessons
that Descartes draws, in LaDioptrique, from the Stoic analogy between a perceiver
and a blind man with a stick and, in the SecondMeditation, from the wax argument.
And it is a lesson preserved by Locke. Though aspects of external objects may be
found to resemble our experience of their primary qualities, nothing in such ob-
jects resembles our experience of their secondary qualities. On the early modern
conception of perceptual experience, there is nothing in the obelisk that resembles
our hominid ancestor’s idea or sensation of its blackness. And if there is nothing
in the obelisk that resembles our hominid ancestor’s idea or sensation of its black-
ness, then their perception of its blackness could not consist in their perceptual
experience formally assimilating to its object, even relative to their perspective on
it. There is nothing to formally assimilate to, and, hence, no formal assimilation
to constitute the perception. And if secondary quality perception cannot be un-
derstood as a mode of formal assimilation, then sensory presentation, generally,
cannot be understood as essentially involving the perceiver’s experience formally
assimilating to its object, relative to their partial perspective on it in the circum-
stances of perception.
1.5 Shaping
So far we have distinguished material and formal modes of assimilation, and have
suggested that while grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic percep-
tion, involves material assimilation—it is a kind of incorporation—, its objectivity
is connected to the way in which the hand and haptic experience more generally
formally assimilates to its object. Moreover, we have emphasized the way that the
similarity involved in formal assimilation need not be exact so as to involve the
sharing of qualities. And we have explained how the inexact similarity is related
to the formal assimilation’s perspectival relativity. We now turn to another impor-
tant distinction. Consider Lederman’s and Klatzky’s (1987) claim that that grasp-
ing or enclosure involves molding one’s hand to the contours of the object grasped.
Molding is a kind of shaping. And there are causal and constitutive senses of shap-
ing that can be distinguished. Correspondingly, there are causal and constitutive
explanations of perception’s formal assimilation to its object.
So consider theway that theNazi air campaign shaped the London skyline. The
destructive impact of the bombing caused the London skyline to be shaped in a
certain way. This contrasts sharply with the way that St Paul’s shapes the London
skyline, as Herbert Mason’s iconic photograph of 29 December 1940 dramatically
demonstrates. St Paul’s deﬁantly shapes the London skyline by being part of it
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despite the devastating impact of the bombing campaign. Whereas Nazi bombing
shaped the London skyline in a merely causal sense, St Paul’s constitutively shapes
that skyline by being a part or contour of it.
The causal–constitutive distinction plays out, I believe, in the use that Aristotle
makes of Plato’s wax analogy from the Theaetetus. Plato, in the Theaetetus, appeals
to an impression made on wax as an analogy for the operation of memory in the
context of explaining how error in judgment is possible:
We may look upon it, then, as a gift of Memory, the mother of the
Muses. We make impressions upon this of everything we wish to re-
member among the things we have seen or heard or thought of our-
selves; we hold the wax under our perceptions and thoughts and take
a stamp from them, in the way in which we take the imprints of signet
rings. Whatever is impressed upon the wax we remember and know so
long as the image remains in the wax; whatever is obliterated or can-
not be impressed, we forget and do not know. (Plato, Theaetetus 191
d–e, Levett and Burnyeat in Cooper 1997, 212)
In De anima, Aristotle uses the wax analogy, not for memory and knowledge as
Plato does, but for explaining his deﬁnition of perception as the assimilation of
the sensible form without the matter of the perceived particular:
Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the
power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the
matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a
signet-ring without the iron or gold. (Aristotle, De anima 2 12 424a18–
23; Smith in Barnes 1984, 42–43)
Part of the point of using Plato’s wax analogy, not formemory or knowledge, but for
perception is to highlight that Aristotle is assigning to perception functions that
Plato assigned only to reason. (For discussion of how far Aristotle departs from
Plato in drawing the distinction between perception and cognition see Sorabji 1971,
2003.) There is a further, and for present purposes, more important way in which
Aristotle departs from Plato’s use of the wax analogy. There is a sense in which he
takes the signet ring in the analogy more seriously than Plato. Or rather, Aristotle
takes seriously, in a way that Plato does not, the distinctive discursive role of signet
rings as opposed to a stylus, say. Moreover, this makes a difference to how the
shaping of the wax by the ring is to be understood. Whereas Plato has in mind
a causal notion of shaping, Aristotle has in mind the constitutive notion (or at
least, so I argue Kalderon 2015, chapter 9). Plato’s explanation of the reliability of
memory crucially relies on causal features of the situation. An object’s impression
is the effect it has on the mind’s wax. So the operation of peoples’ memories may
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vary as to how hard or soft their mind’s wax is, or how pure or impure it is, since
these features causally bear on how clear an impression the object will produce and
how long it may persist in the mind’s wax.
If, however, we reﬂect on the distinctive discursive role of a signet ring over a
stylus, say, this canmotivate the alternative, constitutive understanding of shaping.
Notice that the impression of a signet ring plays a similar role to a signature. Thus
Caston writes:
A signet produces a sealing, an impression that establishes the identity
of its owner and consequently his authority, rights, and prerogatives.
When a sealing is placed on a document, especially for legal or offi-
cial use, it authorizes the claims, obligations, promises, or orders made
therein. A sealing thus differs from other impressions in that it pur-
ports to originate from a particular signet. The wax thus receives the ‘golden
or brazen signet’ … which is representative of the office or person to
whom the signet belongs. (Caston, 2005, 302)
Signet rings and styli thus have distinctive discursive roles. The impression made
by a stylus is not linked to its legitimate possessor—one scribe may borrow another
scribe’s stylus—the way an impression sealed by a signet ring is.
Taking this feature of the analogy seriously has an important consequence for
how sensory impressions are individuated. Just as a forged signature is not my sig-
nature, an impression sealed by a forged ring, or by a stolen ring, is not the seal
of the ring’s legitimate possessor. Impressions are individuated by their legitimate
sources. If this feature of the analogy carries over, then perceptions, conceived on
the model of sealed impressions, are individuated by their objects which are their
source. A perception of Castor and a perception of Pollux are different percep-
tions, no matter how closely the twins may resemble one another. Castor may be
a perfect duplicate of Pollux, but my impression of Castor is not an impression
of Pollux. If I grasp his hand, it is Castor’s hand I grasp, not Pollux’s. My tactile
impression of Castor is not thereby an tactile impression of Pollux, even if they
feel the same.
Notice that a causal understanding of sensory impressions, as merely the ef-
fects of causal shaping, does not have this consequence. If, as Hume maintained,
cause and effect are contingently connected, the same effect, the same impression,
could have been produced by a different cause. Sensory impressions, understood
as the effects of causal shaping, are not individuated by their causes. If sensory
impressions are individuated by their objects which are their sources, they cannot
be understood as merely the effects of causal shaping.
What taking seriously the distinctive discursive role of the signet ring in the
wax analogy brings out is that the formal assimilation at work in haptic perception
and, arguably at least, in perception more generally, might be understood, not on
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the model of causal shaping, but rather on the model of constitutive shaping. If
sensory impressions are individuated by their objects, perhaps these objects shape
sensory consciousness not causally, or at least not merely. Perhaps in being indi-
viduated by their objects, these objects constitutively shape our sensory impres-
sions of them (for contemporary discussion of this suggestion see Kalderon 2008,
2011a,c). Recall that the assimilation at work in grasping or enclosure understood
as a mode of haptic perception is formal in that, not only the shape of the interior
of the hand and the region it encloses is similar to the overall shape and volume of
the object grasped, but that the haptic experience, its conscious qualitative char-
acter, is similar to the tangible object at least as it is presented to the perceiver’s
haptic perspective. On the causal model, a haptic experience, with its conscious
qualitative character, is a sensory impression caused in a perceiver with an appro-
priate sensibility by the object of haptic investigation. Moreover, if the causal
structure of the world cooperates and the circumstances of perception are propi-
tious, then the conscious qualitative character of the haptic experiencemay be like,
if not exactly like, the qualitative character of the tangible object. (Locke thinks
something like this about primary quality perception.) On the constitutive model,
haptic experience formally assimilates to its tangible object as well. However, that
object does not merely cause the perceiver to undergo a haptic experience with
a certain conscious qualitative character. Rather, corporeal aspects of the object
constitutively shape the perceiver’s haptic experience of it. Not only does the per-
ceiver’s haptic experience formally assimilate to its tangible object relative to their
haptic perspective, in the sense that the conscious qualitative character of the ex-
perience is like, if not exactly like, the qualitative character of the tangible object
present in it, but the tangible quality present in their haptic experience consti-
tutively shapes that experience. The conscious qualitative character of the haptic
experience depends upon and derives from, at least in part, the tangible qualitative
character of object had prior to haptic investigation. If something feels metallic,
and this is a case of tactile perception, then not only is this because of its metallic
feel, but something’s feeling metallic is also constituted, in part, by that metallic
feel. The metallic feel of the thing is felt in it and in conformity with it. That is
just what it is for something to be present in tactile experience.
In grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, the hand
maintains simultaneous contact with as much of the overall surface of the object as
possible. Grasping is a kind of incorporation, and thus a material mode of assimi-
lation. Moreover, in grasping, the hand is so conﬁgured that it approximates to the
contours of the object. Just as the shape of the interior of the hand and the region
it encloses is like, if not exactly like, the overall shape and volume of the object
grasped, the phenomenological character of the haptic experience, its conscious
qualitative character, is like, if not exactly like the overall shape and volume pre-
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sented to the perceiver’s haptic perspective, the particular way they are handling
the object. Moreover, the shaping involved, at least in the latter formal assimila-
tion, is not merely causal but constitutive. The conscious qualitative character of
the haptic experience is constituted, in part, by the tangible qualities presented to
their haptic perspective.
While not all modes of perception involve material modes of assimilation, ar-
guably at least, the formal assimilation of haptic experience to its object relative to
the perceiver’s haptic perspective generalizes to other modes of perception. The
conscious qualitative character of perceptual experience is constituted, in part, by
the qualitative character of the object presented to the perceiver’s partial perspec-
tive. Our hominid ancestor turns, and looks, and sees the alien obelisk set against a
cloudy dawn sky. The blackness of the obelisk is a constituent of their visual expe-
rience. The blackness of the obelisk is a constituent of their experience insofar as
that experience involves the presentation of that blackness in the visual awareness
afforded them by their experience of that scene. And since the experience of our
hominid ancestor is constitutively linked to the blackness of the alien obelisk—
an awful darkness in which stars may appear—the obelisk’s blackness shapes the
contours of their visual consciousness by being present in that consciousness. The
blackness of the obelisk shapes the contours of their visual experience in the way
that St Paul’s deﬁantly shapes the London skyline, the Shard notwithstanding, sim-
ply by being present.
If this feature of grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic percep-
tion, generalizes to other modes of perception, then it is easy to see its epistemic
signiﬁcance. If perception involves becoming like the perceived object actually is,
then it is a genuine mode of awareness. One can only perceptually assimilate what
is there to be assimilated. If perceptual experience is a formal mode of assimi-
lation understood as a kind of constitutive shaping, then one could not undergo
such an experience consistent with a Cartesian demon eliminating the object of
that experience. If there is no external object, then there is nothing to which the
perceiver, or perhaps their experience, can assimilate to. If the phenomenologi-
cal character of perception is constitutively shaped by the object presented to the
perceiver’s partial perspective, then we can begin to see the epistemic signiﬁcance
of perceptual phenomenology. If the phenomenological character of perception is
constitutively shaped by the object presented to the perceiver’s partial perspective,
then it is the grounds for an epistemic warrant for the range of propositions whose
truth turns on what is presented in that perceptual experience (see chapter 6.2).
Earlier, in section 1.2, I claimed that the effort exerted in more precisely mold-
ing one’s hand against the contours of the object grasped was not yet proof against
a Cartesian demon. How is this consistent with what is now being claimed? No-
tice the earlier claim was essentially a claim about the hand’s formal assimilation
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to the object of haptic investigation in grasping or enclosure. What is distinctive
about modern skepticism is that it counts the perceiver’s body as an aspect of the
external world and so doubts about the external world comprise the body as well.
As Burnyeat (1982) argues, skeptical doubts about the existence of our bodies was
not so much as entertained in the ancient world. So the felt force of one’s hand in
molding to the contours of the object grasped is no proof against a Cartesian de-
mon since the hand falls within the scope of the external world and thus is cast into
doubt by the demon hypothesis. (The rhetorical genius of Moore’s 1903 example,
“This is a hand”, turns precisely on this point or, rather, precisely calls this point
into question.) However, the present discussion is not about the hand’s formal as-
similation to the object of haptic perception, but about the formal assimilation of
the haptic experience, that the hand’s activity gives rise to, to the object presented
in it. Haptic experience, and conscious experience more generally, is not within
the purview of the skeptical doubt licensed by the demon hypothesis. But if hap-
tic experience is constituted, even in part, by tangible aspects of an external body,
then haptic experience contains within itself tangible aspects of the external body,
so there is no room for the possibility of eliminating that body while leaving expe-
rience as it is. Just as the hand incorporates its object in grasping or enclosure, the
haptic experience that this activity gives rise to is itself a kind of incorporation, in
a different, metaphorical, and anti-Cartesian sense.
Haptic experience is a kind of incorporation, in the metaphorical sense, insofar
as its formal assimilation to its object, relative to the perceiver’s haptic perspec-
tive, is understood on the model of constitutive shaping. If haptic experience is,
in this way, a kind of incorporation, the resulting conception of experience is anti-
modern. Descartes, by contrast, models sensory experience on bodily sensations,
such as tickles and pains (LeMonde deM.Descartes ou le Traité de la Lumière, chapter 1).
Tickles and pains, as conceived by Descartes, are not incorporations of the extra-
somatic so much as conscious modiﬁcations of the perceiving subject that do not
resemble their external causes. What in the feather resembles the tickle that it
prompts? Indeed, it is the conception of sense experience as a conscious modi-
ﬁcation of the perceiving subject that generates the possibility that the external
cause of sense experience may fail to resemble it. However if haptic experience
is a kind of incorporation, in the sense that the formal assimilation of haptic ex-
perience to its object, relative to the perceiver’s haptic perspective, is the result
of constitutive shaping, then it is not a conscious modiﬁcation of the perceiving
subject, at least not in Descartes’ sense. Vestigial remnants of this conception are
the Cartesian core of what Putnam called “Cartesianism cum materialism”. (For a
staunch defence of this Cartesian core see Farkas 2008.) If haptic perception must
be understood in some other way, and is an exemplar of perception more generally,
then this aspect of the early modern paradigm must also be rejected.
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If the formal assimilation involved in haptic perception is the result of consti-
tutive shaping, then the resulting anti-modern conception of experience does not
allow for the possibility of a demon eliminating the object of the perceiver’s ex-
perience while leaving that experience just as it is. Nevertheless, the anti-modern
conception of experience is not, by itself, sufficient to refute skepticism. For skep-
tical worriesmay be posed in terms of non-perceptual experiences that appear from
within just like the corresponding perceptual experience, consistent with percep-
tual experiences being constitutively shaped by their objects (chapter 6.2).
1.6 ActiveWax
I have claimed that the assimilation at work in grasping or enclosure, understood
as amode of haptic perception, is themanifestation, if not the source, of the objec-
tivity of haptic perception. I have also claimed this is part of what makes grasping
an apt metaphor for sensory presentation more generally. We are now in a position
to elaborate further. Not only does the grasping hand assimilate to the contours of
the object, but the perceiver’s haptic experience—there where they are handling
the object—assimilates to the overall shape and volume of the object as well, at
least relative to their haptic perspective on it, the speciﬁc manner in which they
are handling the object. But one can only assimilate to what is there to be as-
similated. The objectivity of haptic perception is thereby manifested. And if this
formal assimilation, understood on the model of constitutive shaping, generalizes
to other modes of perception, then part of what makes grasping an apt metaphor
for perception generally is our consequent understanding of perceptual objectivity.
The formal assimilation of haptic experience to its object relative to the perceiver’s
handling of it, the constitutive shaping of the phenomenological character of that
experience by the presentation of its object to the perceiver’s haptic perspective,
is the manifestation of the objectivity of that haptic perception. But what is its
source? What explains haptic experience assimilating to its object? If we bear in
mind that haptic experience is where the perceiver is handling the object, then a
plausible thought is that it is the force of the hand’s activity, the effort exerted in
more precisely molding the hand to the contours of the object, that is the source
of the hand, and consequently our haptic experience, assimilating to its object.
Objective haptic perception is an experience sustained by the hand’s activity.
While the assimilation of haptic experience to its object, relative to the per-
ceiver’s haptic perspective, is the manifestation of the objectivity of haptic percep-
tion, it is the force of the hand’s activity that is its source. It is because the hand
tightens its grip that it’s ﬂexible interior surface may more precisely mold to the
object’s contours. Molding more precisely to the object’s contours ensures that
those contours explain the hand’s conﬁguration and force. And in molding more
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precisely to the object’s contours, the haptic experience this activity gives rise to
formally assimilates to its constituent object.
Robert Kilwardby provides a vitalist twist on the Peripatetic analogy that po-
tentially sheds light on the epistemic signiﬁcance of the force of the hand’s ac-
tivity in grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception. (On
Kilwardby on perception see Silva 2008; Silva and Toivanen 2010; Silva 2012.) Kil-
wardby composed De spiritu fantastico sive de recptione specierum most likely while in
Blackfriars in Oxford in the 1250s prior to being elevated to the Archbishop of
Canterbury. In a remarkable passage, Kilwardby writes:
if you place a seal before wax so that it touches it, and you assume
that the wax has a life by which it turns itself towards the seal and by
striking against it comes to be like it, by turning its eye upon itself it
sees in itself an image of the seal. (Kilwardby, De spiritu fantastico 103,
Broadie 1993, 94)
Kilwardby transform’s the Peripatetic analogy by imagining life to inhere in the
wax so that it is actively pressing against the seal and so taking its sensible form
upon itself. (Kilwardby’s image of active wax will be echoed by Peter John Olivi,
perhaps independently of Kilwardby, in Quaestiones in secondum librum Sententiarum q.
58 415–16, 506–7; q. 72 35–6.)
Kilwardby’s account is motivated, in no small part, by his conviction, grounded
in his reading of Augustine, that the soul cannot be acted upon by the body (De
spiritu fantastico 47–54, on Augustine’s philosophy of mind see O’Daly 1987, on Au-
gustine’s inﬂuence on Kilwardby see Silva and Toivanen 2010). It is a consequence
of the soul’s ontological superiority over the corporeal that the latter may never
act upon the former. Kilwardby tentatively accepts a Peripatetic model where, in
vision, say, the perceived object acts upon the transparent medium such that its
image (its likeness, in Scholastic terminology, its species) exists, in some sense, in
it, and that the medium, in turn, affects the sense organ such that the image comes
to, in some sense, exist in it as well (De spiritu fantastico 69, 97). But how does the
sensory soul receive the image that informs the sense organ, if the sense organ is
precluded, by its corporeal nature, from acting upon the soul?
The vitalist twist on the Peripatetic analogy is meant to address this problem.
The sensory soul pervades the sense organ, and animates it, and in so doing makes
itself like the external body. So it is the sensory soul that is the efficient cause of the
likeness of the body occurring in it. The sensory soul makes itself like the external
body by pressing against the sense organ that it animates itself impressed with
the image of the object. In actively pressing against the impressed sense organ,
the soul makes within itself the image of the external body: “For in this way the
sensory soul, by turning itself more attentively to its sense organ which has been
informed by a sensible species, makes itself like the species, and by turning its own
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eye upon itself it sees that it is like the species” (De spiritu fantastico 103, Broadie
1993, 94).
What does the metaphor of the sensory soul pressing against the impressed
sense organ mean? Sense can be made of it in terms of Kilwardby’s doctrine that
the soul’s use of a body is limited by the passivities of matter (De spiritu fantastico
99–100). So a feather striking a tapir’s skull will not break it, but a femur will, even
if it is the same hominid striking the skull with equivalent musculature exertion in
each instance. The difference is due to the way in which the activity of the agent
is limited by the passivities of matter inhering in the body that is being used. A
species inhering in a sense organ is among the passivities of matter exhibited by
that corporeal body. And Kilwardby explains the soul’s assimilation of the sensible
form of the perceived object in terms of how the species inhering in the sense
organ limits the sensory soul’s use of it (Kilwardby De spiritu fantastico 103).
It is not clear whether the subsequent account constitutes a genuine reconcili-
ation of Augustinian and Peripatetic metaphysics (for discussion of Kilwardby on
perception see Silva 2008; Silva and Toivanen 2010; Silva 2012, chapter 4; selec-
tions from De spiritu fantastico are also translated in Knuuttila and Sihvola 2014).
Regardless of Kilwardby’s intent, however, and dropping his Augustinian dualism,
the hand, the mobile and elastic instrument of haptic exploration, is the active
wax in grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception. It is the
hand that is actively molding itself to the object in grasping or enclosure. And it is
the hand that is thereby taking upon itself a conﬁguration and enclosing a certain
volume determined by the overall shape and volume of the object grasped. And it
is these activities of the hand that gives rise to the perceiver’s haptic experience.
In making an effort to mold more precisely to the contours of the rigid, solid body,
not only does the hand assimilate to the contours of the object grasped, but the
perceiver’s haptic experience—there where the perceiver is handling the object—
assimilates to the overall shape and volume of the object presented in it.
Further, I take it that it is at least part of Kilwardby’s suggestion that it is the
activity of the wax and the resistance it encounters in pressing against the seal—
the passivities of matter that limits its activity—that discloses the shape of the seal
had prior to perception. So if the hand is the active wax in grasping, understood as
a mode of haptic perception, then it is the force of the hand’s activity and the resis-
tance it encounters in maintaining simultaneous contact with a non-insigniﬁcant
portion of the object’s overall surface that discloses the tangible qualities of the ob-
ject had prior to that haptic encounter. Kilwardby’s suggestion, then,—if released
from the conﬁnes of Augustinian metaphysics, if, in turn, narrowly conﬁned to
haptic presentation—is that the presentation of tangible qualities of objects ex-
ternal to the perceiver’s body is due, at least in part, to the activity of the hand in
grasping and the felt resistance it encounters. The hand, and haptic experience in
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turn, only assimilate to the tangible aspects of the rigid, solid body thanks to the
force of the hand’s activity in conﬂict with the self-maintaining forces that consti-
tute the categorical bases of that body’s solidity and rigidity. At least with grasping
or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, perceptual realism is sus-
tained by the force of the hand’s activity in conﬂict with the self-maintaining forces
of the object grasped. It is only in this way is it ensured that the tangible quali-
ties determined by the self-maintaining forces of the object grasped explains the
conﬁguration and force of the grasping hand.
1.7 A Puzzle
In discussing the objectivity of grasping, understood as a mode of haptic percep-
tion, we supposed that it is our hand’s conﬁguration in grasping and the force that
needs to be exerted in maintaining that conﬁguration that discloses the overall
shape and volume of the object grasped. The hand is, in this way, the active wax
in haptic perception. I believe this supposition to be both plausible and true, but
once it is clearly stated, a puzzle immediately arises.
Embodiment is a fundamental feature of animal existence and so a fundamental
feature of the existence of primates like ourselves. So much so, that many philoso-
phers take animality to be the key to our very identity (for a recent statement see
Snowdon 2014). An animal’s awareness of its body is a mode of self-presentation.
There may be more to an animal than is revealed in bodily awareness, but bodily
awareness nevertheless presents corporeal aspects of the animal whose awareness
it is. Bodily awareness remains a mode of self-presentation even if its disclosure
of the animal whose awareness it is is partial in this way. Let bodily awareness be
understood broadly enough to comprise both proprioception and kinesthesis and
potentially more besides. So bodily awareness affords the perceiver with, among
other things, awareness of the conﬁguration of their limbs as well as awareness
of their motion. So understood, awareness of the hand’s conﬁguration in grasp-
ing and awareness of the force that needs to be exerted in maintaining that grasp
are both modes of bodily awareness. And since bodily awareness is a kind of self-
presentation, so are awareness of the hand’s conﬁguration and awareness of the
force exerted in maintaining it.
Our puzzle now is this. How can a mode of self-presentation disclose the pres-
ence of some other thing? After all, perceivers, in being aware of their body, in
presenting only themselves, present no other thing. So how can bodily awareness
be leveraged into disclosing the presence of something external to the perceiver’s
body? What alchemy transmutes bodily sensation into tactile perception?
Our puzzle concerns whether grasping so much as could be a mode of haptic
perception. Though our interest is presently restricted to grasping as a mode of
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haptic perception, we can, however, get a better sense of that puzzle by considering
an analogous case. So consider felt temperature. Contrast two cases. In both cases
you feel warm, and you feel warm to the same degree. But in the ﬁrst case, you feel
warm because of a fever, and in the second case, you feel warm because because
of the ambient heat. In both cases, your body is warmed. They differ only in
the source of the warmth, with whether the warmth of your body is internally or
externally generated. And in both cases, you feel equally warm. Nevertheless, a
phenomenological difference remains. In the second case, not only do you feel
warm, but you feel, as well, the warmth in the ambient air. Indeed, the warmth
you feel is in conformity with the warmth felt in the ambient air. What explains
this phenomenological difference? How are tangible qualities felt in something
external to the perceiver’s body such that perceiver feels in conformity with such
qualities?
The puzzle is not meant to underwrite skepticism about haptic perception or
tactile perception more generally. We are taking it for granted that in grasping a
stone, say, our hominid ancestor feels the overall shape and volume of that stone.
We are taking it for granted that grasping is a mode of haptic perception that af-
fords the perceiver awareness of tangible qualities that inhere in the object grasped.
Our puzzle is not meant to underwrite skepticism about whether grasping is a gen-
uine mode of haptic perception so much as to underwrite a “how-possible” ques-
tion (Cassam, 2007). How is it that the conﬁguration of the hand and the force
exerted in maintaining that conﬁguration disclose the overall shape and volume
of the object grasped? How is objective haptic perception so much as possible?
The puzzle, then, is at best proof of an explanatory lacuna rather than proof of the
impossibility of objective haptic perception.
There is an aspect of grasping or enclosure that has so far remained implicit
in our discussion of it but is crucial for reﬁning our how-possible question in such
a way as to point toward an adequate solution. The perceiver, in exerting effort
in more precisely molding their hand to the contours of the object grasped, en-
counters felt resistance to their efforts. It is because the self-maintaining forces of
the body resist the hand’s encroachment that the hand can assimilate to the body’s
contours. The forces that constitute the body’s solidity ensure that the force of
the grasping hand does not penetrate it. And the forces that constitute the body’s
rigidity ensure that it maintains its overall shape and volume despite the force of
the hand’s grasp. Maybe it is the hand’s encounter with felt resistance—the ac-
tivity of the wax limited by the passivities of matter—that discloses the tangible
qualities of an external body. The suggestion, here, is not merely that the puz-
zle overlooked the contribution of cutaneous activation to tactile awareness, but
rather with how cutaneous activation interacts with kinesthesis and bodily aware-
nessmore generally in giving rise to the experience of an external limit to the body’s
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activity. If among the objects of bodily awareness are limits to the body’s activity,
a question arises whether bodily awareness is exhaustively understood as a mode of
self-presentation. In presenting a limit, does not one, implicitly at least, present, as
well, what lies beyond that limit? Thus, in presenting a limit to the body’s activity,
bodily awareness is more than a mere mode of self-presentation. (We shall re-
turn to this issue in chapter 2.5.) While the initial formulation of the how-possible
question relied on the assumption that bodily self-awareness is ameremode of self-
presentation, the reﬁned how-possible question that will guide us from hereon out
dispenses with that assumption.
Smith has appropriated Fichte’s term, Anstoss, for the way in which the experi-
enced limitation of the body’s activity can disclose sensible aspects of an external
body:
Although neither touch sensations nor the active / passive distinction
suffices for perceptual consciousness, when the two are taken together
we do ﬁnd something that suffices … Although no mere impact on a
sensitive surface as such will give rise to perceptual consciousness, we
certainly feel objects impacting on us from without. This fact needs to
be recognized in any adequate perceptual theory. I shall name the phe-
nomenon that is central here by the term that is at the heart of Fichte’s
treatment of the “external world,” or the “not-self ”: the Anstoss. This
phenomenon is that of a check or impediment to our active movement;
an experienced obstacle to our animal striving, as when we push or pull
against things. (Smith, 2002, 153)
Part of what we shall learn from the reﬁned how-possible question is that Anstoss,
at least as Smith conceives of it, is itself subject to further explanation (elaborating
that explanation is the task of the next chapter).
Inﬂuenced by Fichte, Maine de Biran applies this conception to grasping or
enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, thus:
If—the object still remaining on my hand—I wish to close the hand,
and if, while my ﬁngers are folding back upon themselves, their move-
ment is suddenly stopped by an obstacle onwhich they press and thwarts
them, a new judgment is necessary: this is not I. There is a very distinct
impression of solidity, of resistance, which is composed of thwarted
movement, of an eﬀort that I make, in which I am active … (Maine de
Biran, Inﬂuence de l’habitude sur la faculté de penser, 1803; Boehm 1929, 57)
It is the experienced limit to the hand’s activity, a felt resistance to touch, that
discloses the presence of a material object external to the perceiver’s body.
There is a long history connecting objectivity to felt resistance to touch. In
the Sophist, Plato recasts the Gigantomachy, the struggle for political supremacy
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over the cosmos between the Olympian Gods and the Giants, as a metaphysical
dispute. The Gods, or Friends of the Forms, insist that only imperceptible forms
are most real. Against them, the Giants, the offspring of Gaia, insist that only
bodies than can be handled and offer resistance to touch are real:
One party is trying to drag everything down to earth out of heaven
and the unseen, literally grasping rocks and trees in their hands, for
they lay hold upon every stock and stone and strenuously affirm that
real existence belongs only to that which can be handled and offers
resistance to the touch. (Plato, Sophist 246a; Cornford in Hamilton
and Cairns 1989, 990)
For the Giants, felt resistance to touch has become a touchstone for reality. Only
that which can be handled and offers resistance to touch is real. Even if one rejects
the corporealist metaphysics of the Giants, one can accept that the experience
that grounds their corporealist conviction is phenomenologically compelling. It
would have to be to elicit such cosmic conviction. Grasping something which
offers resistance to touch is a phenomenologically vivid and primitively compelling
experience of what is external to us.
The phenomenologically vivid and primitively compelling experience of felt re-
sistance to touch will underwrite the dramatic episode involving Dr Johnson out-
side of a church in Harwich:
After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time to-
gether of BishopBerkeley’s ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence
of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I ob-
served, that though we are satisﬁed his doctrine is not true, it is impos-
sible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson
answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, ’till
he rebounded from it, “I refute it thus.” This was a stout exempliﬁ-
cation of the ﬁrst truths of Pere Buffier, or the original principles of
Reid and Beattie; without admitting which, we can no more argue in
metaphysicks, than we can argue in mathematicks without axioms. To
me it is inconceivable how Berkeley can be answered by pure reasoning
… (Boswell, 1935, i 471)
The reality of external matter was demonstrated in the resistance it offered to Dr
Johnson’s foot, which rebounded despite its mighty force. It was a demonstration
not in the sense of proof, since it is inconceivable how Berkeley can be answered
in pure reasoning. Moreover, what was stoutly exempliﬁed was metaphysically
axiomatic, a ﬁrst truth, but proof proceeds from axioms, it does not establish them.
Rather Dr Johnson’s performance was a demonstration of ﬁrst truths by showing
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or exhibiting them. (On the character of Johnson’s refutation of Berkeley see Patey
1986). Dr Johnson’s demonstration, like the Giants’ before him, draws its dramatic
power from the phenomenologically vivid and primitively compelling experience
of felt resistance to touch. And this remains true even if the dramatic power of
that gesture is all but exhausted in the twentieth century cliché of the exasperated,
table-pounding realist.
Campbell, in his contribution to Campbell and Cassam (2014, 71), argues, in-
stead, that Dr Johnson’s demonstration was essentially multimodal, depending not
only upon the kicking of the stone but upon seeing it as well:
It is important that Johnson’s kicking the rock is a multimodal affair. It
would not have had the same visceral impact if Johnson had rebounded
off the thing while kicking it in the pitch dark. That would merely
have established the presence of some force or another. (Campbell in
Campbell and Cassam 2014, 71)
To be sure, Dr Johnson’s performance would have no impact on his audience (Bos-
well, and by extension, us, as recipients of his eye-witness account) if no one saw
his demonstration of a ﬁrst truth or original principle. Recall, his performance is
a demonstration in the sense that it showed or exhibited ﬁrst truths or original
principles. So the demonstration, involving Dr Johnson’s activity addressed to an
audience, was essentially multimodal. But it does not follow that haptic compo-
nent of that demonstration merely presented some force or another.
There is more to the experience of kicking a stone in the dark than Campbell
allows. For example, despite the darkness, Dr Johnson, perhaps through the rever-
beration of his foot, which rebounded despite its mighty force, might discern that
it was stone and not a log that he was kicking. The characteristic density of stone
as opposed to wood might be felt in this manner. And if it is sufficiently cold, he
might feel the coldness of the stone through the leather of his boot. So it is not
true that all that kicking the stone in the dark presents is some force or another.
It can present as well material and thermal qualities of the object kicked.
Campbell underestimates the experience of kicking a stone in the dark in a
further and more fundamental way. Not only would that experience establish the
presence of some force or another, it would disclose the self-maintaining forces
that constitute a rigid, solid object external to Dr Johnson’s body. If Dr John-
son’s exasperation merely grew with the rebounding of his foot, he might kick it
again. But as exasperated as he was in the dark, Dr Johnson’s haptic experience
presents him with the same stone kicked twice. Each kicking of the stone consti-
tutes distinct haptic perspectives on that object, and Dr Johnson has the capacity
to haptically reidentify the stone presented to distinct haptic perspectives, distinct
kickings in the dark. Notice that this would not be possible if kicking the stone
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in the dark merely presented some force or another. Earlier in Campbell and Cas-
sam (2014, 26), however, and more plausibly to my mind, Campbell claimed that it
was “the obstinance of the rock, its resistance to the will” that manifest its mind
independence. But surely the obstinance of the rock, its resistance to the will, the
effect of the rock’s self-maintaining forces which reveal it to be mind-independent
matter, was manifest in Dr Johnson’s haptic encounter with it independently of
being seen. Moreover, it would have to be, if Dr Jonson’s performance is to consti-
tute a genuine demonstration wherein a ﬁrst truth or original principle is shown or
exhibited to an audience. Dr Johnson’s demonstration, an activity directed to an
audience, may be multimodal, but the visceral impact upon the audience depends
upon their sympathetically responding to what is present in Dr Johnson’s haptic
experience.
Campbell may be wrong about what the experience of kicking a stone in the
dark may disclose, but a mystery remains as to how Dr Johnson may feel the char-
acteristic density of a stone and its coldness in an external body, or how he may
have the experience of kicking the same stone twice. That is to say, it remains a
mystery how haptic perception is so much as possible. How does felt resistance to
touch disclose tangible qualities inhering in external bodies prior to perception?
After all, not all limitations to the body’s activity are due to its interaction with
external bodies. Not all passivities of matter that limit the hand’s activity are ex-
ternal to the perceiver’s body. There are internal limitations to the body’s activity
as well. We encounter an internal limitation to the body’s activity due to fatigue or
in an inability to touch one’s toes. And Smith (2002, 154) gives the nice example of
separating your index andmiddle ﬁngers until you can nomore. So not every expe-
rience of a limitation to the body’s activity is due to the tangible qualities inhering
in an external body prior to perception. The problem, then, is a failure of suffi-
ciency. So how is it that in grasping, or enclosure, the experienced limitation to
the hand’s activity in molding more precisely to the contours of the object grasped
discloses that object’s overall shape and volume? How does the experienced lim-
itation to the hand’s activity become, in haptic perception, an experience of the
tangible qualities of an external body? How is it that by means of an experienced
limitation to the hand’s activity tangible qualities are felt in something external to
the perceiver’s body and felt in conformity with those qualities?
This, then, is the reﬁned version of our how-possible question: How is it pos-
sible for felt resistance to the hand’s activity in grasping or enclosure to disclose a
rigid body’s overall shape and volume? How does the experience limitation to the
hand’s activity allow the perceiver to feel something in an external body and in con-
formity with it? Earlier I claimed that the reﬁnement of our question could point
toward an adequate solution. Indeed, we have all but stated it. Though perhaps
that can only be appreciated once the solution is clearly in view.
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Chapter 2
Sympathy
2.1 HapticMetaphysics
Tactilemetaphors for perception are primordial and persistent. Whatmakes grasp-
ing an aptmetaphor for perceptual awareness, even for non-tactilemodes of aware-
ness such as vision an audition? In order to answer this question, we undertook a
phenomenological investigation into the nature of haptic perception. That inves-
tigation was phenomenological in that it conﬁned itself to perceptual appearances
and not because of any methodology involved. The hope was that if we better
understood how grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic percep-
tion, presents itself from within haptic experience, then we would be in a bet-
ter position to understand what potentially makes grasping an apt metaphor for
perception generally. We discussed three claims about the metaphysics of haptic
presentation:
(1) Tangible qualities of the object of haptic exploration are disclosed over time
and so presentation in haptic experience has duration.
(2) Haptic perception formally assimilates to the tangible qualities presented to
the perceiver’s haptic perspective, understood as the distinctive way they are
handling the object.
(3) The formal assimilation of haptic perception to its objects is a consequence of
haptic experience being constitutively shaped by the object presented to the
perceiver’s haptic perspective.
Not only does the hand assimilate to the contours of the object grasped, but the
haptic experience that this activity gives rise to itself formally assimilates to its ob-
ject. Moreover the formal assimilation of haptic experience to its object relative
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to the perceiver’s haptic perspective is not merely causal but constitutive. Hap-
tic perception formally assimilates to its object, relative to the perceiver’s haptic
perspective, because that object constitutively shapes that perceptual experience.
This, I suggested, was the basis of haptic perception’s objectivity and part of what
makes it an apt metaphor for perception generally.
Beside the three metaphysical claims about haptic presentation enumerated
above, I also made a further explanatory suggestion about haptic perception’s ob-
jectivity. Speciﬁcally, while haptic experience assimilating to its object is a mani-
festation of the objectivity of haptic perception, it is not its source:
(4) The presentation of tangible qualities of objects external to the perceiver’s
body is due, at least in part, to the activity of the hand in grasping and the
resistance it encounters.
The hand, and haptic experience in turn, only assimilate to the tangible aspects
of the rigid, solid body thanks to the force of the hand’s activity in conﬂict with
the self-maintaining forces of that constitute the categorical bases of that body’s
solidity and rigidity. In engaging in such haptic activity, inmolding one’s handmore
precisely to the contours of the body, one ensures that the overall shape and volume
of the body had prior to being grasped, and maintained in being grasped, explains,
in part, the hand’s conﬁguration and the force that needs to be exerted to maintain
that conﬁguration. At least with grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of
haptic perception, perceptual realism is sustained by the force of the hand’s activity
in conﬂict with the self-maintaining forces of the object grasped. In this way, the
hand is the active wax of haptic perception. And the end of this activity is to ensure
that that the tangible quality explains, in part, the hand’s conﬁguration in grasping
the object and the force that needs to be exerted to maintain that conﬁguration,
and the experience these give rise to.
However this last insight, if it is one, gave rise to the puzzle that arose at the end
of the last chapter. That puzzle revealed no genuine incoherence in the Manifest
Image of Nature. The puzzle was not meant to be the basis of skepticism about
objective haptic perception so much as the basis of a how-possible question, how
is objective haptic perception so much as possible? The puzzle began with haptic
perception’s dependence upon bodily awareness. For animals like ourselves bodily
awareness can be a mode of self-presentation even if there is more to our nature
than is revealed in bodily awareness. But how can a mode of self-presentation dis-
close the presence of some other thing? How is it that bodily awareness is lever-
aged in haptic perception into disclosing the presence and tangible qualities of
an external body? Perhaps, however, bodily awareness is not merely a mode of
self-presentation if it can present, as well, limits. Taking on board Kilwardby’s
transformed insight that the presentation of tangible qualities of an external body
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is due, at least in part, to the activity of the hand and the felt resistance it encoun-
ters, we reﬁned our how-possible question: How does felt resistance to the hand’s
activity in grasping or enclosure disclose the overall shape and volume of an exter-
nal body? After all not every felt resistance is due to the tangible qualities of an
external body. There are internal as well as external limits to the body’s activity.
So how does the experienced limitation to the hand’s activity allow the perceiver
to feel something in something external to the perceiver’s body and in conformity
with it?
Reﬂection on this puzzle or aporia shall be the basis for further substantive
claims about the metaphysics of haptic presentation. The present chapter thus
proceeds dialectically. Chief among the substantive claims to bemade on this basis
is the perhaps surprising claim that haptic presentation is governed by the principle
of sympathy—that feeling something in another thing and in conformity with it
is a kind of sympathetic disclosure. Part of what makes this claim surprising is
our tendency to think of sympathy exclusively as a kind of fellow-feeling, akin
to compassion or pity. However, as we shall see, sympathy, here, should not be
thought of as fellow-feeling, though perhaps it is its principle.
2.2 TheDependence uponBodily Awareness
Our puzzle began with the dependence of haptic perception upon bodily aware-
ness. Getting clearer on the nature of that dependence should help with our puz-
zle’s resolution.
In a chapter devoted to discussing the nature of this dependence, Fulkerson
(2014, chapter 4.6) draws the distinction between implicit and explicit experiences:
An implicit bodily experience is one that is the background or reces-
sive. “Background” here can be understood as an experiential content
that is not consciously attended, in the minimal sense that it does not
allow its objects to be open for epistemic appraisal. Such unattended
contents or experiences do not incur an additional attentional load on
our conscious experiences (we can only actively attend to a limited
number of items at any one time, but implicit experiences do not add
to this threshold). However, they are in consciousness nonetheless,
primed for attention. (Fulkerson, 2014, 90)
The object of an implicit experience is not attended to and so is not the object of
epistemic appraisal. An explicit experience, by contrast, involves attending to, or
actively thinking about, the object of that experience, and so that object is open
to epistemic appraisal. That an object is “open for epistemic appraisal” I take
to mean that it is potentially recognizable and that the perceiver, in undergoing
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an experience that affords explicit awareness of it, is in a position to make judg-
ments about its presence and character should they have the relevant conceptual
resources. Bracketing, for the moment, Fulkerson’s use of “consciousness” and its
cognates, that is how we shall understand his distinction. Why ignore Fulkerson’s
use of “consciousness” and its cognates? As will emerge, there is reason think that
it is not fully coherent. The quoted passage already provides a hint of this. On the
one hand, there is a tendency to identify what the perceiver is conscious of with
what they are attending to. On the other hand, there is the claim that implicit ex-
periences, whose objects are unattended to, occur in consciousness. Surely, “con-
sciousness” must receive a sense distinct from, and uncoordinated with, the qual-
iﬁer, “conscious”, on pain of incoherence. For how can implicit experiences be in
consciousness, if this is understood to be what is in the range of the perceiver’s
attention, and be such that their objects are unattended to? Consciousness, here,
must not be amatter of what falls in the range of the perceiver’s attention, butmust
rather be a matter of what falls in the range of the perceiver’s sensory experience,
elements of which fall within the range of the perceivers attention while other el-
ements of which are merely potential objects of attention, there to be selectively
attended to.
With the distinction drawn between implicit and explicit experience, we may
ask whether grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, de-
pends upon an explicit bodily experience of the hand’s conﬁguration and force, or
whether the presentation of the object’s overall shape and volume in haptic expe-
rience merely depends upon an implicit experience of the hand’s conﬁguration and
force? If the bodily experience upon which haptic perception depends is explicit,
then the perceiver consciously attends to the state and activity of the body and
haptic perception of the tangible qualities of an external body depends upon this
explicit bodily experience. Fulkerson calls this Strong Experiential Dependence.
On the hypothesis of Strong Experiential Dependence, the haptic perception in-
volved in grasping or enclosure, an explicit experience, depends upon another ex-
plicit experience, speciﬁcally, of the hand’s conﬁguration and force.
Fulkerson (2014, chapter 4.8) argues, instead, that the dependence is best un-
derstood in terms of what he calls Informational Bodily Dependence. Though
information from processes that underly proprioception and kinesthesis are inte-
grated with afferent information, such as the information provided by cutaneous
activation, these give rise to a single conscious experience. The idea is that the
sensitivity exhibited by haptic perception, such as grasping or enclosure, depends
upon the tactile system drawing upon functionally distinct streams of information
involved in bodily awareness. Nevertheless, the percept that is thereby determined
is a single conscious experience, in the case of grasping or enclosure, our feeling
of the overall shape and volume of the object grasped. This contrasts with Strong
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Experiential Dependence where haptic experience is understood to depend upon
a distinct explicit experience of the body’s conﬁguration andmotion. On the alter-
native, haptic experience depends upon, not an explicit, but an implicit experience
of the hand’s conﬁguration and force. Fulkerson (2014, 91) cites with approval Gal-
lagher (2005, 137) in this regard: “Our pre-reﬂexive, kinesthetic-proprioceptive ex-
perience thus plays a role in the organization of perception, but in a way that does
not require the body itself to be a perceptual object.” If we understand the per-
ceptual object as something that is actively attended to, then haptic experience
merely depends upon an implicit experience of the hand’s conﬁguration and force
(see also Bower and Gallagher 2013).
Put another way, according to Informational Bodily Dependence, our capacity
for haptic perception draws upon our distinct capacities for proprioception, kines-
thesis, motor activity, and our sense of agency but its exercise is an experience that
affords the perceiver awareness of the presence and tangible qualities of an object
external to the perceiver’s body. So understood, Information Bodily Dependence
could not, by itself, be a solution to our puzzle. First, while haptic perception may
depend upon the functionally distinct streams of information associated with the
various forms of bodily awareness, it depends as well upon distinct afferent in-
formation provided by cutaneous activation. So Information Bodily Dependence
fails to provide anything like a sufficient condition for the tangible qualities of
the perceived body to be present in haptic experience. More importantly, that
our capacity for bodily awareness, however implicit, enables haptic experience to
present the tangible qualities of an external body is less an explanation than what
needs explaining. Our puzzle is not completely resolved until we understand how
this may be so.
Campbell cites Huang’s and Pashler’s (2007) distinction, in visual attention, be-
tween selecting something out from its background and characterizing or accessing
its features:
So a property may be used to select the object or region. Or the prop-
erty may be accessed as a property of that object or region. Selection
is what makes the object or region visible in the ﬁrst place; selection
is what makes it possible for the subject to focus on that object or re-
gion in order to ascertain its various properties. Access is a matter of
the subject making it explicit, in one way or another, just which man-
ifold properties the object or region has. (Campbell in Campbell and
Cassam, 2014, 54)
Notice that the property used to select an object or region, though unattended
to, may, nonetheless, contribute to the phenomenological character of the sensory
experience. Should the same object or region be selected by a different property,
the subsequent experience would differ in phenomenological character.
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Tactile perception, like visual and auditory perception, involves grouping, seg-
mentation, and recognition. Suppose, then, that this distinction can be drawn, not
only within visual attention, but also within tactile and, speciﬁcally, haptic atten-
tion. So a property may be used to select an object or region for active attention in
haptic exploration or a property may be accessed in haptic experience as a prop-
erty of that object or region. With Huang’s and Pashler’s distinction in mind, and
supposing it may legitimately apply to haptic attention as well, Fulkerson’s notion
of an explicit experience is characterized in terms of our accessing its object—it is
attended to and open for epistemic appraisal. Now suppose Campbell is right in
thinking that a property may be used to select an object in visual attention but not
be accessed in consciously attending to it (Campbell and Cassam, 2014, chapter
3.2). And suppose, further, that this possibility is a consequence of the distinction
Huang and Pashler introduced, so that, if it holds, as well, for haptic attention, then
there should be cases of selecting an object or region for haptic attention without
attending to the tangible quality on the basis of which that object or region was
selected. Since explicit experiences are a matter of accessing their objects, then
our haptic experience of a tangible quality that selected the body or region but
was not attended to would be an implicit experience of that quality.
This is the basis of a worry for a further claim Fulkerson makes about implicit
experiences. There is a sense in which, for Fulkerson (2014, 91), implicit experi-
ences are no experiences at all, and this despite his claim that they occur in con-
sciousness. The content of an implicit experience is merely the content of a po-
tential, that is to say, non-actual, experience (Fulkerson, 2014, 95). And there is
an associated tendency in Fulkerson’s discussion to identify conscious experience
with what is attended to and accessed, with explicit experience. But if the presence
of a tangible quality is the basis for the selection of an object or region in haptic
exploration, and if selection is what makes the object or region tangible in the ﬁrst
place, then surely it contributes to the phenomenological character of the haptic
experience even if it is not attended to. If that same object or region were selected
on the basis of a different tangible quality, the subsequent experience would differ
in phenomenological character.
Another worry is this. For Fulkerson (2014, 95), the objects of implicit aware-
ness are there for “potential directedness”. But if we can voluntarily selectively at-
tend to something about which we are merely implicitly aware, it must be present
already in our experience, however recessively and in the background, if it can
thus be consciously and voluntarily selected. The objects of implicit awareness
are “in consciousness” in the sense of being within the range of the perceiver’s
sensory experience if not within the range of their attention. So the objects of im-
plicit awareness being there for “potential directedness” is inconsistent with our
experience of them being potential and non-actual. Moreover, reﬂection on “po-
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tential directedness” reinforces the claim of the previous paragraph. If the object
of implicit awareness can be voluntarily selectively attended to, it must make a
phenomenological difference to the perceiver’s experience even when unattended.
The phenomenological difference the object makes to the perceiver’s experience
is what makes for the possibility of voluntarily selecting it for increased attention.
The worries just adumbrated have consequences for how the implicit–explicit
distinction may be understood. If an explicit experience is an actual conscious
experience whereas an implicit experience is merely the content of a potential,
non-actual conscious experience, then the distinction does not admit of degrees.
But if Fulkerson is wrong about this, if an implicit experience is of something actu-
ally present, if recessive and in the background, if the object of implicit experience
falls within the range of sensory experience if not the range of explicit attention,
then this raises the possibility that the implicit–explicit distinction is a matter of
degree. An element present in experience would then be more or less recessive,
more or less in the background. A gateway conception of attention might encour-
age one to deny that the implicit–explicit distinction admits of degrees. However,
if attention is, instead, conceived as a modiﬁcation of consciousness, then it is
natural to think that consciousness may be modiﬁed in degrees. So perhaps un-
derlying the present disagreement are different models of conscious attention (see
Wu, 2014, for an excellent recent discussion of attention).
The possibility raised by Huang’s and Pashler’s distinction between selection
and access concerns the implicit experience of tangible qualities of external bod-
ies. Our present, focus, however, is not on implicit experiences of external bodies
but on implicit experiences of the perceiver’s body. But here too it seems im-
plausible that my awareness of my hand’s conﬁguration and force in grasping or
enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, while implicit, is merely
potential and, thereby, non-actual. The information drawn upon from proprio-
ception, kinesthesis, motor activity, and our sense of agency in haptic perception
makes a contribution to the phenomenological character of that experience, even
if there is, as Fulkerson urges, only one conscious experience (the haptic experi-
ence) in play and not two (the haptic experience and a distinct experience of the
body’s state and activity). The information from bodily awareness drawn upon
in the exercise of our haptic capacities speciﬁcally makes a difference to the way
the object of haptic awareness is presented. As I argued in chapter 1.6, distinct
exploratory activities, distinct ways of handling the object of haptic exploration,
constitute distinct haptic perspectives on that object, and this perspectival rela-
tivity is manifest in the different haptic appearances presented by the constant
object of haptic exploration. It is one thing to claim that bodily awareness makes
no explicit contribution to haptic experience. In grasping or enclosure, under-
stood as a mode of haptic perception, we attend only to the object grasped and
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its manifest tangible qualities. But it is a further, contestable claim, that bodily
awareness, however implicit, contributes nothing to the phenomenological char-
acter of the haptic experience it partly gives rise to. Bodily awareness, however
implicit, contributes to the variable haptic appearances in the exercise of constant
haptic perception. If the phenomenological character of haptic experience were
exhausted by the constant tangible qualities attended to, then no room would be
left for the contribution of ﬂux to our haptic experience. But an adequate account
of perceptual constancy must determine not only the constant object of percep-
tion but its variable appearances as well. In grasping or enclosure, understood as
a mode of haptic perception, haptic experience is the joint upshot of the force of
the hand’s activity and the self-maintaining forces of the object grasped. Constant
tangible aspects are presented in haptic experience as the forces that constitute
their categorical bases come into conﬂict with force of the grasping hand. And
the variable appearances of these constant tangible aspects are a phenomenologi-
cal reﬂection of the variable activity of the hand in haptic exploration.
2.3 AgainstHaptic Indirect Realism
That our awareness of the hand’s conﬁguration and force is merely implicit in
grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, rules out at
least one response to our reﬁned how-possible question. Our question was how
can an experienced limitation to the hand’s activity disclose the presence and tan-
gible qualities of an external body? And one natural suggestion might be that our
puzzle merely reveals haptic presentation to be indirect. That is to say, perhaps our
puzzle reveals that we have an explicit experience of the hand’s conﬁguration and
force and thereby come to have an explicit experience of the overall shape and vol-
ume of the object grasped. This would be an instance of what Fulkerson described
as Strong Experiential Dependence. That haptic perception depends only upon
an implicit awareness of the hand’s conﬁguration and force reveals this otherwise
natural suggestion to be ultimately misguided. Nevertheless, it is worth examining
for the light it sheds on the challenge posed by our reﬁned how-possible question.
(For a recent sophisticated defence of tactile indirect realism see Richardson 2013;
though the way that Richardson’s view avoids some of the present worries makes
me think that that she has in mind a different distinction in speaking of bodily
sensation as mediating tactile perception.)
Begin with bodily sensation. Among the corporeal aspects of our nature of
which we may be aware are felt limitations to our body’s activity, be it in the exer-
tion and depletion of physical force—lifting something until we can no more—or
in the inability to move our limbs in a certain way. Perhaps felt resistance to the
hand’s activity is a bodily sensation causally coordinated with tangible qualities of
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the object grasped. Thus the overall shape of the object grasped causes in the per-
ceiver a certain bodily sensation, a felt resistance to the hand’s activity. Perhaps it
is this felt resistance of the hand conﬁgured so that is the object explicit awareness.
We thus come to haptically experience the tangible qualities of an external body
thanks to the way in which bodily sensation is causally coordinated with them. The
overall shape of the external object would bemediately presented by the character-
istic bodily sensations that making an effort to mold more precisely the hand to its
contours gives rise to. So, on this model, we would be immediately presented with
aspects of our own body’s conﬁguration and the limits to its activity and thereby
mediately presented with the tangible qualities of an external body.
Recall the obstacle that prompted our reﬁned how-possible question was a fail-
ure of sufficiency. Not all experienced limitations to the body’s activities, not all
passivities of matter, are due to the tangible qualities of an external body. How
then do we distinguish those experienced limitations that are perceptions of ex-
ternal bodies from those that are not? Haptic indirect realism would provide at
least a sketch of an answer. The experienced limitations of the body’s activity that
are involved in the perception of an external body’s tangible qualities are those
that are causally coordinated with them, at least in the right sort of way. This last
qualiﬁcation is not insigniﬁcant, as anyone who is familiar with the problem of
wayward causal chains will appreciate. This is part of why this is just a sketch of
an answer.
The problem for this envisioned haptic indirect realism, however, lies not with
its being underdeveloped in this way, but rather with its claim that haptic percep-
tion depends upon an explicit awareness of the hand’s conﬁguration and force. Ar-
guably at least, that awareness is merely implicit. An explicit experience of a limit
to the hand’s activity is, according to this indirect realism, the means by which we
experience the external body. But the disclosure of an object’s overall shape and
volume in grasping or enclosure is not apparently mediated in this way. Grasp-
ing seems from within haptic experience to directly disclose corporeal aspects of
its object. Moreover, explicitly attending to the hand’s conﬁguration and force
in grasping or enclosure draws attentive resources away from the object of haptic
perception. In grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception,
we attend only to the object of haptic investigation and its manifest tangible quali-
ties. It is because the tangible qualities of an external body are directly disclosed in
haptic perception that grasping becomes, in the cosmology of the Giants, a touch-
stone for reality. Grasping, however, could not play this rhetorical role, if it were
apparently mediated.
Phenomenologically, this seems apt. Haptic experience seems to present it-
self as the immediate, if partial, disclosure, to the perceiver’s haptic perspective,
of the tangible qualities inhering in a thing external to the perceiver’s body. In a
46 CHAPTER 2. SYMPATHY
way, haptic indirect realism makes the converse of Fulkerson’s mistake. Whereas,
Fulkerson emphasizes the presence of the constant tangible object in haptic atten-
tion at the expense of its variable haptic appearance, haptic indirect realismmakes
these variable haptic appearances the objects of active attention. Haptic indirect
realism thus involves the objectiﬁcation of appearing as appearance of which Cook
Wilson complained in his 1904 letter to Stout:
And so, as appearance of the object, it has now to be represented not as
the object but as some phenomenon caused in our consciousness by the
object. Thus for the true appearance (=appearing) to us of the object is
substituted through the ‘objectﬁcation’ of the appearing as appearance,
the appearing to us of an appearance, the appearing of a phenomenon
cause in us by the object. (Correspondence with Stout 1904, Cook Wilson
1926, 796)
But when we perceive by means of our grasping hand we attend only to what is in
our grasp and not to the way that it is presented in our handling of it. Our sense of
our hand’s conﬁguration and force contributes only to the pre-noetic structure of
haptic experience and, at best, determines the way its object is presented therein.
In making our awareness of the hand’s conﬁguration and force explicit, haptic in-
direct realism is thus precluded.
However, if anything, precluding this haptic indirect realism only makes our
how-possible question more urgent and more challenging. For how can an implicit
awareness of a limit to the hand’s activity directly disclose the overall shape and
volume of an external body? What contribution can an awareness, however im-
plicit, of the hand’s conﬁguration and force make to haptic perception that would
not undermine its directly disclosing the constant object of haptic attention? If
anything, recognition of the dependence of haptic perception upon an implicit
bodily awareness can seem only to make matters worse.
2.4 Sympathy
How can an implicit awareness of a limit to the hand’s activity contribute to di-
rectly disclosing the overall shape and volume of the object grasped? How does the
pre-noetic structuring of haptic experience determined by this implicit awareness
contribute to the presentation of its object?
When our hominid ancestor reaches out and picks up a rough-hewn stone,
perhaps in preparation to skirmish with a competing group of hominids, they feel
the overall shape and volume of the stone in their grasp. It is not the hand’s shape,
the conﬁguration of the hand in grasping or enclosure, that they haptically perceive
though they may be aware of it, however implicitly. It is the stone’s shape that is
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disclosed in their grasp. They feel the overall shape and volume in the stone, and
its overall shape and volume are tangible qualities of the stone that their hand is felt
to conform to. I shall make a suggestion that will be the basis for an answer to our
reﬁned how-possible question. Speciﬁcally, feeling tangible qualities in something
external to the perceiver’s body and feeling in conformity with them can fruitfully
be understood as due to the operation of sympathy.
Felt resistance to touch, insofar as it is the presentation of an object external to
the perceiver’s body, is a sympathetic response to the force that resists the hand’s
activity. Recall our reﬁned version of our how-possible question was this: How
is it possible for felt resistance to the hand’s activity in grasping or enclosure to
disclose a rigid, solid body’s overall shape and volume? If feeling tangible qualities
in something external to the perceiver’s body and in conformity with them is due to
the operation of sympathy thenwe have a basis for an answer. It is when the limit to
hand’s activity is experienced as a sympathetic response to a countervailing force,
as the hand’s force encountering an alien force resisting it, one force in conﬂict
with another, like it yet distinct from it, that the self-maintaining forces of the
body disclose that body’s presence and tangible qualities to haptic awareness.
If felt resistance is the means by which the conﬂicting forces are sympatheti-
cally presented in haptic experience, then in being sympathetically presented with
an external body, the perceiver is naturally attending to the external body, the ob-
ject of haptic perception. In haptic perception, the perceiver is explicitly aware of
the object of haptic perception. Insofar as felt resistance is sympathetically pre-
senting an external body, the perceiver’s awareness of the hand’s conﬁguration and
force is, by contrast, merely implicit. Indeed actively attending to the hand’s activ-
ity would erode the sympathetic presentation of what is external to the perceiver’s
body.
Earlier, the initial statement of the puzzle was motivated by considering the
analogy of felt temperature. We contrasted two cases. In both cases you feel warm,
and you feel warm to the same degree. But in the ﬁrst case, you feel warm because
of a fever, and in the second case, you feel warm because because of the ambient
heat. There is also, importantly, a phenomenological difference between these
cases. In the second case, not only do you feel warm, but you feel, as well, the
warmth in the ambient air. Indeed, the warmth you feel is in conformity with the
warmth felt in the ambient air. What explains the phenomenological difference
is that in the second case, but not in the ﬁrst, the felt warmth is a sympathetic
response to the ambient heat, to the thermal properties of something external to
the perceiver’s body. In sympathetically responding to ambient heat, the warmth
you feel becomes a way of feeling the warmth in something located outside of your
body. Moreover, in sympathetically responding to ambient heat, the warmth you
feel is in conformity with the warmth felt in the air. Active attention to the warmth
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you feel can erode the sympathetic presentation of the ambient warmth. Focus too
much on the warmth you feel, and you cease to feel the warmth in the air.
Sympathetically responding to the way the body’s self-maintaining forces re-
sist the hand’s grasp is a way of presenting that body and its tangible qualities.
Sympathy is what makes the extra-somatic present in haptic experience. Thanks
to the operation of sympathy, we experience from within what the extra-somatic
is like. One obstacle to appreciating this concerns our present understanding of
sympathy, where sympathy is a kind of emotional response to others, a kind of
fellow-feeling, akin to compassion or pity. The notion of sympathy that is being
invoked as the principle governing haptic presentation is closer to the notion at
work in Stoic and neo-Platonic physics, if more abstract and not at all reliant on
on their vitalistic metaphysics. I believe that this more abstract principle is at
work both in haptic presentation and fellow-feeling. After all, each is a way of
experiencing from within what another is like.
The present approach thus contrasts with Whitehead’s (1978). Whitehead
both explains perceptual prehension partly in terms of sympathy and embraces
the association with emotion:
The primitive formof physical experience is emotional—blind emotion—
received as felt elsewhere in another occasion and conformally appro-
priated as a subjective passion. In the language appropriate to the
higher stages of experience, the primitive element is sympathy, that
is, feeling the feeling in another and feeling conformally with another.
The separation of the emotional experience from the presentational
intuition is a high abstraction of thought. Thus the primitive experi-
ence is emotional feeling, felt in its relevance to a world beyond. The
feeling is blind and the relevance is vague. (Whitehead, 1978, 162-3)
Whitehead’s retention of the emotional associations of sympathy lead him to para-
doxically portray perceptual prehension as an outgrowth of blind emotion. How-
ever, as we shall see, the principle of sympathy can be understood with sufficient
generality so that it may be at work both in haptic presentation and fellow-feeling,
without reducing perceptual presentation to blind emotion. Perception may not
reduce to blind emotion, but that is consistent with certain natural affective re-
sponses being made possible and, indeed, partly constituted by the operation of
sympathy in haptic presentation. It would have to be, if, as Derrida (2005, chapter
4) insists, an adequate philosophy of touch must leave room for both blows and
caresses (see also Wyschogrod 1981).
The proposal is that presentation in haptic perception is governed by the prin-
ciple of sympathy. There are two ways to understand this.
The ﬁrst proceeds synthetically. That is, beginning with elements and princi-
ples understood independently of haptic perception, one constructs the notion of
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the presentation of tangible qualities of external bodies in haptic experience on
their basis. So, for example, one might begin with bodily sensation and “extend
its reach”, so to speak, via the operation of sympathy to construct a notion of the
presentation of tangible qualities of external bodies. So understood, haptic presen-
tation would be the coordination of bodily sensations with the tangible qualities
of external bodies via the operation of sympathy.
The second way proceeds analytically. That is, beginning with the notion of
the presentation of tangible qualities of external bodies in haptic experience, one
analyses or decomposes that notion into constituent elements thatmust be present
and principles that must be operative if haptic perception is so much as possible.
On the synthetic approach, the unity of haptic presentation is an explanandum. The
unity of haptic presentation is to be explained in terms of a construction from
elements and principles understood independently of haptic presentation. On the
analytic approach, by contrast, the unity of haptic presentation is an explanans. It
explains and renders intelligible elements and principles that must be operative
if haptic presentation is so much as possible. On the analytic approach, the task,
then, is to articulate the intelligible structure determined by the presupposed unity.
The synthetic approach naturally, perhaps inexorably, motivates indirect real-
ism about haptic perception, comparable to the indirect realism that we previously
rejected. So consider again our toy model where we begin with bodily sensation
and extend its reach through the operation of sympathy. Bodily sensation does
not involve the presentation of tangible qualities of external bodies. It is, instead,
a mode of self-presentation. Thanks to the operation of sympathy, in being pre-
sented with an aspect of our corporeal nature, we are mediately presented with the
tangible quality of an external body. But haptic perception is not indirect in this
way. When our hominid ancestor grasps a rough-hewn stone they feel its overall
shape and volume in the stone. Moreover, the presentation of these tangible qual-
ities in their haptic experience is not apparently mediated. Our hominid ancestor
need not attend to their bodily sensations as a means of attending to the tangible
qualities of external bodies, rather these are directly disclosed in haptic percep-
tion. Indeed, attending to the body and its activity draws attentive resources away
from the object of tactile perception.
The problemwith the synthetic approach, at least as so far developed, is twofold.
First, it posits two experience—the haptic experience and the experience of the
perceiver’s body—when plausibly there is only one. (These would remain two dis-
tinguishable experiences even if the experience of the perceiver’s body were, in
some sense, a part, or constituent, of the broader haptic experience.) And, sec-
ond, the awareness of the perceiver’s body is explicit rather than implicit. On the
synthetic approach, the state and activity of the body are actively attended to and
so are, potentially at least, the object of epistemic appraisal. Moreover, both of
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these features were directly involved in the subsequent indirect realism. On the
alternative, analytic approach, indirect realism is simply not a possibility. One be-
gins with an irreducible unity, the presentation of the tangible qualities of external
bodies in haptic experience, and then discerns what intelligible structure it must
display if it is somuch as possible. (On sensory presentation being a kind of unity—
a “communion” with its object—see Ardley’s 1958 unjustly neglected essay.) Thus
the presentation of tangible qualities of external bodies in haptic experience could
not be a construction from elements and principles understood independently of
haptic perception, the way they would be if indirect realism were true.
The analytic approach to sensory presentation is comparable to Frege’s ap-
proach towards thought, at least at certain stages of his career, on certain inter-
pretations (see, for example, Travis 2011, essays 7 and 9). Frege begins with a unity,
a truth-evaluable thought, and discerns what intelligible structure it must display.
Beginning with the thought, Frege analyzes or decomposes that thought into con-
stituent elements that must be present and principles that must be operative if
that thought is to be so much as truth-evaluable (which is not say that there is a
unique such decomposition). Frege’s position thus contrasts with recent discus-
sions of the problem of the unity of the proposition (compare King 2007, Gaskin
2008, Soames 2010, and King et al. 2014). The problem of the unity of the propo-
sition simply does not arise for Frege, since he does not begin with independently
understood elements and principles and tries to construct thoughts on their basis.
Rather the unity of thought is explanatorily prior to the intelligible structure it
must display if it is to be so much as truth-evaluable. Similarly, on the analytic ap-
proach, the unity of sensory presentation is explanatorily prior to the intelligible
structure it must display if it is so much as possible.
To get a general sense of the analytic approach, consider the following plausi-
ble, if contentious, example (Johnston 2007, for one, seems to deny it). Arguably
at least, any notion of sensory presentation essentially involves a subject–object
distinction. If an object is present in perceptual experience then not only is there
the object of perception—what is present in that experience—but there is also a
perceiver that undergoes that experience—the subject to whom the object is pre-
sented. If the subject–object distinction cannot intelligibly be sustained, then the
presentation of the object to the subject is not so much as possible.
If we allow for modes of self-presentation where the subject and object are the
same entity, then the subject–object distinction arguably required by the presup-
posed unity is merely hyperintensional. So compare Plotinus’ view, in the Fifth
Ennead, that intellection, the presentation of intelligible objects, the highest form
of unity short of that displayed by the hyperontic One, requires the distinction
between the act of intellect and its object. Nevertheless, the Intellect apprehends
only itself insofar as it is an image of the One. So the subject–object distinction
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required for intelligible presentation is consistent with its being a mode of self-
presentation and so hyperintensional (see Gerson 1994, chapter 3.1).
If presentation may be self-presentation, and the intelligible distinction be-
tween subject and object may be hyperintensional, then I am genuinely uncertain
about Johnston’s denial of the claim that presentation intelligibly requires a sub-
ject. Johnston (2007) invites us to to think of ourselves as Samplers of Presence,
where we access objective modes of presentations that are part of a larger reality,
both accessible and inaccessible, but where our access, relative to our perspec-
tive, though ours, does not involve a subject over and above the accessed objective
modes of presentations. But if the subject to whom the object is presented can
be one and the same thing, then there being no subject over and above the ob-
ject is not yet proof that they cannot be intelligibly distinguished. Even if there is
no subject over and above the objective mode of presentation accessed from our
perspective, the denial that there is no subject which accesses the objective mode
of presentation is a further claim. One and the same thing, the objective mode
of presentation, may be playing two roles. Just as in self-hate, where, tragically,
one thing both hates and is hated, perhaps, in perception, one thing both accesses
and is accessed. The present point is not to criticize Johnston, nor to defend neu-
tral monism, but to emphasize how little may be involved in the subject–object
distinction.
Intelligible presentationmay be amode of self-presentation, but Plotinus claims
that the subject and object of perception must be more than hyperintensionally
distinguished, they must be two things. This is a reﬂection of the fact that the
unity presupposed in sensory presentation is a lesser unity than the unity presup-
posed in intelligible presentation. However, once one adopts a more naturalistic
approach to embodiment than Plotinus, it is plausible to allow for forms of sensory
self-presentation. Since having a fever is a condition of the body, and we are funda-
mentally embodied, then feeling a fever is itself a mode of self-presentation, even if
there is more to one’s nature than the fever one is currently suffering. (For discus-
sion of this example and the puzzlement that results from not allowing modes of
sensory self-presentation see Yrjönsuuri 2008.) If sensory presentation is partial,
and primates like ourselves are fundamentally embodied, then the sensory presen-
tation of aspects of our corporeal nature is a kind of self-presentation even if there
is more to our nature than is present in bodily awareness.
There may, however, be a sense in which Plotinus was right. The unity pre-
supposed in sensory presentation, being partial, is a lesser unity than the unity
presupposed in intelligible presentation. When the Inchoate Intellect turns, and
looks, and sees only itself insofar as it is the image of the hyperontic One, thus be-
coming the Intellect in full actuality, this intelligibly differentiated image is wholly
present in the act of intellection. An intelligible object is wholly present in the act
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of intellection in the way that a sensible object never is in perception since sensory
presentation is invariably relative to the perceiver’s partial perspective.
Notice that in proceeding analytically, the subject–object distinction is not
something to overcome (a characteristically modern anxiety dramatized by Carte-
sian skepticism). Instead we are presupposing their unity in an episode or process
of sensory presentation. There is no need to bridge the gap between subject and
object since we began with their unity in haptic perception andmerely discern that
their distinction, potentially hyperintensional, is intelligibly required. The need to
bridge the gap between the subject and object constituted by their distinction only
arises if their unity is not in this way presupposed. Thus bridging the gap between
subject an object by having bodily sensation be coordinated with tangible qualities
of external bodies via the operation of sympathy and its attendant indirect realism
only arises if their unity in perceptual presentation is not presupposed but some-
thing to be constructed from elements and principles antecedently understood.
In grasping or enclosure the overall shape and volume of the object is directly
disclosed in a perceiver’s haptic encounter with it. Since I believe that perception
quite generally involves an irreducible presentational element, I do not believe
that the haptic presentation of the tangible qualities of external bodies could be
constructed out of elements and principles understood independently of haptic
perception. So I am debarred from the synthetic approach. It is, at any rate,
inconsistent with our implicit awareness of the hand’s conﬁguration and force in
grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception. Thus I proceed
analytically. Presupposing the unity of haptic presentation, I try to determine the
intelligible structure it must display if it is so much as possible. The claim that the
presentation of tangible qualities of external bodies in haptic experience involves
the operation of sympathy should be understood in this light. It is not the claim
that one thing, the tangible qualities of external bodies, is mediately presented
by another thing, the presentation of aspects of the subject’s corporeal nature in
bodily sensation. Rather, it is the claim that the presentation of tangible qualities
of external bodies in haptic experience is an irreducible unity that is governed by
the principle of sympathy. Feeling a tangible quality in an external body and in
conformity with it just is the presentation of that quality in tactile experience and
can be analytically explicated in terms of the operation of sympathy.
2.5 Sensing Limits
In grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, the overall
shape and volume of an external body is present in haptic experience thanks to an
implicit experience of an external limit to the hand’s activity. If an experienced
limit to the hand’s activity discloses tangible qualities of an external body, then the
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idea of the experience of a limit, however implicit, must be in good order. But is it
really? Within the phenomenological tradition, Derrida (2005) has expressed his
doubts. Our present purpose is not to lay these doubts to rest in a way that would
persuade a determined Derridean skeptic but rather to make intelligible, at least
to ourselves, what would be involved in the experience of a limit, and so, in this
way, sketch a few of its features.
In a representative passage, Derrida describes an aporia involved in the ﬁgure
of touch:
Above all, nobody, no body, no body proper has ever touched—with
a hand or through skin contact—something as abstract as a limit. In-
versely, however, and that is the destiny of this ﬁgurality, all one ever
does touch is a limit. To touch is to touch a limit, a surface, a bor-
der, an outline. Even if one touches an inside, “inside” of any thing
whatsoever, one does it following the point, the line or surface, the
borderline of a spatiality exposed to the outside, offered—precisely—
on its running border, offered to contact. … This surface, line or point,
this limit, therefore, … ﬁnds itself to be at the same time touchable
and untouchable: it is as is every limit, certainly, but also well-nigh at
and to the limit, and on the exposed, or exposing, edge of an abyss, a
nothing, an “unfoundable” unfathomable, seeming still less touchable,
still more untouchable, if this were possible, than the limit it self of its
exposition. (Derrida, 2005, 103–4)
There is a lot to say about this passage and how the aporia it describes may, if at
all, pace Derrida, be resolved. One thing to get clearer about is the sense in which
a surface, understood as a limit, is abstract. On at least one good sense of the
abstract–concrete distinction, the surfaces of material bodies count as concrete—
they at least exist in space and time. But notice, as well, that the surfaces of ma-
terial bodies could not themselves be material. They are not themselves material
parts of the bodies whose surfaces they are. Surfaces are, in Sellars’ (1956, iv 23) apt
phrase, bulgy two-dimensional particulars. They are two-dimensional in the sense
that they lack thickness. But no material thing lacks thickness. This suggests an
alternative understanding of the sense in which such limits are abstract. Whether
it is sufficient to underwrite Derrida’s aporia is another matter. And there may
yet be other relevant senses in which a surface, understood as a limit, may be said
to be abstract. Another thing to get clearer about is whether the limit which is
said to be intangible is the same limit which we must be said to touch. Perhaps
like Protagorean arguments, at least on a Peripatetic diagnosis of them, the puzzle
turns on a conﬂation. After all, limits may be said of in many ways, and there may
be different senses in which we may be said to touch a limit.
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Notice, however, that the putatively intangible limit at work in this passage is a
spatial boundary, the surface of the object of tactile perception. An external limit
to the hand’s activity is not a spatial boundary or a surface, though it may disclose
these, if it is experienced as their sympathetic presentation. However, if there is a
puzzle about how anything as abstract, on some suitable understanding, as the limit
of a bounded bodymay be tangible, surely a limit to the hand’s activity is evenmore
abstract. After all, the limit to the hand’s activity is intangible—like virtue, and the
being of capacity more generally, as the Eleatic Visitor instructs the Giants in the
Sophist. Bodily awareness presents corporeal aspects of the embodied perceiver,
just as tactile perception presents corporeal aspects of its object. Our question is
whether anything as abstract as a limit to the hand’s activity so much as could be
the object of bodily awareness. Thus a variant of the Eleatic Visitor’s lesson raises,
as well, a question about the Giant’s appeal to the phenomenologically vivid and
primitively compelling experience of felt resistance to touch if it is to motivate
their corporealism.
What would it take to be aware of a limit to the hand’s activity? Such an
awareness would have to afford the subject with a contrast between the hand’s
present conﬁguration and a potential conﬁguration that extends beyond the points
at which the hand’s force is resisted by the self-maintaining forces of the object
grasped. Such an awareness would depend upon a psychological representation of
potential motor activity, a sense of how far one’s grasp may extend if unimpeded.
The representation of potential motor activity need only be apparent. I may have
a sense that I could reach the top shelf, but trying may reveal that I was mistaken.
A sense of the contrast between the hand’s present conﬁguration and a po-
tential conﬁguration beyond the limit of the grasped object’s boundaries may be
necessary for awareness of an external limit to the hand’s activity but it is not suffi-
cient. There is a crucial additional element involved in being aware of a limit to the
hand’s activity. Whenever I deliberately hold my hand in a certain conﬁguration
that is not completely outstretched, I may have a sense of potential conﬁgurations
extending beyond the present one, but I do not thereby experience a limit. The
relevant sense of limit involves a check or impediment to the will. So not only
does an awareness of a limit to the hand’s activity involve a kinaesthetic represen-
tation of potential motion, but it must also draw upon our sense of agency. Not
only must one have a sense of how far one’s grasp may extend if unimpeded, but
one must also have a sense of an impediment to one’s grasp. A sense of impedi-
ment arises out of a frustration of the will in being unable to extend one’s grasp
further. Moreover this second condition is related to the ﬁrst. The object of the
will is to extend the hand further in peripersonal space, the space of potential mo-
tor activity. The object of the will is thus represented on the kinaesthetic map.
The location of the hand’s conﬁguration in the space of potential motor activity is
2.5. SENSING LIMITS 55
only experienced as a limit insofar as it is the frustration and not the fulﬁlment of
the will. The frustration arises from the inability to extend the hand’s activity fur-
ther in peripersonal space, the object of the will being located in the space beyond
which the hand may extend its activity, and this despite a sense of effort exerted
in trying to obtain the object of the will—the felt force, however implicit, of the
hand’s activity in conﬂict with the self-maintaining forces of the object grasped.
A qualiﬁcation is needed. This may seem unobvious if one focussed exclusively
and superﬁcially on the case of grasping a rigid, solid body. But here too careful re-
ﬂection reveals that something more needs to be said. For it is not as if, in grasping
a rigid, solid body, one is trying to crush that body. One typically does not sum-
mon all one’s strength in grasping a stone. Or consider grasping a fragile body, an
abandoned chrysalis, say, or a body whose overall shape and volume can deform
if sufficient pressure is applied, such as a sponge. If I want to have a sense of the
chrysalis’ or sponge’s overall shape and volume I must take care, in conforming to
their contours, not to exert so much effort that I crush or otherwise deform what
is in my grasp. Crushing or deforming the grasped object would defeat the end of
that activity, to become aware of that object’s overall shape and volume had prior
to our grasping it.
What these cases reveal is that the impediment to the will is not purely exter-
nal. Let me be unequivocal. There must be an external element to the impediment
to the will insofar as this is to form the basis of the sympathetic presentation of
the extra-somatic. Thus the self-maintaining forces of the object grasped are an
impediment to the force of the hand’s activity insofar as they conﬂict with it. Typ-
ically, however, we wish to sense the limit of our hand’s activity in grasping a body
consistent with not crushing or deforming that body. Again, crushing or deform-
ing the grasped object would defeat the end of that activity, to become aware of
that object’s overall shape and volume had prior to our grasping it and sustained
in our grasp. Should it be crushed or deformed, it would come to have some other
overall shape and volume. Its original overall shape and volume, which we aimed to
sense, would, in being destroyed, remain forever unfelt. This has the consequence
that the limit to the hand’s activity, while external, is not purely external. Our own
ends constrain, as well, our hand’s activity.
We sense a limit to the hand’s activity despite a sense of effort. Sartre has
objected to the posited sense of effort, at least as it arises in Maine de Biran’s
work:
Either it is a thing among other things, or else it is that by which things
are revealed to me. But it can not be both at the same time. Similarly I
see my hand touching objects, but do not know it in its act of touching
them. This is the fundamental reason why that famous “sensation of
effort” of Maine de Biran does not really exist. For my hand reveals to
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me the resistance of objects, their hardness or softness, but not itself.
(Sartre, L’Être et le néant; Barnes 1958, 304)
The body is lived and not known. This explains why the famous “sensa-
tion of effort” by which Maine de Biran attempted to reply to Hume’s
challenge is a psychological myth. We never have any sensation of our
effort, but neither do we have peripheral sensations from the muscles,
bones, tendons, or skin, which have been suggested to replace the sen-
sation of effort. We perceive the resistance of things. What I perceive
when I want to lift this glass to my mouth is not my effort but the
heaviness of the glass—that is, its resistance to entering into an instru-
mental complex which I have made appear in the world. (Sartre, L’Être
et le néant; Barnes 1958, 324)
One may complain that a sense of effort need not be narrowly construed as a sen-
sation of effort. Given certain background assumptions, the sensation of effort
can sound like an oxymoron. Speciﬁcally, if sensations are the passive reception
of sensory impressions, and effort involves activity, one may well wonder what a
sensation of effort could be if it is not merely the passive sensory effect of ac-
tive effort. But a sense of effort need not be so narrowly construed as a sensation
understood as a passive sensory impression.
Setting that aside, there is a more principled issue moving Sartre, namely the
distinction between a thing among other things and that by which things are re-
vealed to me. The former are known, the latter lived. Sartre’s point seems to be
that the body’s effort or activity is not the kind of thing that is known by percep-
tion, though perception is a way in which we can know about how things are with
a thing among things. Sartre is right at least to this extent. In grasping a rough-
hewn stone, the hand of our hominid ancestor discloses to them the resistance of
the stone, its hardness and rigidity. In grasping or enclosure the perceiver explicitly
attends to the tangible qualities of the object of haptic exploration. The activity
of the hand in grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception,
is not itself the object of explicit awareness. If the object of explicit awareness
is the object of the perceptual experience that affords such awareness, then the
activity of the hand in grasping or enclosure is not perceived. Explicit awareness
of the hand’s activity would erode the sympathetic presentation of the corporeal
aspects of the object of haptic investigation. But Sartre goes too far if he denies,
as well, that we are implicitly aware of the hand’s activity in grasping or enclosure.
Like Fulkerson, Sartre’s suggestion limits phenomenological character of tactile
experience to what we are explicitly aware of in undergoing such an experience.
Derrida, too, is skeptical of the Biranian sense of effort, though for different
reasons:
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What does the word eﬀort … designate, appearing as it does in this sin-
gular context…, where effort, precisely, stalls in making an eﬀort. At the
point where effort meets the limit forcing it to exert itself in this eﬀort?
Derrida 2005, 110
But the sense of effort, however implicit, does not make its appearance solely at
the point where effort stalls, at the external limit to the force of the hand’s activity.
Effort appearing in such a singular context would indeed be puzzling. What sort of
effort would it be whose actualization is necessarily ineffectual? However, a sense
of effort may intensify as one’s tightening grip comes into conﬂict with the self-
maintaining forces of body that resist it, but it was manifest, however implicitly,
even in the preparatory reach.
These brief remarks would be insufficient to assuage the doubts of a deter-
mined Derridean skeptic. Fortunately, however, there were not meant for such a
task. Rather, the Derridean skeptic was invoked as a foil against which to do two
things: First, to make intelligible, for ourselves, what an implicit experience of an
external limit would be, and second, to sketch a few of its features as exhibited
in grasping or enclosure. Without providing anything like a full account, I hope
I have said enough to render prima facie intelligible the conception of an implicit
awareness of a limit to the hand’s activity, the passivities of matter constraining
the active wax of haptic perception, not least because it is a precondition for the
sympathetic presentation of the tangible qualities of external bodies in haptic ex-
perience. For it is this impediment of the will that makes the disclosure of the
extra-somatic in haptic experience possible.
Notice that the felt resistance to touch involved in grasping or enclosure, un-
derstood as a mode of haptic perception, exhibits considerably more structure
than the haptic indirect realist allows (section 2.3). In taking felt resistance to
touch to be the object of active attention there was a temptation to conceive of it
as a sensory impression existing, somehow, within the mind, as a conscious modiﬁ-
cation of the perceiving subject, as the objectiﬁcation of appearing as appearance,
at least by CookWilson’s lights. Think again of the ways in which that experience
depends upon kinaesthesia and our sense of agency. Not only does felt resistance
to touch involve a sense of how far one’s grasp may extend if unimpeded (and so
locating the hand’s present conﬁguration in a broader space of potential motor
activity) but also the frustration of the will in being able to extend that grasp no
further, consistent with one’s other ends, and this despite the effort exerted. This
complex capacity involves the representation of potential motor activity that is not
only ego-centrically structured, but also teleologically structured by the will. No
conception of sensory impression available to the indirect realist displays a similar
structure.
Our initial puzzle about bodily awareness’ contribution to haptic perception
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was generated by a conception of bodily awareness as a mere mode of self-pre-
sentation. However, if among the objects of bodily awareness are the limits of
the body or its activity, then bodily awareness is more than a mere mode of self-
presentation. AsMartin (1992) argues, to be aware of the limits of the body is to be
aware, inter alia, of a space beyond those limits. Proprioceptive awareness is thus
not conﬁned to what is within those limits. Similarly, to be aware of the limits
of the body’s activity, at least in the case of grasping or enclosure understood as a
mode of perception, is to be aware, inter alia, of how far one’s grasp may extend if
unimpeded. It is thus to be aware of, at least, a space of potential motor activity
normally accessible except for the external impediment that presently limits the
body’s activities. And in each case, bodily awareness being more than a mere mode
of self-presentation in disclosing a limit is what allows it to play a role in perceiving
what lies beyond that limit. For Martin, the sense of the limit of the body allows
the perceiver to use their body tomeasure other bodies in contact with it. Similarly,
the sense of the limit to the hand’s activity allows the perceiver to sympathetically
respond to the self-maintaining forces of the external body and so present that
body and its tangible qualities in haptic perception. So bodily awareness is no
mere mode of self-presentation, which is not to say that it does not sometimes
function as such.
Let me end by emphasizing a crucial difference. Martin’s (1992) conception of
touch and the present conception are superﬁcially consistent and yet fundamen-
tally opposed. They are superﬁcially consistent insofar as they concern apparently
distinct if related subject matters. Martin provides an account of static touch, sen-
sation by contact, whereas I aim to account for a species of haptic touch. This con-
sistency is superﬁcial since it masks an explanatory difference. For Martin, static
touch is fundamental and haptic touch is to be explained in terms of it, albeit tem-
porally extended and supplemented with various forms of bodily awareness. In
contrast, I am inclined to think of haptic touch as fundamental and to explain
static touch as a degenerate form of haptic touch. Indeed, many of Martin’s exam-
ples can be described in this way. I do not mean to settle this difference here. I
only observe that this is why we focus on different limits, the limit of the body, for
Martin, as opposed to the limit of the body’s activity, for myself. That we focus
on different limits is a manifestation of the deeper underlying disagreement about
explanatory priority of static and haptic touch.
2.6 The Stoics
I observed earlier that our present conception of sympathy can be an obstacle to
appreciating how feeling something in another thing and in conformity with it is
itself a mode of sympathy. We all too easily understand sympathy as a kind of
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fellow-feeling akin to compassion and pity when, in fact, sympathy, understood
as an explanatory principle, had a history prior to being proposed as the principle
governing fellow-feeling. To bring this abstract explanatory principle into view, it
is useful to consider a select history. And not only to distance ourselves from our
own presuppositions about sympathy. A consideration of a select history of this
principle allows us to introduce some important claims about the operative notion
of sympathy. Speciﬁcally, we shall consider sympathy as a principle of action at a
distance in Stoic physics in this section and Plotinus’ use of sympathy in explain-
ing distal perception in vision and audition in the next. As we shall see, Plotinus’
conception of sympathy is no mere Stoic borrowing, but that there is an impor-
tant explanatory contrast with the Stoic conception of sympathy, an explanatory
contrast that parallels the one between the synthetic and analytic approaches, and
one that I shall exploit in appropriating Plotinian sympathy in an account of haptic
presentation.
According to the standard Galenic narrative, the Stoic conception of sympathy
is grounded in the medical thought of the Hippocratic tradition (for doubts about
this Galenic narrative see Holmes 2015). It is easy to be impressed, as ancient
medical opinion was, with how affecting a part of an animal’s body may affect an-
other part of their body without affecting the parts between (see, for example, the
Hippocratic Peri trophé and Galen’s De locis aﬀectis). Consider how the Hippocratic
author of Peri trophé understands symptoms:
Signs: tickling, ache, rupture, mind, sweat, sediment in urine, rest,
tossing, condition of the eyes, imaginations, jaundice, hiccoughs, epilepsy,
blood entire, sleep, from both these and all other things in accordance
with nature, and everything else of a similar nature that tends to harm
or help. (Hippocratic author, Peri trophé 26; Jones 1957, 351)
Symptoms are understood to be signs of underlying conditions, in the case of ill
health, of disturbances in parts of the animal’s body without any apparent distur-
bance in the parts between. The nature of an animal, whether in sickness or in
health, is the nature of a composite natural body whose parts are organized with
reference to the function of the whole and these parts may thus sympathetically in-
teract. Thus, in a passage that Galen never tires of citing, our Hippocratic author
writes:
Conﬂux one, conspiration one, all things in sympathy; all the parts as
forming a whole, and severally the parts in each part, with reference to
the work. (Hippocratic author, Peri trophé 23; Jones 1957, 351)
Thus a tickling, ache, or rupture is a sign for an underlying condition since it is the
sympathetic effect of an occurrence in a complex whole.
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The Stoics believed that such medical phenomena were subject to a corporeal
explanation, involving sympathy as its principle. And since they conceived of the
cosmos as a whole as a living being, the principle involved in that explanation,
sympathy, was elevated to the status of a cosmic principle.
What, then, was the Stoics’ corporeal explanation of sypmathetic affection?
According to the Stoics, the soul that pervades and animates a living body is com-
posed of pneuma, a kind of rariﬁedmixture of air and ﬁre (Stoicorumveterumfragmenta
2 773–89). The soul, while corporeal, pervades the body. It does so not by ﬁlling
interstitial spaces within the body, like water absorbed by a sponge. Rather, active
pneuma is sufficiently rariﬁed that it can occupy the same space as the passive mat-
ter of the body it animates, the way warmth may pervade a sun-baked stone. The
pneuma in a living body is in a state of tension. This tension in the pneuma gives rise
to a continuous wave-like motion (Stoicorum veterum fragmenta 2 448, 450-7). Since
the pneuma in a living body is in a state of tensional motion, affecting some part
of the body will affect the living body as a whole. Moreover, and more impor-
tantly for our present purposes, when a part of a living body is affected, a similar
or different affection may be transmitted via the tensional motion of the pneuma
to another part of the body without affecting the parts between, depending upon
the disposition of these parts.
The operation of sympathy was not conﬁned to ordinary living bodies. The
sensible cosmos itself was conceived to be a living being as well, though perhaps an
extraordinary one, at least by our lights. The sensible cosmos was thus conceived
to possess the same kind of unity as living beings. The sensible cosmos, like all
living beings, has a soul that animates it, the World-Soul. The World-Soul, like all
souls, is composed of pneuma, and the souls of ordinary living beings are, in some
sense, part of the World-Soul. Like ordinary living beings, the sensible cosmos is
united by an all pervading pneuma in a state of tensional motion. Thus, according
to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Chrysippus:
ﬁrst assumes that the whole of substance is uniﬁed by a breath (pneuma)
which pervades it all, and by which the universe is sustained and sta-
bilized and made interactive with itself (sympathes … auto) (Alexander
of Aphrodisias, On Mixture and Growth, 216 14–218 6; Stoicorum Veterum
Fragmenta 2 473; Long and Sedley 1987, 48 C)
So according to Chryssipus, disparate parts of the sensible cosmos may sympathet-
ically interact due to the all pervasive pneuma. Moreover, this sympathetic interac-
tion is part of what explains the unity of the sensible cosmos. Thus sympathy was
transformed, in Stoic thought, into a cosmic principle of action at a distance.
While perhaps Posidonius is the most famous proponent of cosmic sympathy
(Augustine, Civitas Dei 5 2), the doctrine goes back at least as far as Chrysippus
and, arguably, has roots in Plato’s Timaeus (on Stoic sympathy see Sambursky 1959;
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Meyer 2009; Brouwer 2015; on the Timaeus and sympathy see Emilsson 2015). Sym-
pathy, as a principle of action at a distance, was used to explain a variety of natural
phenomena, such as the inﬂuence of the moon on the tides (Sextus Empiricus,M 9
79; Cicero,De divinatione 2 34) and the efficacy of divination (Cicero,De divinatione,
and Seneca, Naturales quaestiones 2; on how explanations of divination are a part of
Stoic natural philosophy see Struck 2007.)
2.7 Plotinus
Plotinus appeals to sympathy to explain a variety of natural and psychological phe-
nomena. Plotinus’ use of sympathy has been portrayed as a Stoic borrowing (Emils-
son 1988, chapter 3, Ierodiakonou 2006), but most likely its roots lie in Plato’s
Timaeus (Emilsson, 2015). On that hypothesis, Plotinus’ use of Stoic material is
conﬁned to elaborating what is, by his lights, essentially Platonic ideas.
There are number of differences between Plotinus’ use of sympathy and the
Stoic’s use.
First, according to Plotinus, the soul is incorporeal and so could not be com-
posed of pneuma, no matter how rareﬁed the admixture of ﬁre and air. So the
mechanism of tensional motion in an all pervading pneuma that, on the Stoic ac-
count, explained the operation of sympathy is simply left out of Plotinus’ account.
Moreover, not only does Plotinus abandon the Stoic explanation of sympathy as
the effect of tensional motion in an all pervading pnuema, but he seems to offer no
alternative mechanism in its place (Emilsson, 1988, 48).
This latter fact may seem like a deﬁcit of Plotinus’ account until we realize
that there is a deeper issue at work, here, other than Plotinus’ rejection of Stoic
corporealism. As the view that Alexander of Aphrodisias attributes to Chryssipus
makes clear, the all pervading pneuma and its tensional motion is meant to unify
the cosmos. So while both the Stoics and Plotinus take sympathy to only oper-
ate within a unity, the Stoics further hold that this unity is subject to explanation.
There is, then, an important difference in explanatory priority that leads Ploti-
nus to reject the Stoic explanation of sympathy in terms of the tensional motion
of pneuma. It is not the corporeal character of the Stoic explanation of that unity
that leads to Plotinus’ rejection, so much as unity being subject to explanation at
all. The hyperontic One is the fundamental principle, or arche, of Plotinus’ meta-
physics. Thus for Plotinus, unity is an explanans not an explanandum. That sympathy
only operates within a unity is a consequence, for Plotinus, of that unity making
possible the operation of sympathy. No further mechanism is speciﬁed since, by
Plotinus’ lights, no further mechanism is required. This second, explanatory dif-
ference roughly corresponds to the explanatory difference between the synthetic
and analytic approaches discussed earlier.
62 CHAPTER 2. SYMPATHY
If this second explanatory difference seems odd to you, or you remain in anyway
incredulous, consider Bas van Fraassen’s explanation of how action at a distance in
a system of physical events would be an intelligible effect of global constraints on
that system should there be such constraints:
By a global constraint I mean a principle that applies to a system as a
whole, and is not equivalent to any principle that applies distributively
to the localized particulars or point locations in that system. As ex-
treme illustration, imagine a world in which the totalmass is conserved,
but by the happenstance that some bits of matter spontaneously ap-
pear in random locations, to balance the mass that disappears else-
where. Here the global principle of conservation of total mass of the
system is not derivable from principles that govern any proper part.
(van Fraassen, 1989, 3)
The system of physical events is a uniﬁed manifold, and the global constraint, ap-
plying as it does to the whole, is an aspect or manifestation of the unity of that
manifold. If it is coherent that there should be such global constraints on the
system of physical events, then action at a distance is a potential intelligible ef-
fect. Put another way, the operation of sympathy in a uniﬁed manifold would be
explained by its unity.
While Plotinus was not the ﬁrst to use sympathy to explain psychological phe-
nomena, his application of sympathy to the psychological phenomena was broader
than many of his predecessors. Thus in a remarkable anticipation of David Hume
and Adam Smith, Plotinus writes:
Indeed the argument deriving from facts opposed [to the assumption
of complete separation of souls] asserts that we do share each other’s
experiences (sympathein) when we suffer with (synalgountas) others from
seeing their pain and feel happy and relaxed [in their company] and
are naturally drawn to love them. For without a sharing of experience
there could not be love for this reason. (Plotinus, If All Souls are One,
Ennead 4 9 3 1–5; Armstrong 1984, 433–5)
Sympathy involves the sharing of experiences between distinct individual souls.
As in Hume’s system, it is an interpersonal principle, and so underwrites a kind of
action at a distance within the social sphere. So the unity of all souls—whatever,
exactly, that doctrine amounts to—makes it possible for distinct individual souls to
sympathetically respond to one another and so share in one another’s experiences.
In his explanation of sympathy in the second book of the Treatise, however, Hume
does not himself presuppose the unity of those who sympathetically interact, and
so his account is, in that respect at least, more like the Stoic’s than Plotinus’.
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Not only does Plotinus use sympathy to explain fellow-feeling, but he also uses
sympathy to explain the operation of our distal senses, speciﬁcally, in vision and
audition (see especially the treatise, On Diﬃculties of the Soul iii, or On Sight, Ennead
4 5 and the supplementary work, On Sense-Perception and Memory, Ennead 4 6). He
acknowledges that he was not the ﬁrst to do so. Accounts of perception in terms
of sympathy can be found in Cleomedes’ Meteōra and Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus.
So Plotinus understands sympathy as a principle that explains a variety of natural
and psychological phenomena including perception and fellow-feeling. Plotinus
thus provides an important historical precedent for the idea that sympathy can be
understood with sufficient generality so that it may be at work both in percep-
tion and fellow-feeling without one reducing to the other (as in Whitehead’s 1978
conception of perceptual prehension as the outgrowth of blind emotion).
Themain elements of Plotinus’ account of sympathy are in play in the following
representative passage:
This one universe is all bound together in shared experience (sympathes)
and is like one living creature, and that which is far is really near, just as,
in one of the individual living things, a nail or horn or ﬁnger or one of
the other limbs which is not contiguous: the intermediate part leaves a
gap in the experience and is not affected, but that which is not near is
affected. For the like parts are not situated next to each other, but are
separated by others between, but share their experiences (sympaschonta)
because of their likeness, and it is necessary that something which is
done by a part not situated beside it should reach the distant part; and
since it is a living thing and all belongs to a unity nothing is so distant
in space that is not close enough to the nature of the one living thing
to share experience (sympathein). (Plotinus, On Diﬃculties about the Soul
ii, or On Sight, Ennead 4 4 32 14–22; Armstrong 1984, 235–7)
There are a number of observations to make about this passage.
First, like the Timaeus and Stoic accounts, Plotinus thinks that the sensible cos-
mos has the unity of a living being. And since living beings are essentially ensouled,
sympathy is based on the unity of the soul. So the unity of the ensouled living being
is explanatorily prior to the sympathetic interaction of its parts.
Second, the effects of sympathy may be between non-contiguous parts of the
living being. The distance between the parts of a living being need not be an ob-
stacle to their sympathetic interaction. The parts of a living being that sympathet-
ically interact may be non-contiguous, but that is consistent with contiguous parts
of the living being sympathetically interacting. The point is that sympathy is a
mode of affection that does not require contact between cause and effect. While
Plotinus acknowledges that there is affection by contact, he alsomaintains, like the
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Stoics before him, that there are natural phenomena that can only be explained by
sympathetic affection.
Third, Plotinus links the sympathetic interaction between the parts of a living
being with their similarity (Emilsson, 1988, 2015). In cases of sympathetic affec-
tion, one part of the uniﬁed manifold formally assimilates to a potentially non-
contiguous part by becoming like it. Indeed, it is the link between sympathy and
similarity that explains why a distant part may be affected without the parts be-
tween being affected. This will happen when only the distant part, but not the
parts between, is suitably similar to the affecting part of the living being: “For the
like parts are not situated next to each other, but are separated by others between,
but share their experiences (sympaschonta) because of their likeness …” However, as
we shall see, this should be understood so as to be consistent with the unity of the
soul being explanatorily prior to any likeness that may obtain between the parts of
the living being that it animates.
Fourth, the similarity between the parts of the living being that may sympa-
thetically interact must be suitably understood. Suppose that some part of the
living being comes to be affected in a certain way. A potentially distant part of
that same living being, because of its suitable disposition, may come to be affected
in that way. Let F be this way of being affected. The potentially distant part is
initially not F, but comes to be F, by sympathetically interacting with the initial
part’s being F. So the potentially distant part is, at the beginning of this process,
only potentially like the initial part actually is. So the affected part’s formal assim-
ilation to the affecting part should be understood, in the Peripatetic fashion, in
terms of the capacity to become like.
Finally, it is consistent with the account provided by this passage that there be
considerable leeway in how the formal assimilation is understood. So far, we have
envisioned the initial part being F and a potentially distant part becoming F as a re-
sult of their sympathetic interaction. But the operative notion of similarity might
be understood more broadly than this. Perhaps because of the disposition of the
parts, the initial part being F induces in a suitably disposed, potentially distant part
the affectG, at least ifG is somehow suitably related to F, if F andG are correlatives
(in something like Aristotle’s sense in the Categoriae), or at least not incongruous.
Think, for example, of fellow-feeling. Plotinus, like Hume and Smith after him,
thinks that fellow-feeling is explained by sympathy operating between individuals.
One person’s esteem may, due to the operation of sympathy, cause in another the
sentiment of pride, as Hume contends. But the latter person’s pride, even if it is
like the ﬁrst person’s esteem in being an agreeable sentiment, is a distinct affect.
Pride may, in some sense, be the appropriate response to another’s esteem, and
like it in being an agreeable sentiment, but it is not their esteem reduplicated so
much as a correlative response. Collingwood provides a nice example. Thanks to
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the operation of natural sympathy a dog will feel the terror of a rabbit. However,
“terror in a rabbit will communicate itself to a pursuing dog not as terror but as
a desire to kill, for a dog has the psychical ‘nature’ of a hunting animal” (Colling-
wood, 1938, 231). There is another dimension along which the relevant similarity
may be generalized. Even if the subsequent affect is not correlative to the initial
affect, perhaps the subsequent affect may be like, if not exactly like, the affect of
the initial part. There is some evidence that Plotinus himself exercised consider-
able leeway in understanding similarity here. The stars may affect the course of
human affairs, but there is nothing in the stars that is very much like their sublu-
nary effects. Whatever Plotinus’ considered view is, the passage, as it stands, is
consistent with wider and narrower interpretations of the role of similarity in the
operation of sympathy.
Importantly, for our purposes, Plotinus uses sympathy to give an account of
the distal senses, vision and audition (On Diﬃculties about the Soul iii, or On Sight,
Ennead 4 5, 4 6). Though that is his avowed intent, the bulk of the discussion con-
cerns vision with Plotinus maintaining that a structurally similar account applies,
as well, to audition. Vision and audition are distal senses. By means of them, the
perceiver may become aware of the object of perception located at a distance. This
is a remarkable fact, about which ancient thinkers devoted considerable ingenu-
ity in explaining. An important part of what is at issue is the nature of the causal
transmission between the distal object and the sensory organs of the perceiver. If
that was all that was at issue, however, it would be of antiquarian interest only.
We rightly believe that we have an approximately correct account of the causal
transmission in distal perception involving, in the case of vision and audition, the
propagation of light and sound waves.
But, equally, part of what was at issue was not just the causal inﬂuence of ob-
jects of perception located at a distance from the perceiver but a puzzle about
their sensory presentation as well. As I emphasized at the outset, insofar as the
distant object is present in our experience, we are tempted to say that we are in
perceptual contact with it, that we apprehend, or grasp, that object. However, insofar
as that object is distant, we could not be in contact with it, at least not literally.
Thus Broad (1965, 33) remarks that “It is a natural, if paradoxical, way of speaking
to say that seeing seems to ‘bring us into contact with remote objects’ and to reveal
their shapes and colors”. So these ancient discussions concern, as well, what sen-
sory presentation could be if it is not, indeed, tantamount to sensation by contact.
In these ancient discussions, then, issues about causal transmission and sensory
presentation are intertwined, which is not to say confused. The present point is
important, not only for reading Plotinus on perception, but for the use I propose
to put that reading. Recall, the present historical digression is in aid of the proposal
that haptic presentation may be analytically explicated in terms of the operation
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of sympathy.
Emilsson (1988, chapter 3) correctly emphasizes that sympathy, in Plotinus’ ac-
count of vision, is meant to provide an account of how the distal object of vision
affects the eyes. Thus the object of perception is the causal agent affecting the
patient, the organ of perception. Since the object is distant, it cannot affect the
sense organ by contact. And since, at least within the sensible cosmos, Plotinus
views affection not involving contact to instead involve sympathy, it is natural for
him to understand the distant object acting upon the organ of perception bymeans
of sympathy.
The principle obstacle to this line of reasoning concerns the invalidity of the
inference from the object of perception not affecting the sense organs by contact
to there being no affection by contact in the causing of that perception. The line
of reasoning above seems to present us with a stark choice: Either the object af-
fects the sense organ by contact or by sympathetic affection. But consider just
one alternative. Perhaps, as on the Peripatetic model, the object affects the sense
organ only mediately, by affecting an intervening medium, that in turn affects the
sense organ with which it is in contact. The Peripatetic model accepts that the
distant object cannot be in contact with the perceiver’s sense organ, but concludes
from this, not the need to postulate a principle of action at a distance, but that
causal transmission from the object of perception to the sense organ requires the
existence of a suitable medium, in the case of vision, the illuminated transparent.
Plotinus is well aware of this obstacle and devotes considerable effort in criti-
cizing accounts that postulate a medium and other alternatives. We shall not re-
view Plotinus’ critical discussion here, nor who his likely targets were (for discus-
sion see Emilsson 1988, chapter 3.1). However, I shall make an observation about
just one of Plotinus objections:
For if our perception resulted from the air being previously affected,
when we looked at the object of sight we should not see it, but we
should get our perception from the air which lay close to us, just as
when we are warmed. (Plotinus, On Diﬃculties about the Soul iii, or On
Sight, Ennead 4 5 2 50–55; Armstrong 1984, 289)
Plotinus is claiming that if the affection of the perceiver’s sense organ involves the
intervention of the medium, then the perception that would result would present
not some sensible aspect of the distal object but, rather, with some sensible aspect
of the intervening medium.
What is presently important is not the plausibility of Plotinus’ claim (the full
assessment of which would involve specifying his target and explaining his explana-
tory framework, something from which one may depart in varying degrees), but
rather with how issues about the causal inﬂuence of the object of perception are
bound up with issues about their sensory presentation. It is for this reason that I
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suspect that Emilsson goes too far in conﬁning sympathy to explaining the action
at a distance involved in visual perception. To be sure, sympathy provides Plotinus
with such an account. But sympathy explains, as well, at least in part, how it is that
we are presented with the distant visible object and not the intervening medium.
That explanation, however, is never made fully explicit, which is unfortunate since
we are interested in explaining sensory presentation, and not action at a distance,
in terms of the principle of sympathy.
Plotinus concedes that perception would not be possible in the absence of an
intermediary. But Plotinus insists that this is not because of the absence of a
medium, but rather “because the sympathy of the living being with itself and of
its parts with each other” would be disrupted (OnDiﬃculties about the Soul iii, or On
Sight, Ennead 4 5 3 15–19). Insofar as the observation that perception is not pos-
sible in the absence of an intermediary is meant to motivate the postulation of a
medium, what reason it provides should be understood on the model of inference
to the best explanation. If that is right, then the fact that Plotinus has provided an
equally credible alternative explanation means that the reason for the postulation
of a medium is, to that extent, undermined. But why should we prefer Plotinus’
alternative? To address this, Plotinus provides the following thought experiment:
if there was another universe, that is another living being making no
contribution to the life of this one, and there was an eye “on the back
of the sky”, would it see that other universe at a proportionate distance?
(Plotinus, OnDiﬃculties about the Soul iii, or On Sight, Ennead 4 5 3 21–24;
Armstrong 1984, 293)
The eye on the back of the sky is an image Plotinus derives from Plato’s Phaedrus:
When [the gods] go to feast at the banquet they have a steep climb to
the high tier at the rim of heaven … when the souls we call immortals
reach the top, they moved outward and take their stand on the high
ridge of heaven, where its circular motion carries them around as they
stand while they gaze upon what is outside heaven. (Plato, Phaedrus 247
b1–c2; Nehemas and Woodruff in Cooper 1997, 525)
Like the gods feasting at their banquet, the eye on the back of the sky is look-
ing outward, beyond the conﬁnes of the sensible cosmos (“What is in this place is
without color and without shape and without solidity …” Phaedrus 247 c 6–7; Nehe-
mas and Woodruff in Cooper 1997, 525). Sympathy only operates within the unity
provided by the soul of a living being. Since the soul of the other living being, a
sensible cosmos distinct from the one within which we reside, makes no contri-
bution to the life of this one, understood as our sensible cosmos, the parts of that
other living being cannot sympathetically affect the parts of this one. They eye on
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the back of the sky fails to see the other universe, a sensible cosmos, at a propor-
tionate distance, not because of the intervening void, but because the unity that
makes a sympathetic response possible does not obtain between the eye in this
sensible cosmos and any of the parts in the other sensible cosmos. So the eye on
the back of the sky thought experiment is meant to be a case where there is no
intermediary, but sight fails, not because of the absence of a medium, but because
the conditions that make possible sympathetic interaction do not obtain.
Plotinus devotes the ﬁnal chapter of that treatise to elaborating the thought
experiment (On Diﬃculties about the Soul iii, or On Sight, Ennead 4 5 8). His dis-
cussion is compact and often obscure. So a reasonable treatment of that chapter
would require a close exegesis. However, I want to draw our attention to one as-
pect of his discussion that bears on the explanatory priority of the unity of the
soul. Speciﬁcally, Plotinus denies that the similarity between the parts of the liv-
ing being, their capacity to become like one another, is sufficient to explain their
sympathetic interaction. So, on the view that Plotinus opposes, one part’s being F
sympathetically causes another part to become F, say, not because they are parts
of a single ensouled living being, but because of the similarity between them, un-
derstood, in the Peripatetic fashion, as the capacity to become like. Notice that if
similarity alone suffices for the operation of sympathy, then the eye on the back
of the sky should be able to see, at a proportionate distance, the visible aspects of
that other sensible cosmos, if these are suitably similar to the visible aspects of the
sensible cosmos within which we reside. Plotinus, however, doubts that the visi-
ble aspects of that other cosmos would be sufficiently similar to visible aspects of
our own for a capacity to become like to ground the eye’s perception of the other
sensible cosmos:
Now the objects apprehended are apprehended in this way by being
like, because this soul [of the universe] has made them like, so that
they are not incongruous; so that if the active principle out there is the
altogether different soul [of that other universe], the objects assumed
to exist there would be in noway like the soul of our universe. (Plotinus,
OnDiﬃculties about the Soul iii, or On Sight, Ennead 4 5 8 26–31)
What this passage brings out is the way in which the unity of the soul is explana-
torily prior to the formal assimilation among the parts of the living being. Within
a single living being, because of the unity provided by the soul of that living be-
ing, parts that are suitably disposed to become like may sympathetically interact.
Similarity, subject to the qualiﬁcations previously discussed, may be a condition
on sympathetic affection, but is insufficient to explain that affection. And this
is so because the soul, the active formative principle of the living being, makes
its parts like or unlike depending upon the coherence and function of the whole.
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While it remains difficult to understand why, for Plotinus, there could be no du-
plicate cosmoi, his reasoning here clearly presupposes that the unity of the soul
is explanatorily prior to the disposition of the parts of the living being to become
like one another and so sympathetically interact.
Allow me to end this historical digression with an abstract description of the
principle of sympathy. Sympathy, as Plotinus conceives of it, is the explanatory
principle governing certain cases of formal assimilation. Sympathy is not a prin-
ciple in the sense that it possesses a content that may be discursively articulated,
such as a principle of mathematics. Sympathy is not a discursive principle, but
an explanatory principle governing certain cases of formal assimilation. Consider,
then, a uniﬁed manifold where one part of the manifold formally assimilates to
another, potentially non-contiguous, part, and does so because the parts, disposed
as they are, are united in the manifold, in the way that they are. Sympathy, then,
is the explanatory principle governing such cases of formal assimilation:
Sympathy: A case of formal assimilation is governed by the principle of
sympathy when and only when one part of a uniﬁed manifold formally
assimilates to a potentially non-contiguous part of that manifold be-
cause the parts, disposed as they are, are united in the manifold, in the
way that they are.
As we shall see in the next section, the formal assimilation of perceptual experi-
ence to is object in cases of haptic perception, while not an affection, also satisﬁes
this abstract description. The grasping or enclosure of an object, understood as a
mode of haptic perception, is a uniﬁed manifold where one part of the manifold,
the perceiver’s hand and the haptic experience its activity gives rise to, formally
assimilates to another part of the manifold, the object grasped, and does so be-
cause the parts, disposed as they are, the hand’s power of haptic activity and the
object’s self-maintaining forces, are united in the manifold in the way that they are,
in the hand’s active grasp, the joint upshot of the conﬂict between the force of the
hand’s activity and the object’s self-maintaining forces. If the formal assimilation
of haptic experience to its tangible object really satisﬁes this abstract description,
then sympathy is the principle governing haptic presentation.
2.8 The Principle ofHaptic Presentation
In grasping or enclosure, haptic perception is the joint upshot of forces in con-
ﬂict. On the one hand, there is the force exerted in molding the hand more pre-
cisely to the contours of the rigid, solid body. On the other hand, there are the
self-maintaining forces of the rigid, solid body itself. Haptic perception is the
joint upshot of the force exerted by the grasping hand and the self-maintaining
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forces of the object grasped. In resisting the force of the hand’s activity, the self-
maintaining forces that constitute the body’s rigidity and solidity present these
qualities in haptic awareness. In resisting the hand’s encroachment, the hand, and
the haptic experience it gives rise to, formally assimilates to the overall shape and
volume of the object grasped. And haptic experience’s assimilation to its object,
relative to the perceiver’s haptic perspective, is a kind of constitutive shaping. The
conscious qualitative character of that experience depends upon and derives from
the qualitative character of the tangible object as presented to the perceiver’s hap-
tic perspective, an event in peripersonal space, the distinctive manner in which
they are handling that object in the given circumstances of perception.
Perception places us in the very heart of things. In being present in our per-
ceptual experience, they constitutively shape that experience, at least relative to
the our partial perspective on things. It is for this reason that Ardley (1958) de-
scribes perception as a “communion” with its object. In an episode of perception,
the perceiver is united with the object of perception. Perceptual presentation is
a distinctive kind of unity. It follows that haptic presentation is itself a kind of
unity and more distinctive still. So in feeling the overall shape and volume of the
stone in their grasp, our hominid ancestor is united with tangible aspects of that
external body.
Just as the Stoics thought that the unity of the sensible cosmos was explicable
in terms of tensional motion in the all pervading pneuma, the synthetic approach
claims that the unity involved in haptic presentation is itself subject to further
explanation. However, in proceeding analytically rather than synthetically, the
unity of the perceiver and the object grasped in haptic presentation is explanato-
rily prior to whatever intelligible structure it must display. The analytic approach
thus shares at least this much with Plotinus’ account. It thus contrasts with any
account that would make the unity involved in haptic presentation subject to fur-
ther explanation in terms of elements and principles understood independently of
haptic perception.
So far, then, we have two important features of Plotinus’ account of sympathy
in play, namely, that sympathy only operates within a unity and the explanatory
priority of that unity. What about the role of similarity in the operation of sympa-
thy? In chapter 1.6, we discussed how haptic perception involves a kind of formal
assimilation. We observed that the hand formally assimilates to the overall shape
and volume of the object grasped in the sense that the shape of the hand’s inte-
rior becomes like, if not exactly like, the shape of the object grasped, and that
the volume of the region that the hand encloses becomes like, if not exactly like,
the volume of the object grasped. Not only does the hand formally assimilate to
the object grasped, but the experience that the grasping hand gives rise to itself
becomes like, if not exactly like, the tangible object presented in it, at least rel-
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ative to the perceiver’s haptic perspective. Moreover, the formal assimilation of
the hand, and the haptic experience that it gives rise to, should be understood, like
in Plotinus’ account, on the Peripatetic model. The hand, the mobile and elastic
instrument of haptic perception, only approximates the overall shape and volume
of the object grasped in grasping. It thus has the capacity to become like the ob-
ject grasped in these respects. Similarly, the perceiver possesses the capacity for
their haptic experience to become like whatever object is presented in it, relative
to their haptic perspective, the distinctive manner in which they are handling that
object, in the given circumstances of perception.
We saw that Plotinus account of sympathy allows for considerable leeway in the
formal assimilation it gives rise to. It is enough if the potentially non-contiguous
parts of the uniﬁed manifold become like, if not exactly like. After all, there is
nothing in the stars that is verymuch like anything sublunary and yet the sublunary
may be sympathetically affected by their activity. Similarly, with respect to the
formal assimilation involved in haptic presentation, if a tangible quality is present
in haptic experience, then that experience is like, if not exactly like, the tangible
quality present in it. Theophrastus was right to insist that not only is it absurd
to suppose that the eye becomes red when seeing red, but it is even more absurd
to suppose that the soul becomes red when seeing red (Priscian,Metaphrasis 1 3–8).
What would it even mean for an experience to be red or cube shaped? But these
absurdities only follow if the similarity involved in formal assimilation is exact. In
following Plotinus in allowing the parts of the uniﬁed manifold to become like, if
not exactly alike, Theophrastus’ aporia is avoided.
We saw in our discussion of the eye on the back of the sky thought experiment
that Plotinus understood the unity of the sensible cosmos to be explanatorily prior
to the capacity for its parts to become like or unlike one another. It is not just that
the unity is not subject to further explanation, but that the unity explains, as well,
the capacity of potentially non-contiguous parts of the manifold to formally as-
similate to one another. It is because of the unity provided by theWorld-Soul that
potentially distant parts of the sensible cosmos that are suitably disposed to be-
come like or unlike may sympathetically interact. The parts of the living being are
so arranged that their being suitably disposed to become like or unlike is explained
by the function and coherence of the whole. A similar pattern of explanation is
in play in the case of haptic perception. Recall, at least the formal assimilation at
work in haptic perception was understood as a kind of constitutive shaping. Not
only does the perceiver’s haptic experience formally assimilate to its tangible ob-
ject relative to their haptic perspective, in the sense that the conscious qualitative
character of the experience is like, if not exactly like, the qualitative character of
the tangible object present in it, but this formal assimilation is the effect of con-
stitutive shaping as well. If, in grasping, the perceiver feels the overall shape and
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volume in the object, then not only is this because of the object’s overall shape and
volume, but its feeling that way is also constituted, in part, by the overall shape
and volume felt. But the constitutive shaping of haptic experience by its object is
a “communion” with that object—in undergoing that experience the perceiver is
united, in a way, with the object of their perception. Moreover, as with Plotinus,
this unity explains, in part, the similarity between the haptic experience and its
tangible object. It is because the perceiver’s haptic experience is united with its
tangible object in haptic perception that the latter shapes the former. The formal
assimilation of haptic perception to its object, at least relative to the perceiver’s
haptic perspective, is the effect of constitutive shaping, and thus its conscious
qualitative character depends upon and derives from, at least in part, the tangible
qualitative character of the object grasped.
So far, then, we have seen that ﬁve key features of Plotinus’ account of sympathy
are in play in the haptic case. Now let us turn to the differences. There are four of
them.
First, for Plotinus, like the Stoics before him, sympathy is primarily a principle
of action at a distance. One of Plotinus’ innovations was the broad application of
such a principle in accounting for psychological phenomena such as fellow-feeling
and the distal senses of vision and audition. But haptic perception, and touchmore
generally, is not a distal sense, at least not in this way. Does this mean that a prin-
ciple of sympathy is inapplicable in the haptic case? No. Rather, the application
to the haptic case is a natural generalization. Consider one of Cicero’ examples of
Stoic sympathetic affection, the resonance of strings of a lyre (De divinatione 2 34,
Stoicorum veterum fragmenta 2 1211). When some strings of a lyre are struck, others
resonate. The strings, however, would resonate even if they were in contact with
the strings that were struck. And if we suppose, with the Stoics, that their reso-
nance was a result of sympathetic affection when they were at a distance, then their
resonance would remain the result of sympathetic affection even when in contact.
Thus, Porphyry, Plotinus’ student and literary executor, writes “It is not the case
that everything which operates on another thing produces effects that it produces
by contiguity and contact; in fact, even those things which operate by contiguity
and contact only employ contiguity incidentally” (Sententiae 6; John Dillon in Bris-
son 2005, 796). So understood, sympathy is a principle that merely allows action at
a distance. If sympathy merely allows action at a distance, then it may consistently
be in operation even between bodies in contact. Such cases employ contiguity in-
cidentally. In a way, this is the converse point of the eye on the back of the sky
thought experiment. The lesson of that thought experiment was meant to be that
from the absence of perception in the absence of an intermediary, we should not
infer that a medium is required for perceptual transmission. Similarly, from the
presence of contact in some cases of resonance, we should not infer that contact
2.8. THE PRINCIPLE OFHAPTIC PRESENTATION 73
is required for these resonant affections.
Sympathy may present the distal, but, more fundamentally, it presents what is
different or other than oneself. And in moving from self to other, the ﬁrst step is
the biggest. Moreover, this remains true regardless of whether the other is in con-
tact with the perceiver or located at a distance from them. Indeed, sympathy was
invoked to distinguish cases where felt resistance to the hand’s activity was due to
an internal limitation (such as the inability to stretch one’s index and middle ﬁn-
ger past a certain point) from cases where the felt resistance was due to an external
limitation (such as the self-maintaining forces that constitute the categorical bases
of an external body’s rigidity and solidity). It is because we were puzzled, in a way
that Plotinus was not, about how the limitation to the hand’s activity could dis-
close the presence and tangible qualities of an external body, that is was natural for
us to appeal to sympathy to resolve such puzzlement. The ﬁrst difference, then, is
merely a generalization of the Plotinian account, albeit a generalization prompted
by a problem that Plotinus never considered.
The second difference is a partial difference in explananda. Recall, sympathy, in
Plotinus’ account of perception, was meant to explain how the sense organ may be
affected by a distant sensible object without the intervention of a medium. And
this because, if the medium intervened, the perceiver would be presented with
sensible aspects, not of the distant object, but of the intervening medium. So
sympathy explained not only the action at a distance involved in distal percep-
tion, but the sensory presentation of distal objects as opposed to the intervening
medium. I have retained and elaborated the explanation of sensory presentation
in terms of sympathy while abandoning the explanation of action at a distance.
Vision may be a distal sense, but vision science reveals no action at a distance in
its operation. The present account is thus consistent with Descartes’ animadver-
sions against sympathy in Principia philosophiae, for there he objects only to invoking
sympathy to explain themotion of natural bodies (in, for example, magnetic attrac-
tion), explicitly leaving it open that such a principle should explain psychological
phenomena.
The third and fourth differences are, perhaps, more of a departure from our an-
cient sources. Plotinus’ account, not fully described here, sympathy merely play-
ing a role in a more complex phenomena, was intended as an alternative to the
Peripatetic account, at least as he understood it. Plotinus knows well and under-
stands Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Peripatetic philosophy, but his fruitful engage-
ment with Alexander’s philosophy was nonetheless the critical engagement of a
rival. The present appropriation of Plotinus’ notion of sympathy in explaining the
haptic presentation of an external body is not, however, a self-conscious alterna-
tive to the Peripatetic account. Rather, it is, perhaps, better understood as a neo-
Platonic elaboration of what is, essentially, a Peripatetic account of perception.
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Speciﬁcally, insofar as the assimilation of sensible form is understood as a mode
of constitutive shaping, we have retained the hylomorphic account of sensory pre-
sentation from De anima 2, at least on a certain interpretation of that doctrine
(Kalderon 2015). Plotinian sympathy was only invoked to elaborate the intelligible
structure of the haptic presentation of an external body and its tangible qualities.
So unlike Plotinus’ account, the present account is not an alternative to, but an
elaboration of, what is, essentially, a Peripatetic account of perception.
The fourth difference is also a departure from our ancient sources. Like the
Stoic account of sympathy, Plotinus’ account is set in the context of a vitalis-
tic metaphysics. However, while there may be deep, if controversial, reasons for
thinking that the unity that grounds the operation of sympathy is an organic unity,
I propose, instead, to simply drop the vitalist metaphysics, or, at the very least,
remain agnostic about it (for a contemporary, Anglophone expression of sympa-
thy for vitalist metaphysics see Nagel 2012). What is presently important is that
it is because of the unity of the perceiver with the object grasped that the felt
resistance to the force of the hand’s activity is a sympathetic response to the self-
maintaining forces of the object grasped. So it is the unity of the perceiver and
the object grasped along with the capacity for their haptic experience to become
like, if not exactly, like the tangible qualities presented in that experience, relative
to the perceiver’s haptic perspective, that grounds the operation of sympathy in
haptic perception. I simply decline to follow the Stoics and Plotinus in explicitly
conceiving of that unity to be the unity of a living being.
Despite these differences, haptic presentation, as herein understood, shares
the abstract description of the operation of sympathy. Sympathy governs cases
of formal assimilation where one part of a uniﬁed manifold formally assimilates
to a potentially non-contiguous part of the manifold and does so because of the
parts, disposed as they are, are united in the manifold, in the way that they are.
The grasping or enclosure of an object is a uniﬁed manifold where one part of the
manifold, the perceiver’s hand and the haptic experience its activity gives rise to,
formally assimilates to another part of the manifold, the object grasped, and does
so because the parts, disposed as they are, the hand’s power of haptic activity and
the object’s self-maintaining forces, are united in the manifold in the way that they
are, in the hand’s active grasp, the joint upshot of the conﬂict between the force of
the hand’s activity and the object’s self-maintaining forces. Since the formal assim-
ilation of haptic experience to its tangible object satisﬁes this abstract description,
sympathy must be the principle of haptic presentation.
Earlier, Imentioned how one potential obstacle to appreciating that haptic pre-
sentation is a kind of sympathetic response to an external body is the emotional
associations of our contemporary conception of sympathy. Sympathy, as we nowa-
days tend to conceive of it, is a kind of fellow-feeling akin to compassion or pity.
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The Plotinian account, however, revealed that sympathy can be understood with
sufficient generality to be at work in both fellow-feeling and perception. Plotinus
understood the operation of sympathy to be at work in fellow-feeling and percep-
tion as well as in a number of other natural phenomena not explicable in terms of
affection by contact, at least by Plotinus’ lights. Thus in analytically explicating
haptic presentation in terms of the operation of sympathy we need not thereby un-
derstand haptic perception as an outgrowth of blind emotion the way Whitehead
(1978, 162–3) did. Whitehead takes sympathy to be a kind of fellow-feeling and
in extending its application beyond paradigmatic cases of human fellow-feeling he
extends, as well, the notion of a feeling. In contrast, I have followed Plotinus in
taking sympathy to be a general principle at work both in cases of fellow-feeling
and perception, and without the extended notion of a feeling required by White-
head’s metaphysics.
Nevertheless, in understanding haptic presentation as the sympathetic presen-
tation of an external body and its tangible qualities by felt resistance, the present
account has the resources to distinguish blows from caresses as Derrida (2005) rec-
ommends. Our sympathetic interaction with the object of our hatred (where sym-
pathy, here, is understood more broadly than, as we might colloquially say, feeling
sympathy for them) naturally differs from our sympathetic interaction with our
beloved. Our sympathetic response to contact with an enemy will naturally differ
in character fromour sympathetic response to contact with the beloved. And there
is a natural tendency for the character of our sympathetic response to be expressed
in the haptic activities that sustain them. Our anger is expressed by the blows that
present an enemy, just as our love is expressed by the caresses that present the
beloved. Perception may not reduce to blind emotion, but that is consistent with
certain natural affective responses being made possible and, indeed, partly consti-
tuted by the operation of sympathy in haptic presentation. So without reducing
haptic perception to blind emotion, in understanding haptic presentation as the
sympathetic presentation of an external body and its tangible qualities, the dis-
tinction between blows and caresses is rendered intelligible, at least in principle.
(In an insightful and neglected discussion of sympathy and the affective charac-
ter of touch, Wyschogrod 1981 overlooks the present possibility only because she
narrowly understands sympathy as fellow-feeling.)
Sympathy is the principle of haptic presentation. That principle was invoked to
resolve the puzzle with which the previous chapter ended. Recall, that puzzle was
a failure of sufficiency. How, in the case of haptic perception, can felt resistance to
the hand’s activity disclose the presence and tangible qualities of an external body
when not all limitations to the body’s activity are due to external bodies? How
is it possible for felt resistance to the hand’s activity in grasping or enclosure to
disclose a rigid, solid body’s overall shape and volume? If feeling tangible qualities
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in something external to the perceiver’s body and in conformity with them is due to
the operation of sympathy thenwe have a basis for an answer. It is when the limit to
hand’s activity is experienced as a sympathetic response to a countervailing force,
as the hand’s force encountering an alien force resisting it, one force in conﬂict
with another, like it yet distinct from it, that the self-maintaining forces of the
body disclose that body’s presence and tangible qualities to haptic awareness.
Sympathy presents what is different or other. It thus allows us to experience
from within what transpires with another and so, in a sense, to be with another. In
the case of haptic perception it allows us to experience from within the tangible
character of the extra-somatic. The sympathetic presentation of what is other
involves an implicit presentation of self. Recall how Maine de Biran dramatizes
the haptic presentation of the extra-somatic with the exclamation “This is not
I”. To be presented with what is other is to be presented with what is other than
oneself. The presentation of self need not be explicit as is its representation in
the exclamation “This is not I”. The explicit presentation of what is other need
only involve the implicit presentation of self. Thus haptic awareness of the extra-
somatic involves bodily self-awareness. More speciﬁcally, the explicit awareness of
the object grasped involves a pre-reﬂective implicit awareness of the hand’s activity
in grasping or enclosure.
If sympathy is the principle of haptic presentation, as I suggest that it must
be, at least as analytically explicated, then the perceiver’s experience of the hand’s
activity could not be explicit. Explicit awareness of the hand’s conﬁguration and
force would draw attentive resources away from the object grasped. If our hominid
ancestor explicitly attends to the intensive sensations involved in grasping a stone,
such that these are open for epistemic appraisal, then they would no longer be
attending to the stone and its tangible qualities. Moreover, this would be a conse-
quence of sympathy being the principle of haptic presentation. In order for grasp-
ing or enclosure to directly disclose the overall shape and volume of the stone, the
felt resistance to the force of the hand’s activity must be experienced as a sympa-
thetic response to the self-maintaining forces that constitute the categorical bases
of the stone’s rigidity and solidity. In this way they feel the rigidity and solidity
in an object external to their body. Consciously attending to the hand’s activity
would erode the sympathetic presentation of the tangible qualities of an external
body. So we could not be explicitly aware of the hand’s activity in grasping or en-
closure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, if sympathy were the principle
of haptic presentation.
But, again, that is not to say that our hominid ancestor is unaware of their
hand’s activity in grasping a stone. Reﬂection on perceptual constancy (sections 1.2,
1.6, 2.2) revealed that the phenomenological character of their haptic experience
could not be exhausted by the object of explicit awareness. An implicit awareness
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of the hand’s conﬁguration and force contributes, as well, to the phenomenology of
their haptic experience. Our hominid ancestor’s sense of their hand’s conﬁguration
and force contributes only to the pre-noetic structure of their haptic experience
by determining the way its object is presented therein. So not only do they feel the
overall shape and volume in the stone, but their hand is felt to conform to these
tangible qualities as well. Feeling the hand to conform to the stone’s rigidity and
solidity may be implicit, it may be recessive and in the background, so that it does
not compete for attentive resources directed toward an external body, but it con-
tributes to the conscious qualitative character of their haptic experience by being
the way in which the overall shape and volume of the stone is presented in that ex-
perience. Haptic presentation in grasping or enclosure just is feeling something in
an external body and in conformity with it. And feeling something in an external
body and in conformity with it just is the exercise of a sympathetic capacity.
Haptic presentation is an irreducible unity. If sensory presentation is a dis-
tinctive kind of unity, then haptic presentation is more distinctive still. What
distinguishes haptic presentation as the kind of unity it is is the intelligible struc-
ture it displays. If sympathy is the principle of haptic presentation, then haptic
presentation, the kind of unity that it is, is a mode of being with (which is not to
say that it is a mode of mitsein, in Heidegger’s sense). Feeling the overall shape and
volume in the stone, and in conformity with it, is a way of being with the stone
in one’s grasp. Grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception,
involves the embodied perceiver consciously being with the body in its grasp. So
the mode of being with involved in haptic presentation is corporeal, a way for one
body to be with another. Moreover the mode of being with involved in haptic pre-
sentation is conscious. It is a way for a particular kind of body, a conscious animate
body, to be with an external body encountered in peripersonal space.
In the last chapter I claimed that while the formal assimilation of haptic expe-
rience to its object, understood on the model of constitutive shaping, was a man-
ifestation of the objectivity of haptic perception, it was the force of the hand’s
activity that was its source. In focussing exclusively on the role of sympathy in
Plotinus’ account of perception, we have ignored a crucial aspect of that account,
one that highlights the activity of the perceiver:
It is clear in presumably every case that when we have a perception
of anything through the sense of sight, we look where it is and direct
our gaze where the visible object is situated in a straight line from us;
obviously it is there that the apprehension takes place and the soul
looks outwards. (Plotinus, On Sense-Perception and Memory, Ennead 4 6 1
14–18; Armstrong 1984, 321)
And later, Plotinus generalizes the point:
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[The soul] speaks about things which it does not possess: this is a mat-
ter of power, not of being affected in some way but of being capable
of and doing the work to which it has been assigned. This is the way,
I think, in which a distinction is made by the soul between what is
seen and what is heard, not if both are impressions, but if they are not
by nature impressions or affections, but activities concerned with that
which approaches [the soul]. (Plotinus, On Sense-Perception and Memory,
Ennead 4 6 2 1–7; Armstrong 1984, 325)
Plotinus thus stands at the head of a historical tradition that stresses the active
nature of perception and includes Augustine, Kilwardby, Olivi, Fichte, Maine de
Biran, Ravaisson, Bergson,Merleau-Ponty, and contemporary enactivists (for a par-
tial overview of this historical tradition see the essays in Silva and Yrjönsuuri 2014).
We may retain, from this tradition, an important insight. Speciﬁcally, we are
now in a position to fully appreciate why if the formal assimilation of haptic ex-
perience to its object, relative to the perceiver’s partial perspective, is the man-
ifestation of the objectivity of haptic perception, being a mode of constitutive
shaping, it is the force of the hand’s activity that is its source. Engaging in such
activity ensures that the tangible qualities of the body had prior to being grasped,
and maintained in being grasped, explains, in part, the hand’s conﬁguration and
force. The force of the hand’s activity, and the felt resistance it encounters, is a
precondition for sympathy’s partial disclosure, relative to the perceiver’s handling,
of the self-maintaining forces of an external body.
It is the hand, the mobile and elastic instrument of haptic exploration, the
active wax of haptic perception, whose activity must be resisted, by the passivi-
ties of matter, in order to sympathetically present the external body whose self-
maintaining forces constrain that activity. The felt resistance to the hand’s activity
in grasping or enclosure, understood as amode of haptic perception, is an event oc-
curring in an ego-centrically and teleologically structured peripersonal space that
partly discloses corporeal aspects of the object of haptic investigation. It is for this
reason that the perceiver’s handling of the object counts as a perspective on that
object, albeit a distinctively haptic perspective. The hand’s activity in peripersonal
space constitutes, in part, the haptic perspective to which the object is sympathet-
ically presented. Thus the activity of the hand, of which we are merely implicitly
aware, is the source, nevertheless, of the objectivity of haptic perception because
it is a precondition for the sympathetic presentation of the tangible object that
constitutively shapes that haptic experience.
Chapter 3
Sound
3.1 Moving Forward
Tactile metaphors for perception, even for non-tactile modes of awareness such as
vision and audition, are primordial and persistent. In trying to understand what, if
anything, makes these tactile metaphors for perceptual awareness apt, we under-
took a phenomenological investigation into the nature of grasping or enclosure,
understood as a mode of haptic perception. Which, if any, of the features of hap-
tic presentation plausibly carry over to other forms of sensory presentation? Do
any of the features of haptic presentation carry over to the presentation of aud-
abilia?
We have already observed (chapter 1.4) that haptic presentation is a mode of
disclosure and that this may be a feature that carries over to audition. To claim
that haptic presentation is a mode of disclosure is to claim that corporeal aspects
of the object of haptic exploration are disclosed over time and so that presenta-
tion in haptic experience has duration. As in the haptic case, sounds are disclosed
over time and so their presentation in auditory experience has duration. How-
ever, we also observed a potential asymmetry. There may be a reason sounds are
disclosed over time that is not applicable in the haptic case. Whereas tangible
qualities are relatively static features of things, sounds are essentially dynamic en-
tities, not wholly present at any given moment, but unfolding through time (to be
further discussed in section 3.3). And if sounds are spread over time, their sensory
presentation must also be.
We also identiﬁed two features of haptic presentation the conjunction of which
might plausibly be generalized to other forms of sensory presentation. First, hap-
tic experience formally assimilates to its object, at least relative to the perceiver’s
haptic perspective, the particular way that they are handling that object in the cir-
cumstances of perception, in the sense that the conscious qualitative character of
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the experience becomes like, if not exactly like, the tangible quality presented in it.
And second, the formal assimilation of haptic experience to its object is explained
by that experience being constitutively shaped by the presentation of its object.
Perhaps, perspective-relative formal assimilation as a consequence of constitutive
shaping is a general feature of perception. This would explain why incorporation,
unconsciously echoed by contemporary talk of content, is an apt metaphor for
perception generally, even for those modes of perception that involve the material
assimilation of no thing (chapter 1.6). The proposed general thesis, then, is that
the conscious qualitative character of a perceptual experience formally assimilates
to its object, relative to the perceiver’s partial perspective, as a result of consti-
tutive shaping. More would have to be done to fully defend this general thesis.
Among other things, that there is an analogue of visual perspective in each of the
sensory modalities would have to be justiﬁed. (Can we really have a perspective on
an odor, say?) In this chapter and the next, I will say more about the applicability
of this idea to audition at least.
But what of the other important claim that was made about the metaphysics
of haptic perception, that sympathy is the principle of haptic presentation? Does
sympathy operate in other modes of sensory presentation as well? Does the sen-
sory presentation of the extra-somatic require the operation of sympathy quite
generally? It was natural to appeal to sympathy to explain how felt resistance to
the hand’s activity in grasping or enclosure discloses the overall shape and volume
of the object grasped since we began by thinking of haptic perception in terms of
the Secret Doctrine that Socrates attributes to Protagoras in the Theaetetus. Just
as on the Protagorean model, perception is the joint upshot of forces in conﬂict,
grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, is itself natu-
rally understood as the joint upshot of forces in conﬂict. On the one hand, there
is the force of the activity of the grasping hand. On the other hand, there are
the self-maintaining forces of the rigid, solid body. Making an effort to more
precisely mold the hand to the body’s contours and the resistance of the body’s
self-maintaining forces together give rise to an experience of that body’s overall
shape and volume. In trying to determine whether sympathy operates in non-
haptic modes of sensory presentation, we shall need to determine whether this
Protagorean model can be extended to other sensory modalities. (Kilwardby, for
one, thought it did: “Two motions come together as if from opposite parts in
sensing”, De spiritu fantastico 112, Broadie 1993. Though, of course, the Protagorean
model ﬁnds its expression in the reconciliation of Peripatetic and Augustinian
metaphysics that it offers Kilwardby.)
Smith’s (2002) discussion ofAnstoss suggests one way onemight generalize from
the haptic case. Haptic perception arises from the conﬂict between the grasping
hand and the self-maintaining forces of the rigid, solid body. Reaching out and
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grasping something is a clear example of voluntary intentional action. Moreover,
at least in the case of haptic perception, the hand is, among other things, a sensory
organ (though see Paterson 2007 for the claim that touch lacks a sensory organ).
Putting these ideas together, it is the voluntary intentional movement of sensory
organs that are the activities whose force comes into conﬂict with the percep-
tual object. In the visual case, then, it is the deliberate movement of the eyes
in their sockets, and not saccadic movement which is relevant, since the latter is
involuntary and non-intentional. Smith faces some difficulties, not necessarily in-
superable, with this proposal. For example, unlike other animals, humans cannot
cock their ears, though we may turn toward a sound to better hear it. This is not,
however, the only way to generalize from the haptic case.
Reaching out and grasping something may be a voluntary, intentional move-
ment of a sensory organ, but insofar as it is a mode of perception, it is a psycholog-
ical activity as well. Consider Cook Wilson’s claim (Correspondence with Stout, 1904,
1926) that in order to feel something in an object, a rough texture say, one must
feel that object, and in order to weigh something, one must weigh it. If grasping
is understood analogously with feeling and weighing, then this suggests an alter-
native generalization. On this alternative, in order to hear something, one must
listen. And in order to see, one must look. Grasping, feeling, weighing, listening,
and looking, while they may or may not involve the intentional movement of sen-
sory organs, are not themselves reducible to such movements when they do. They
are, perhaps, more aptly described as a kind of psychological stance, sustained by
a characteristic activity, where the perceiver opens themselves up, in a directed
manner, to experiencing different aspects of the natural environment. In engag-
ing in such activities, in directing perceptual awareness in this way, the perceiver
contributes to making different aspects of the natural environment perceptually
available.
“In order to hear well,” Maine de Biran observes, “it is necessary to listen” (In-
ﬂuence de l’habitude sur la faculté de penser; Boehm 1929, 63–4). How does listening, or
the activity of listening out for something, come into conﬂict with the objects of
audition such that these may be sympathetically presented in auditory experience?
We can make progress with this question by ﬁrst getting clearer on the objects of
audition, on what there is to listen out for and to. That task will occupy us for this
chapter and the next.
There is an asymmetry between haptic and auditory perception. The tangible
is the object of haptic perception. And, onemight correspondingly say, the audible
is the object of auditory perception. While there is a sense in which that is surely
true, there is also a sense in which it is potentially misleading. Bracketing, for the
moment, Peripatetic worries about the unity of the tangible, the tangible is uniﬁed
in the way that the audible is not. Among audibilia are sounds and their sources, or
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so I contend. And while it is controversial how hearing sounds and hearing their
sources are related, there is no similar division among the tangible.
This asymmetry, while no obstacle to understanding auditory presentation as
a species of sympathetic presentation, does, however, introduce a complexity that
bears on the presentation of material over this chapter and the next. I shall ar-
gue that we hear sources in, or through, the sounds they make, and that sympathy
explains how this may be so. However, before we are in a position to understand
the sympathetic presentation of the sources of sounds, we must have in place a
certain conception of sounds. It is the task of the present chapter to articulate the
relevant conception of sounds, as it turns out, a modiﬁcation of The Wave The-
ory of sound. And it shall be the task of the subsequent chapter to explain how
the sources of sound may be sympathetically presented in, or through, the sounds
they make. Moreover, it will only be in that chapter that we shall be in a posi-
tion to understand how listening is a necessary precondition for the sympathetic
presentation of the sources of sound.
Before turning to TheWave Theory, let us ﬁrst get clearer on sounds, and their
sources, and their relation in our experience of them. The objects of audition are
diverse in a way that the objects of haptic perception are not. We hear sounds, and
their sources, and their audible qualities. How are the hearing of sounds and the
hearing of sources related in auditory experience? What are the bearers of audible
qualities? Are sounds and their sources, as well as their audible qualities, all that
we hear? These three questions will be addressed, in turn, in the following three
sections.
3.2 The Berkeley–Heidegger Continuum
If we hear, not only sounds, but their sources, how are sounds and their sources
related in our auditory experience of them?
From the hill in Greenwich Park where the Royal Observatory is located, one
can see the towers of the City of London across the Thames. I once witnessed the
Ballardian spectacle of a ﬂock of feral parakeets ﬂying across this scene. These for-
merly domesticated tropical birds, having escaped or been released, have gone feral
and their population is increasing throughout London. Bright green set against
mirrored skyscrapers, the parakeets were excited and were calling loudly. I heard
the sound of a calling parakeet. Did I hear, as well, the parakeet’s call?
We hear sounds. Do we hear, as well, their sources? Philosophers divide on this
question. And even those philosophers who maintain that we hear both sounds
and their sources divide as to how we do so. Philosopher’s views on these matters
can be useful represented on a continuum that ranges from Berkeley on the one
extreme to Heidegger on the other (see Leddington 2014 for a similar suggestion).
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Berkeley, inThreeDialogues betweenHylas andPhilonous, followsAristotle in taking
sounds to be the proper objects of audition. For something to be the proper object
of a given sensory modality it must be perceptible in itself and perceptible to that
sensory modality alone. That a sensory modality has a proper object does not
preclude it from having other objects as well. Thus we can see motion and feel
motion. Berkeley thus extends the Peripatetic account in claiming, in addition,
that sounds are the sole objects of audition. We hear no other thing. In a way,
this is a return to an earlier, Platonic view. Plato, in the Theaetetus (184 e 8–185
a 3), maintained that the perception of a given sense just is the presentation of
an object available through the exercise of that capacity alone (compare as well
Republic 5 477–478). Our auditory capacity, so conceived, just is the capacity to
present its proper object, sound. So on Berkeley’s view, strictly speaking, we hear
sounds and not their sources. In part, Berkeley argues for this by distinguishing
sounds from their sources by an application of Leibniz’s Law. Sounds have auditory
qualities that their sources lack, and insofar as sources lack auditory qualities they
are inaudible.
The neo-Berkelean accepts that sound is the proper object of audition. They
accept, as well, that the sounds are distinguished from their sources. But they deny
that sound is the sole object of audition. Sources of sound that can be perceived
by other sensory modalities, such as sight, and are thus common sensibles, are
also the objects of audition, but only derivatively—we hear the source of a sound
by hearing the sound that it generates. According to the neo-Berkelean, Berkeley
goes too far in denying that we hear the sources of sound. Berkeleymistook sound’s
being the direct or immediate object of audition for sound’s being the sole object of
audition. If we allow sources to be the indirect or mediate objects of audition, then
the objects of audition include not only proper sensibles but common sensibles as
well.
So according to the neo-Berkelean, perceivers are immediately presented with
the proper object of audition, sound, and thereby mediately presented with the
source of the sound, the audible activity of a body, say. Sounds are audible. Indeed,
they are audible in themselves in the sense that sounds contain within themselves
the power of their own audibility. Pace Berkeley, sources too are audible. However,
the audible sources of sound are not audible in themselves, but are only audible by
hearing other objects that are audible in themselves, the sounds that they generate.
An explicit experience of a sound is, according to the neo-Berkelean, the means by
which we experience its source. Auditory experience affords the perceiver with an
explicit awareness of a sound that mediates the perceiver’s awareness of its source.
The explicit experience of a sound and the experience of its source that it gives rise
to are, so conceived, distinct experiences, even if the former is a part or constituent
of the latter.
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In “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger presents an opposing view:
We never really ﬁrst perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and
noises, in the appearance of things… ; rather we hear the stormwhistling
in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mer-
cedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to
us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut
in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds.
(Heidegger, 1935/2000, 151–152)
Nothing hangs onHeidegger’s apparent acceptance of the empiricist identiﬁcation
of sound with acoustical sensation. What is important is Heidegger’s denial of the
central neo-Berkelean claim, that we hear the source of a sound by attending to
that sound. Rather, we hear the source without attending to its sound.
In Fulkerson’s (2014) terminology, we are explicitly aware of the wind whistling
in the chimney, and this explicit awareness does not depend upon an explicit
awareness of the sound, for there is no such awareness. At best we are implicitly
aware of that sound. However, if we are to apply that distinction to Heidegger, we
must depart from Fulkerson, as I have recommended (chapter 2.2), and claim that
it admits of degrees. “Much closer to us than all sensations are the things them-
selves.” An element present in experience can be more or less recessive, more or
less in the background. And, conversely, it may be more or less in the foreground,
more or less within the range of explicit awareness. Much closer to the hearer than
its sound is the wind whistling in the chimney.
In undergoing an auditory experience, the source of a sound is the object of an
explicit awareness that does not depend upon explicit awareness of the sound. At
least in this sense is it immediately present in that experience. When we attend
to our auditory experience, as Heidegger invites us to, we attend to the sources of
sounds and rarely, if at all, to the sounds in distinction from their sources. In hear-
ing the storm whistling in the chimney, the three-motored plane, the Mercedes
in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen, there is no explicit experience of
their sound distinct from hearing these sources. That is consistent with main-
taining that hearing a source necessarily involves acoustical sensation. We may be
implicitly aware of the sound in explicitly attending to its source. And yet Heideg-
ger is clearly denying the neo-Berkelean claim that he hear the source of a sound by
hearing the sound. There is one explicit experience, hearing the storm whistling
in the chimney, and no distinct explicit experience of its sound, even if hearing the
source involves implicit awareness of its sound. This constitutes a negative result
about how to characterize aural indirection, the presentative function of sound.
There is more to hearing a source by hearing its sound, in the sense required by
the neo-Berkelean, than the necessary accompaniment of the former by the latter.
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Heidegger exaggerates when he claims that we never attend to acoustical sen-
sations or mere sounds. For he goes on to maintain that we can attend to sounds in
distinction from their sources only by adopting the aural equivalent of the painterly
attitude:
In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert
our ears from them, i.e., listen abstractly. (Heidegger, 1935/2000, 152)
Heidegger observes, however, that this is a difficult attitude to adopt.
We can get a sense of how difficult it is to adopt this attitude by considering
Pierre Schaeffer’s piece Étude aux chemins de fer (1948). Whereas traditional compo-
sition begins with an abstraction, the score, which is made concrete in playing it,
musique concrète begins with concrete sounds and abstracts them into a composition
through tape looping and sound collage. Yet despite these distancing techniques,
the material sources never completely fade from the perceived soundscape. We
get a sense of the train’s speed, its size, the space surrounding the tracks as well as
the space of the interior given the character of the resonance. Working in Scha-
effer’s studio, Karlheinz Stockhausen addressed these problems in the method of
tape composition deployed in Étude (1952). He recorded prepared low piano strings
struck with an iron bar and sliced off the heads of the recorded sounds, thus elim-
inating information about the attack and other material features of the source.
These short headless segments were further repeated to form the basic tones of
the piece. The effect is uncanny. However, the very uncanniness is itself partly
a product of the limitation, or at least a variant of it, that beset Schaeffer’s ear-
lier piece. The tones are uncanny in that there are at once strange, indeterminate,
and yet familiar, though, enigmatically, placing them proves elusive. Indeed, at
the end of his career, Schaeffer pronounced musique concrète a failure, claiming, per-
haps ironically, to have wasted his life. Heidegger’s observation was the principle
obstacle—it is very difficult to listen away from things and hear bare sounds, to
hear sounds without also hearing their sources. And so there are limits to the de-
gree of abstraction that can be achieved with musique concrète. It is telling, in this
regard, that Stockhausen abandons tape composition for the generation of tones
with sine-wave generators as he continued to explore electronic composition.
TheBerkelean alternative raises an explanatory challenge to the neo-Berkelean—
to explain how we can experience a source by explicitly experiencing its sound.
How is the immediate presentation of sound in auditory experience the mediate
presentation of its source? The aural indirection, as the neo-Berkelean conceives
of it, the presentative function of sound, is unlike ordinary cases of perceiving one
thing by perceiving another. One might see where the Shogun’s army is encamped
by seeing the smoke and steam of their cooking rice. But the Shogun’s army is di-
rectly perceptible—and presents a suitably terrifying aspect—in the way that the
sources of sounds could not be, at least by the neo-Berkelean’s lights. What is
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needed is an explanation of how one can hear a source by hearing a sound. What
is needed is an explanation of the presentative function of sounds, how the presen-
tation of sound in explicit auditory awareness constitutes themediate presentation
of its source (analogous, in many ways, to the presentative function of sense data,
at least according to many sense-datum theories, see, for example, Price 1932). The
Heideggerian alternative is a challenge to the very possibility of such an explana-
tion. At the very least, in undergoing an auditory experience, we do not attend to
sources by attending to sounds—according to Heidegger, in normal cases, there
is no sound that we are attending to. Any account of the presentative function
of sound would involve the explicit experience of that sound, but, according to
Heidegger, there is no such experience. There is just the auditory experience of
the storm whistling in the chimney, of the three-motored plane, of the Mercedes
in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. A neo-Berkelean cannot afford to
be as sanguine about the Heideggerian alternative as they may be tempted to be
about the Berkelean alternative. A promissory note is worth nothing in the face
of an inability to repay.
Smith (2002) is an example of a contemporary philosopher who has endorsed
the extreme Berkelean alternative. Though some, like Smith, continue to accept
the Berkelean view that sounds are the sole objects of audition, in this chapter
and the next, I propose to simply set the extreme Berkelean alternative to one
side and accept that we hear, in addition to the sounds, their sources as well. Led-
dington (2014) and Nudds (2010) approach, at least, the other Heideggerian ex-
treme. Neo-Berkeleanism, while well represented in the twentieth century, is per-
haps not well represented in the most recent literature, but is a viable sub-current
of thought for all that. Whenever I talk to philosophers, not necessarily special-
ists, about audition, I am inevitably asked questions that only make sense within
the neo-Berkelean framework. One might object to the present taxonomy that
many contemporary views ﬁt uneasily within it. Consider one prominent exam-
ple. O’Callaghan (2007, 2009) is by no means a Berkelean, nor a neo-Berkelean,
but is he really on the Heideggerian end of the continuum?
O’Callaghan’s is among a class of accounts that is difficult to place within the
Berkeley–Heidegger continuum. They tend to endorse a distal conception of sound,
a conception where sounds are located at a distance from the perceiver, at or near
their source. And these distal conceptions of sound tend to be motivated by criti-
cism of The Wave Theory. As we shall see (chapter 3.7), many of these criticisms
conﬂate features of sources with features of the sounds that they produce. And if
that is right, the resulting conceptions of sound are themselves a product of this
conﬂation. It is no surprise, then, that such accounts ﬁt uneasily in the Berkeley–
Heidegger continuum. In conﬂating features of sources with features of sounds,
they obscure the distinction upon which that taxonomy is based.
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3.3 The Bearers of Audible Qualities
What are the bearers of audible qualities? What are the kinds of things in which
audible qualities inhere? Pitch is an audible quality. In what kind of thing does
pitch inhere? I claim that the bearers or substrata of audible qualities are essen-
tially dynamic entities such as events, as opposed to bodies. If the bearers of au-
dible qualities are essentially dynamic entities, then audible qualities are qualities
essentially sustained by activity.
Colors are spatially extended, at least in the sense of being instanced only by
spatially extended things. We can imagine smaller and smaller things being col-
ored, but we cannot conceive of a thing without extension exhibiting color. Audi-
ble qualities are temporally extended, at least in the sense of being instanced only
by temporally extended things. We can imagine hearing briefer and briefer oc-
currences of pitch, but we cannot conceive of a thing without duration exhibiting
pitch. The temporal dimension of the bearers of audible qualities is not exhausted
by their having a beginning and end. In this regard, they are no different from
mortal animals. But unlike natural substances such as animals and other bodies,
as well as entities of distinct ontological categories such as states, sounds have a
distinctive way of being in time.
Sounds have a distinctive way of being in time. Like events, at least as the three-
dimensionalist conceives of them, sounds unfold in time (see Fine 2006; though
for criticism see Sider 1997; Hawthorne 2008). Unlike states which are wholly
present whenever they obtain, sounds are not wholly present at every moment
of their sounding. They are spread over the interval of time through which they
unfold. So sounds have a temporal mode of being that events have. Perhaps some
sounds, such as the sound of the wind, or the roar of a waterfall, are more like
processes than events (Broad, 1952, 4). However, that distinction is not presently
relevant, and at any rate, processes, like events, are essentially dynamic entities,
though perhaps in their own way.
That sounds are not wholly present at any moment of their sounding precludes
them from being wholly present in auditory experience at any moment of their
hearing. If we further assume that perceptual experience only presents what could
be present at any given moment, then a puzzle about the very possibility of audi-
tion arises, as Prichard observes:
We should ordinarily be said to hear certain noises, e.g. the sound a bell
or the note of a bird. But any sound has duration, however short. If
so, how can it ever be true that we apprehend by way of hearing—or
more generally perceiving—can only exist at the moment of hearing,
and ex hypothesi, at least part of the sound said to be heard is over at
the moment of hearing, and strictly speaking it is all over. And the
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difficulty seems a double one. For since a sound has duration, it cannot
exist at the moment of hearing, and therefore we cannot hear a present
sound—for there is no such thing. And if it is over and so not existing at
the moment when we are said to hear it, it cannot be heard. Therefore,
it seems, it is impossible hear a sound. (Prichard, 1950b, 47)
The most straightforward way to deal with this puzzle is to abandon the principle
that generates it—that perceptual experience only presents what could be present
at any given moment. After all, as we have seen (chapter 1.4), this is the principle
that was driving the Grand Illusion hypothesis. If we abandon this principle, then
wemay conclude that since sounds are spread over time, their sensory presentation
must also be. Auditory experience unfolds with its object. We listen along with
what we hear. So auditory presentation, due to the distinctive temporal nature of
sound, has duration. Auditory presentation is the disclosure of a sound unfolding
through its temporal interval. It discloses its object, then, over time, just like hap-
tic presentation. However, whereas haptic perception discloses relatively static
features such as texture and temperature, sounds, by contrast, are essentially dy-
namic entities, not wholly present at any moment of their existence but unfolding
in time.
Sounds may be particular events or processes, and so have a mode of being that
suffices to distinguish them from entities belonging to other ontological categories
such as bodies and states, but what of other audibilia? Must all audible objects
unfold through time? Or is this just a feature of, in Peripatetic vocabulary, the
proper objects of audition?
We hear sounds, to be sure, but we also hear their audible qualities. I can hear
the sound of the parakeet’s call and its pitch. Audible qualities, such as pitch, are
not essentially dynamic entities unfolding through time. Rather, their mode of
being is more akin to the mode of being of states. Nevertheless, sound, conceived
as an essentially dynamic entity, not wholly present at any moment, but unfolding
through time, is the bearer or substratum of audible qualities (see Aristotle,De anima
2 11 422b31–32). It is the sound of the parakeet’s call whose pitch I hear. That the
bearer of an audible quality is an essentially dynamic entity is manifest in the con-
ditions under which that quality may be instantiated. There is no instantaneous
pitch since there is nothing instantaneous to instantiate it. For pitch to exist, it
must persist over time. And that is because sound, a bearer of audible qualities,
has duration essentially. Sounds without audible qualities would be inaudible, but
audible qualities without soundwould simply not be (or at least, those audible qual-
ities that modify sounds, as opposed to other audible substrata, if such there be).
Sound, an essentially dynamic entity, has existential and ontological priority over
the audible qualities that it gives rise to. Audible qualities, while not essentially
dynamic entities, are qualities that audible activity gives rise to. They are qualities
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of audible events or processes or phases of these.
If audibiliameans all that we can hear, and we can hear a sound’s pitch, then not
all audibilia are essentially dynamic entities. There may be no instantaneous pitch,
pitch may be a quality essentially sustained by activity, but pitch, as a quality, does
not unfold through time. Of all that we hear, some of what we hear is existen-
tially and ontologically prior to other things that we hear. The audible qualities
of a sound will vary and extinguish as the sound’s activity varies and extinguishes.
Sounds are existentially and ontologically prior to their audible qualities because
sounds are the bearers or substrata of audible qualities. At best, then, the claim
should be that the existentially and ontologically prior substrata of audible qualities
are essentially dynamic entities, not wholly present at any moment, but unfold-
ing through time. So conceived, audible qualities would be qualities essentially
sustained by activity
Kulvicki (2008) has argued that the bearers of audible qualities are not events
but bodies. Like Aristotle, De anima 2 11 422b31–32, Kulvicki accepts that an au-
dible quality has a bearer or substratum. Being quality instances, they must inhere
in something upon which they existentially and ontologically depend. However,
unlike Aristotle, he denies that sound is the bearer of audible qualities. Audible
qualities inhere in bodies but these bodies are not themselves sounds. Rather, they
are ordinary material substances. Instead, sounds are the audible qualities that in-
here in these bodies and are manifest in their audible activity. Thus, like Pasnau
(1999b) and Leddington (2014), Kulivicki endorses a broadly Lockean metaphysics
of sound. However, it is not the Lockean metaphysics of sound that is our present
focus, but whether bodies are bearers of audible qualities.
Bodies have resonantmodes determined by theirmaterial structure. Because of
their resonant modes, bodies are disposed to vibrate at certain natural frequencies
when “thwacked”. According to Kulvicki (2008), the sound a body has, an audible
quality of it, is the stable disposition to vibrate when thwacked. Just as the energy
of the illuminant reveals the colors of things to sight, the energy of thwacking
reveals the sounds of things to hearing. And just as bodies retain their colors even
when unilluminated, bodies retain their sound even when unthwacked. The stable
disposition to vibrate when thwacked is a sound that a body has. Not every sound
that a thing makes is a sound that a thing has. Stereo speakers when thwacked
produce a dull thud, but when played they can make a wide variety of sounds.
Why think that sounds are qualities of material bodies that are associated with
their natural frequencies? Kulvicki (2008) provides an argument from perceptual
constancy that, while not conclusive, is meant to speak strongly in favor of his
view. Kulvicki draws our attention to an interesting feature of speech perception,
out ability to recognize voices. A speaker’s voice will vary in pitch, timbre, and so
on, as they speak. And yet despite these variable auditory appearances, we seem
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to be presented with a constant voice in our experience of their speech. This is
due, in part, to the resonant modes of the special parts of the speaker involved in
speech production, such as their vocal cords and nasal cavities. And this is just
the kind of auditory constancy one would expect if the sounds that we hear were
stable dispositions of objects to vibrate in response to being thwacked.
We have our voices. At least as we ordinarily speak. But do we have them, as
well, in Kulvicki’s extraordinary sense? Or are they sounds that we make but do
not have? The sound of a stereo speaker playing is a sound that it makes but does
not have. I suspect that a person’s voice is more like the sound of a stereo speaker
playing than the sound that it makes when thwacked. Through a series of unfor-
tunate events, I have ﬁrst hand experience of what I sound like when thwacked. I
can attest it sounds nothing like my voice. Like a stereo speaker, I produce a dull
thud when thwacked. When playing, a stereo speaker produces the sounds that
it makes but does not have by an internal activity driving the vibration of special
parts of it. When speaking, I produce the sounds that I do by an internal activity
driving the vibration of special parts of myself. Are these not sounds that I make
but do not have? If the sound of my voice is something that I make but do not
have, then its being the constant element in an auditory experience provides no
reason for thinking that sounds are stable dispositions to vibrate when thwacked
since these are sounds that bodies were meant to have rather than make. However,
even should the argument from perceptual constancy fail in this way, sounds may
yet be stable dispositions of bodies to vibrate when thwacked.
Kulvicki is right to emphasize that auditory experience can disclose the stable
dispositions of bodies to vibrate at their natural frequencies and so auditorily man-
ifest, albeit partially and imperfectly, material properties of those bodies. But in
hearing that, is what we hear a sound or its source? Suppose that we hear sounds
and their sources. And suppose that the sources that we hear are sound-generating
events. A body’s participation, if not the body itself, is part of the audible structure
of that event. And those aspects of the body relevant to its participation in the
event are reﬂected, partially and imperfectly, in its audible structure. Stable dispo-
sitions of bodies to vibrate at their natural frequencies given their resonant modes
as determined by their material structure are aspects of bodies relevant to their
participation in audible activities, such as being thwacked. When Dr Johnson,
outside of the church in Harwich, kicked the stone, his boot rebounding despite
its mighty force, the stone was well and truly thwacked. Doubtless, it could be
heard as well as felt. And Dr Johnston could hear, as well as feel, that it was a
stone, and not a log, that he was kicking. He could hear his boot kicking a stone
as opposed to a log because their different resonant modes are relevant to their
participation in audible activities such as being kicked. Kulvicki is right to em-
phasize that auditory experience can disclose the stable dispositions of bodies to
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vibrate at their natural frequencies and so auditorily manifest, albeit partially and
imperfectly, material properties of these bodies. But he was wrong to suggest that
this requires bodies to be the bearers of audible qualities. (We shall revisit this
issue in the next section and when discussing O’Callaghan’s argument from timbre
in section 3.7.)
3.4 The Extent of the Audible
We hear sounds and their sources. These are essentially dynamic entities, not
wholly present at any given moment, but unfolding through time. Sounds and
their sources have audible qualities, qualities essentially sustained by activity. Are
sounds and their sources, as well as their audible qualities, really all that we can
hear?
According to Broad (1952, 4), we ordinarily speak of hearing bodies. So when
Big Ben strikes the time, and is in earshot, we may say that we can hear Big Ben.
However, Broad concedes little in acknowledging this point of usage since he also
observes that it takes but a little pressure to convince “the plainest of plain men”
that “hearing Big Ben” is shorthand for hearing the striking of Big Ben. If we ac-
cept Broad’s suggestion, then we only hear Big Ben insofar as it is a participant in
a sound-generating event or process. And when we do, what we strictly speaking
hear is Big Ben’s striking and not Big Ben, that is, not the body, but an event the
body participates in that is the cause of the propagation of the patterned distur-
bance. We hear not the body in a condition of activity, but the activity of the
body. It is not clear that Broad thinks that even Big Ben’s striking is an object of
audition. “Hearing Big Ben” is meant to be equivalent to “hearing such and such
a noise and taking it to be coming from Big Ben”. But taking the sound that one
hears to be generated in an event in which Big Ben participates may be a cognitive,
rather than a perceptual, activity or stance. Let us set aside any doubts that Broad
may have entertained, and accept, withHeidegger, that we hear not only the sound
of Big Ben’s striking but we hear, as well, Big Ben’s striking. The view we will have
arrived at is one according to which we hear sounds and their sources.
Sounds are events or processes, and their sources that we hear are the events
and processes that generate those sounds. Do sources have audible qualities? Berke-
ley denied that they did. Only the sounds that they produce have audible quali-
ties. And if sources lack audible qualities, then they are inaudible. Or so Berkeley
contends. If sources, pace Berekeley, have audible qualities, then they are existen-
tially and ontologically prior to the audible qualities for which they are bearers or
substrata. Moreover, sources, being sound-generating events or processes, are es-
sentially dynamic entities. Such a view would be a step closer to vindicating the
general claim that among audibilia, the bearers or substrata of audible qualities have
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the distinctive temporal mode of being of events or processes. Full vindication
would require further assurance that sounds and their sources alone have this sta-
tus.
Allow me to elaborate on sources and their hearing and engage in speculation
about a hypothetical sense in which we may be said to hear bodies consistent with
the principle, if true, that audition only presents bearers of audible qualities with
the distinctive temporal mode of being of events or processes.
First, the elaboration. It concerns the sources of sound. In the discussion
above, for convenience, I have silently substituted a philosophically motivated
precisiﬁcation for the ordinary notion. Speciﬁcally, sources were claimed to be
sound-generating events or processes. While it is true that the ordinary notion of
a source is a causal notion, we also speak of objects or bodies being the sources
of sound. We do so presumably because these bodies possess the causal power to
engage in an activity which is a sound-generating event or process. Thus Casati
et al. (2013) speak of event sources and thing sources. In effect the precisiﬁcation
identiﬁes sources with the body’s activity that generates a sound. The prima facie
plausibility of this is abetted in a philosophical milieu where a broadly Humean
metaphysics, with its focus on regularities among events, remains widely inﬂuen-
tial. For the broadly Humean framework encourage the conclusion that sources
are events from the recognition that sources are causal. However, the precisiﬁca-
tion of the ordinary notion was not motivated by aHumeanmetaphysics. I believe
that we should accept the Eleatic Visitor’s teaching and acknowledge the being of
capacity. (After all, it would be impious to deny the existence of virtue.) But once
we do, we can see how sources may be, at once, bodies and causal. Bodies may
be the sources of sound by possessing the causal power to sound, to engage in a
sound-generating activity. The precisiﬁcation was not motivated by an adherence
to a broadly Humean metaphysics but rather had a phenomenological motivation.
Speciﬁcally, we are presently interested in the sources that we can be said to hear.
The sources that we can be said to hear may be a narrower class than what may
ordinarily be described as a source. Big Ben is a source of sound. But we don’t hear
Big Ben, at least not strictly speaking. We hear Big Ben’s striking. What we hear,
strictly speaking, is not the body, but the body’s sound-generating activity.
Both sounds and the sources that we hear are like events or processes in that
they are not wholly present at every moment of their occurrence. The specula-
tion, intimated above, is that perhaps this is a general feature of the bearers of
audible qualities present in audition. Perhaps for a bearer of an audible quality to
be present in auditory experience itmust have a particular temporal mode of being,
it must unfold through time. This would preclude, by their very nature, entities
such as bodies from being present in auditory experience. First, by hypothesis,
bodies lack the requisite temporal mode of being of substrata of audible qualities.
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And second, bodies do not inhere in essentially dynamic entities the way that au-
dible qualities do. But if what is present in auditory experience is either essentially
dynamic or an audible quality that the essentially dynamic substratum gives rise to,
then bodies are not present in auditory experience. Earlier we noted Broad’s help-
ful suggestion that perhaps “hearing Big Ben” is elliptical for hearing Big Ben’s
striking.
As plausible as this may be, a worry may still persist. One of the uses to which
audition may be put is to track a body’s progress through the natural environment.
We can listen to an animal’s approach, say. And it might be thought that we are
attending to the animal in audition in listening to them. Moreover, it might seem
insufficient for the body to be attended to that an event in which that body par-
ticipates is present in auditory experience. Not every part of a visible body is seen,
so why assume that every participant of an audible event is heard? How can we lis-
ten out for bodies even though they are precluded from being present in auditory
experience?
Bodies may not be present in auditory experience, but perhaps they ﬁgure in
auditory experience in another way, if not as the intentional object of experience,
then something very much like it. Bodies are, on the speculative hypothesis that
we are entertaining, not present in auditory experience. Thus bodies are absent in
auditory experience. And yet we can attend to bodies in audition. How could this
be?
Aristotle uses this kind of puzzle or aporia about presence in absence to argue
for, as we might put it, the intentional character of memory (De memoria et remi-
niscentia 450a25–451a1, for discussion see Sorabji 2004). The Peripatetic response
to the puzzle is to straightforwardly accept the claim of absence and reinterpret
what purported to be a presentation instead as a kind of re-presentation. When
one remembers Corsicus in his absence one contemplates a phantasma caused by
a previous perception of Corsicus and one conceives of the phantasma as a like-
ness and reminder of Corsicus as he was perceived. How might the Peripatetic
response, so abstractly described, be applied to the perceptual case of attending
to bodies in audition?
One obstacle to straightforwardly applying the Peripatetic response to the per-
ceptual case of attending to bodies in audition is this: Memory and imagination
are plausibly the primitive intentional capacities in our cognitive economy in the
way that perception could not be, pace Burge (2010), if perception essentially in-
volves an irreducible presentational element. And if our perceptual capacities are
not intentional, but a necessary precondition for the possession of intentional ca-
pacities, then how would the Peripatetic response apply to the perceptual case of
attending to bodies in audition?
Perhaps what is present in auditory experience may, nevertheless, constitute
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a natural image of what is absent. That is, perhaps we can understand hearing
the body’s sound-generating activity as providing the listener with a dynamic aural
image of the body otherwise absent in audition. It is an image, indeed, as I have
suggested, a natural image, like a fossil or a footprint (for a recent general discus-
sion of images see Kulvicki, 2014). But unlike paradigmatic images it is not a visual
image but an aural image (for the denial that there somuch as could be such a thing
see Martin 2012). And while visual images are static, aural images, if such there be,
would be dynamic as beﬁtting their aural character. Hearing Big Ben’s striking,
while not the presentation of Big Ben in auditory experience, would nevertheless
provide the listener with a dynamic aural image of Big Ben. We do not so much
as hear Big Ben in a condition of activity as we hear Big Ben in its audible activity.
In order for this to be so, the auditory presentation of a sound-generating event
must involve at least the partial disclosure of the event’s participants. Audition
partially discloses an event’s participant by presenting it as a participant of the au-
dible event. It is the body’s participation in the event, and not the body per se, that
is part of the event’s audible structure. The disclosure of such audible structure is
partial. Only those aspects of the body that are manifest in its participation in the
audible event are disclosed, and perhaps only some of those. Furthermore, there is
no guarantee that if a perceiver hears an event, they hear each of its participants, if
any. But that is consistent with audition, in certain circumstances of perception,
partially disclosing at least some of the participants in the unfolding audible event.
It is only if we can hear Big Ben’s participation in its striking that we can use that
hearing to attend to Big Ben. It is only if we can hear Big Ben’s participation, can
that hearing provide us with a dynamic aural image of Big Ben and its activities
that we exploit in attending to Big Ben in audition.
Before turning, in the next section, to The Wave Theory of sound, allow me
to summarize the discussion so far. We hear sounds and their sources, and their
audible qualities. Perhaps we hear sources by hearing the sounds that they make,
as the neo-Berkelean contends. In the next chapter, however, I shall argue, in-
stead, for the Heideggerian alternative. We can attend to the sources of sound
without ﬁrst attending to the sounds that they generate. Sounds and their sources
are essentially dynamic entities, not wholly present at any given moment, but un-
folding through their temporal interval. Sounds and their sources, essentially dy-
namic entities, are the bearers or susbtrata of audible qualities. Audible qualities
are qualities essentially sustained by activity. The only bearers of audible qualities
present in auditory experience are essentially dynamic entities. Bodies are not, in
this sense, essentially dynamic entities and so are not present in our auditory ex-
perience. Though absent in auditory experience, we may, nonetheless, attend to
bodies in audition, when an audible sound-generating event in which they partici-
pate presents a dynamic aural image of them.
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3.5 TheWave Theory
An ancient tradition identiﬁes sound with motion. Plato and Aristotle claimed
that sound is amotion in amedium. In the cosmology of theTimaeus (67 a–c), sound
is percussion in the air and the hearing of that sound is the movement it causes
through the ears of the perceiver. For Aristotle, sound is motion in a medium, be it
air or water (Deanima 2 8 420a8–11, 420b11,De sensu 447a1–2; though seeO’Callaghan
2007, 60–1 for an alternative interpretation; see also Johnstone 2013). But the
hearing of the sound, while it may involve the sound’s acting upon the ears, the
organs of audition, is no mere alteration but the exercise of a capacity (De anima 2
5). Though sounds involve the motion of a medium, Aristotle does not conceive
of sound as propagating through the medium. When a solid, smooth object, such
as a piece of bronze, is struck, it causes the medium, the air, say, to move in a
single, continuous mass (De anima 2 8 419b33–420a2). The medium is a unity that
communicates the movement of the distal body to the ear of the perceiver. Think
of the way movement may be communicated through a single, continuous mass
such as a stick. One may poke with a stick, without the poke propagating through
the stick. Aristotle derives this conception of amedium as a continuous unity from
Plato’s account of perception in theTimaeus (see Lindberg 1977, chapter 1; the Stoic
stick analogy, reported by Alexander of Aphrodisias,De anima 130 14, also plausibly
traces to this source).
Aristotle’s Platonically inspired conception of a medium as a continuous unity
shows that conceiving of sound as motion in a medium is not yet to conceive of
successive motion through a medium in the way suggested by talk of propagation.
However, this conception of a medium as a continuous unity did not long persist.
Conceptions of sound as motion in a medium were common in the Middle Ages,
if variously developed (Pasnau, 2000). Roger Bacon’s doctrine of the multiplica-
tion of the species provides one model for sonic propagation. An object will cause
a species, an image or likeness of it, to inhere, in some sense, in the medium ad-
jacent to it. Moreover, species successively inhere in parts of the medium, each
time causing the species to inhere in an adjacent part. This has the consequence
that species are continuously generated along rectilinear rays that proceed in all
directions, if unobstructed, from every point on the surface of a body. Inﬂuenced
by al-Kindī and Robert Grosseteste, Bacon’s doctrine was modelled on the propa-
gation of light:
For light of its very nature diffuses itself in every direction in such a
way that a point of light will produce instantaneously a sphere of light
of any size whatsoever, unless some opaque object stands in the way.
(Grosseteste, De Luce, Riedl 1942, 10)
It might naturally be thought that themultiplication of the species itself provides a
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model for sonic propagation. On that model, audible species successively inhere in
adjacent parts of themedium such that they are continuously generated, at least for
the duration of their sounding, in rectilinear rays in all directions, if unobstructed,
from their source.
Bacon, however, denies that there are audible species (Demultiplicatione specierum
1 2). A species inhering in a part of the medium will cause a species to inhere in
the adjacent part that is similar to it, if weaker. Species cause species. But sounds
do not cause sounds and, hence, are not species. A vibration in one part of the
medium produces a sound, and it will cause the adjacent part of the medium to
vibrate as well. And the vibration of the adjacent part will itself produce a sound.
This sound is similar, if weaker, than the sound produced by the previous vibra-
tion. And like the propagation of species, the propagation of sound occurs along
a rectilinear path. But notice, that whereas vibrations cause vibrations, sounds do
not cause sounds. Sounds, for Bacon, are epiphenomenal effects of the propaga-
tion of vibrations. Species are causally implicated in their propagation in a way
that sounds could not be.
In Perspectiva 1 9 4, Bacon provides an additional argument. This argument de-
pends on the way in which species are said to propagate. The propagation of the
species does not involve locomotion but the generation of the species multiplied
in the medium. Species are not bodies and so are not subject to locomotion, un-
derstood as a change to a body’s location over time. The propagation of the species
is rather the succesive inherence of a form in different parts of the medium along
a rectilinear path. In this way they contrast with sounds:
For sound involves a motion by which the parts of the thing struck
are displaced from their natural position, with and ensuing motion of
vibration and a motion of rarefaction in every direction … as is evident
from [Aristotle’s] On the Soul, book 2. (Bacon, Perspectiva 1 9 4 290–294;
Lindberg 1996, 143)
Bacon’s arguments raise important questions that we shall have to address (sec-
tion 3.7). Do sound-waves travel? Or is the propagation of a sound-wave the
successive inherence of a wave-form in different parts of the dense and elastic
medium?
For present purposes, we shall understand The Wave Theory as identifying
sound with a certain kind of event, akin to themotion of rarefaction in every direc-
tion posited by Bacon. Speciﬁcally, according to The Wave Theory, sound is the
propagation, in every direction, of a patterned disturbance—longitudinal pressure
waves that vary in amplitude and frequency—through a dense and elastic medium
such as air or water (for contemporary defences of the wave theory, though this is
not their primary aim, see O’Shaughnessy 2009 and Sorensen 2009). The longitu-
dinal pressure waves that vary in amplitude and frequency are a kind of rarefaction.
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They are, after all, compression waves. Moreover, as on the Perspectiva account, the
rarefaction propagates in every direction. Notice, on TheWave Theory, as herein
understood, the sound event is not the patterned disturbance in a dense and elastic
medium so much as it is the propagation of a patterned disturbance through that
medium.
Among events, sounds have a distinctive temporal character. According to
O’Shaughnessy (2009), sounds have a “double duration”, the way other events,
such as the alteration of a body’s color, do not. When I hear the call of a feral
parakeet, my hearing of the sound that it produces has a certain duration. Sup-
pose I heard the parakeet’s call from its onset, so that I heard the whole of the
call. But notice, on The Wave Theory, the sound does not cease to exist at that
moment. At a later moment, as the patterned disturbance continues to propa-
gate in the dense and elastic medium, another perceiver, situated further from the
parakeet than me, may subsequently hear that same parakeet’s call. The ﬁrst du-
ration is determined by the length of the patterned disturbance and the speed at
which it is traveling. It is the duration of a potential hearing of the sound. The
second duration is determined by how long the patterned disturbance propagates,
and the speed at which it does, before completely eroding due to the resistance of-
fered by the dense and elastic medium as well as other potential obstructors such
as dampening and interference.
The Wave Theory, so understood, is usefully contrasted with two contempo-
rary alternatives. Each identiﬁes sounds with events. They differ only as to which
event sounds are to be identiﬁed with. Whereas on TheWave Theory, the event is
the propagation of the patterned disturbance through a dense and elastic medium,
according to Casati andDokic (1994, 2014), sounds are the events that would cause
a patterned disturbance to propagate through a medium should there be one, and
according to O’Callaghan (2007, 2009) sounds are the causing of the pattern dis-
turbance to propagate through a medium. On TheWave Theory, the sound event,
in a perfectly elastic medium, and ignoring its density and other potential obstruc-
tors, may be envisioned as an ever expanding sphere, the patterned disturbance
propagating in every direction from its source, as on the Baconianmodel (Sorensen
2009). It is like an expanding ripple caused by a drop in an otherwise calm body
of water, except that the sound event occurs in three dimensions, not two, and
so takes the form of a sphere rather than a circle. In contrast, for Casati and
Dockic as well as for O’Callaghan, the sound event exhibits no such structure.
For Casati and Dokic, it is the striking, bowing, grinding, vibrating, resonating, …
whatever kind of event involving the material source sufficient to propagate a pat-
terned disturbance through a dense and elastic medium, should there be one. And
for O’Callaghan, it is not these but the related event of their causing a patterned
disturbance to propagate through a medium.
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These alternatives are usefully understood in terms of their contrasting ver-
dicts concerning Berkeley’s question whether there could be sound in a vacuum
(on Berkeley’s argument from vacuums see Pasnau 1999b). Whereas on TheWave
Theory, the existence of sound depends upon a medium in which that event tran-
spires, according to Casati and Dokic (1994, 2014), sound is existentially indepen-
dent of a medium. An event involving a material source may be sufficient to cause
the propagation of a patterned disturbance through a dense and elastic medium
and may yet occur in the absence of such a medium. The existential independence
of sound allows for sound in a vacuum in the way The Wave Theory could not.
Nor are sounds existentially independent from the medium as O’Callaghan (2007,
2009) conceives of them. If there is no medium, there is no causing of a patterned
disturbance to propagate through it.
“In space no one can hear you scream.” Our alternatives provide contrasting
interpretations of the tagline for the 1979 movie Aliens. According to Casati and
Dokic (1994, 2014), in space no one can hear you scream because the sound of
your scream is perceptually inaccessible in a vacuum. A dense and elastic medium
merely contributes to the perceptual accessibility of the sound and not to its ex-
istence. According to the Wave Theory, by contrast, in space no one can hear
you scream since screaming produces no sound in a vacuum. Sounds existen-
tially depend upon a dense and elastic medium through which the patterned dis-
turbance may propagate, and in space, there is no such medium. Similarly, for
O’Callaghan (2007, 2009), sounds existentially depend upon a dense and elastic
medium through which the patterned disturbancemay propagate. It is only if such
a medium exists, can there be an event which is the causing of a patterned distur-
bance to propagate through amedium. TheWaveTheory differs fromO’Callaghan’s
account in the structure structure it attributes to the sound event. The propaga-
tion of the patterned disturbance in every direction from its source constitutes
an ever expanding sphere. In contrast, the causing of the propagation of the pat-
terned disturbance itself displays no such structure.
TheWave Theory, on the present understanding, is an idealized reﬁnement of
a traditional view. It represents a metaphysical genus, or class of views, insofar as it
admits of further reﬁnements. Are sound events, as The Wave Theory conceives
of them, plausibly the objects of audition?
Traditionally, the phenomenology of auditory experience was thought to sup-
port The Wave Theory, or at least some version of it. There are, of course, con-
temporary dissenters. Some, at least, of their more important concerns shall be
addressed in section 3.7. But for now, let us focus on why the phenomenology
of auditory experience was traditionally thought to favor The Wave Theory in
the ﬁrst place. It was traditionally thought that our auditory experience presents
an emanative phenomenology. Within auditory experience, sounds appear to em-
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anate from their sources. Speciﬁcally, sounds are heard to come from their sources.
And, at least in the context of The Wave Theory, it is natural to understand this
as the phenomenological reﬂection, in auditory experience, of the direction of the
propagation of the patterned disturbance. If it is, then an emanative phenomenol-
ogy, should it prove veridical, potentially contributes to the ﬁtness of the animal
since the direction of the propagation of the patterned disturbance carries impor-
tant information about the location of its source. Hearing the approach of another
can be of vital concern, be it predator or prey.
In “Some elementary reﬂections on sense-perception”, Broad (1952) provides a
careful description of the emanative phenomenology of audition, by contrasting
the hearing of sounds with the seeing of colors. Colors are seen to inhere in the
surfaces of bodies in a spatial region located at a distance from the perceiver. Most
events lack color despite involving colored participants. Brexit isn’t literally red,
white, and blue. Even in the rare case of a colored event such as a ﬂash or an
explosion, the color of the ﬂash, say, is seen conﬁned to the remote spatial region
of its occurrence. Hearing sounds are crucially different, in this regard, from seeing
colors:
But the noise is not literally heard as the occurrence of a certain sound-
quality within a limited region remote from the percipient’s body. It
certainly is not heard as having any shape or size. It seems to be heard as
coming to one from a certain direction, and it seems to be thought of as
pervading with various degrees of intensity the whole of an indeﬁnitely
large region surrounding the centre from which it emanates. (Broad,
1952, 5)
In this passage, Broad makes clear not only the sense in which a sound is heard to
emanate from its source, but he also connects this aspect of auditory phenomenol-
ogy with a thesis in the metaphysics of sound. For suppose that this emanative
phenomenology of auditory experience were determined by an aspect of what it
presents, then the sounds that we hear would involve a propagation, in every direc-
tion, from the source, of a patterned disturbance that can vary as it travels through
a dense and imperfectly elastic medium. That is to say, Broad is explicitly linking
the emanative phenomenology of auditory experience, if veridical, with TheWave
Theory. Broad (1952), however, should not be read as necessarily endorsing The
Wave Theory here. The description of the emanative phenomenology of auditory
experience is part of a larger task of specifying the phenomenological differences
between vision, audition, and touch, phenomenological differences that are ulti-
mately belied by the common causal mechanisms that underly all of our sensory
capacities.
As we observed, Broad’s claim that auditory experience has an emanative phe-
nomenology has been challenged. I shall take up such challenges in section 3.7.
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But for now, for the sake of argument, suppose that audition does, in fact, have
an emanative phenomenology. Sounds would have to be, at the very least, events
or processes if this aspect of the phenomenology audition is veridical. And this
would rule out sounds belonging to some other ontological category. Sounds, for
example, could not be sensible qualities as the Lockean conceives of them. Static
features like qualities could not, by themselves at least, explain the dynamic struc-
ture of sounds being heard to emanate from their sources. If sounds are qualities
located in a spatial region remote from the perceiver, at or near their source, then
the phenomenological distinction that Broad draws between vision and audition
collapses. So not only does the emanative phenomenology of auditory experience
favor The Wave Theory over other accounts of the sound event, but it favors, as
well, thinking of sounds as events or processes rather than belonging to some other
ontological category.
TheWaveTheory not only coheres with, and would explain well, the emanative
phenomenology of auditory experience, if veridical, but it would explain, as well,
ordinary practices of identifying and re-identifying sound. Ordinarily, we allow
that two perceivers located at different distances from a material source may hear
the same sound, though at different times, and though their experience of that
sound may differ. The sound may be louder for the perceiver located nearer the
source, for example. And so the experience of the sound for the perceiver located
near and far may differ, and yet it is the same sound that they hear.
When invited to envision the sound event, as The Wave Theory conceives of
it, as an ever expanding sphere, we were invited, as well, to make certain ideal-
izations, that the medium through which the patterned disturbance propagates is
perfectly elastic and that its density made no difference the propagation of the pat-
terned disturbance. Of course, the air and water through which we normally hear
sounds are dense and imperfectly elastic. Moreover, complex sonic environments
with multiple active sources of sound will typically contain other obstructors, such
as competing noise, dampening, and resonant interference. And that is presently
relevant. For that means that the patterned disturbance will erode as it propa-
gates through the imperfectly elastic medium. In Bacon’s terminology, it becomes
weaker. As it loses energy, it will become, not only less loud, but ﬁne detail of the
top end will be lost early on and perhaps only the bass will persist the furthest.
That the two perceivers, located at different distances from the source, hear
the sound at different times is due to the different distances that the patterned
disturbance had to propagate from the source to reach them. And that the au-
ditory experience of the two perceivers differ in character is due, in part, to the
erosion of the patterned disturbance as it propagated through a dense and imper-
fectly elastic medium. Nevertheless, they can be said to hear the same sound since
sound, on The Wave Theory, is not identiﬁed with a patterned disturbance but
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with the propagation of a patterned disturbance through an elastic medium. If
sound were identiﬁed with a patterned disturbance, then since the patterned dis-
turbance differed in the auditory stimulation of the two perceivers, they would be
hearing different sounds. But if sound were, instead, identiﬁed with a propagation
of a patterned disturbance through an elastic medium, the two perceivers may be
said to hear the same sound even if they are hearing it at different stages of its
career, different phases of the sound event.
Our ordinary practice of identifying and re-identifying sounds also treats them
as particulars that may be qualitatively identical if numerically distinct (Nudds,
2009, 70). Thus there may be two particulars, each a sound, that are, nonetheless,
alike auditorily. This presupposes that sounds are bearers, or substrata, of audible
qualities. The numerically distinct sounds are qualitatively identical since they in-
stantiate the same audible qualities. But this could only be so if sounds are among
the bearers of audible qualities. If sounds are bearers or substrata of audible qual-
ities, as Aristotle contends, De anima 2 11 422b31–32, then sounds could not them-
selves by qualities as the Lockean contends. Should this aspect of our ordinary
practice of identifying and re-identifying sounds prove valid, then sounds are not
themselves audible qualities, as Locke contends, but their bearers or substrata.
3.6 Auditory Perspective
According to our ordinary practice of identifying and re-identifying sound, two
perceivers located at different distances from a material source may hear the same
sound at different times, though their experience of that sound may differ. How
are we to understand this? Is this a matter of their having different auditory per-
spectives on the same sound? Recall how different visual or haptic perspectives on
the same object can give rise to different visual or haptic appearances (chapter 1.4).
Or consider the following, related case. If the former case involved intersubjective
variation in auditory experience, the present case involves intrasubjective varia-
tion in auditory experience. Suppose that the perceiver is in the presence of a
continual sound, the roar of a waterfall, say. As they approach the waterfall their
auditory experience changes. Does the perceiver gain a new perspective on that
sound by approaching its source? Smith (2002, 135) denies that this is a difference
in perspective if that involves potentially disclosing previously hidden aspects of
the sensible object. We saw this feature at work in haptic perspective (chapter 1.4).
Speciﬁcally, the haptic activities, the distinctive ways the perceiver is handling the
object, occurring in an ego-centrically and teleologically structured peripersonal
space, can disclose previously hidden corporeal aspects of the object of haptic in-
vestigation and are, to that extent, partial perspectives on that object.
Should we accept Smith’s denial that auditory perception potentially discloses
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previously hidden aspects of sound? At least part of the difference between hear-
ing the waterfall from afar and hearing it nearby is due to the erosion of the pat-
terned disturbance, continually generated by thewaterfall, as it propagates through
a dense and imperfectly elastic medium. There are at least two ways to use this
observation to undermine Smith’s denial. The ﬁrst way couples that observation
with the claim that since the patterned disturbance carries material information
about its source, some of that information, at least, is lost as the patterned distur-
bance erodes. Suppose the perceiver initially hears the sound but at such a distance
that they are unable to recognize it as the sound of a waterfall. As they approach
the sound, at some point, if circumstances are propitious, they can recognize the
material source of the sound. The difficulty with the ﬁrst way is that it is not
inconsistent with Smith’s denial. All that has been claimed is that auditory per-
ceptionmay disclose previously hidden aspects of thematerial source of the sound,
but Smith only denies that auditory perception may disclose previously hidden as-
pects, not of the material source of the sound, but of the sound itself. The second
way of developing the observation avoids this difficulty. With the erosion of the
patterned disturbance in a dense and imperfectly elastic medium, not only is in-
formation about the material source lost, but so are audible features of the sound
itself, or at least audible features of the sound possessed at a certain stage of its
career. At a certain distance one may no longer hear the ﬁne play of overtones
in a sound, say. As we shall see, Smith himself provides an example of hearing a
previously hidden aspect of a sound, though he does not, himself, recognize it as
such.
Smith denies that hearing a sound at different distances from its source affords
the perceiver with distinct auditory perspectives on that sound if a perspective
potentially discloses a previously hidden aspect of the sound. Smith, however,
does not himself accept the antecedent of that conditional. Following Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty, Smith suggests, instead, that it is sufficient for the notion of
perspective to get a grip that there are better or worse perspectives on the given
object. And Smith accepts that there are better or worse perspectives in hearing
a sound:
We can discover how loud a distant sound really is, or how hot a ﬁre
really is, by moving closer to them. If we want to hear the ticking of
a pocket-watch “properly,” we put it close to our ear; we behave very
differently when it is a matter of hearing a cannon ﬁre. (Smith, 2002,
135)
While I agree with everything claimed in this passage, I fail to see how the contrast
between a conception of a perspective as potentially disclosing a previously hidden
aspect and a conception of a perspective as affording a better or worse perspective
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can be coherently maintained, at least as Smith apparently understands that con-
trast. Consider Smith’s ﬁrst example, discovering how loud a distant sound really
is. Approaching a waterfall, one eventually reaches a position from which one can
hear just how loud that waterfall really is. That is to say, it is plausible that what
makes hearing the sound of the waterfall from that position a better perspective is
precisely that it discloses a previously hidden aspect of the sound, the relative in-
tensity of its loudness. Similarly, it is plausible that what makes feeling the radiant
heat of a ﬁre from a certain position a better perspective than a position located
further from the ﬁre is that it discloses just how hot the ﬁre really is. And while I
agree that placing a pocket-watch close to the ear is the “proper” way to listen to
its ticking, I suspect that this is because the perceiver is in a position to hear the
workings of the watch’s mechanism, in which case what is disclosed in the “proper”
perspective is the material source of the sound. One only hears the watch ticking,
understood as the sound of the watch, if one hears the watch ticking, understood
as the workings of the watch’s mechanism.
Complicating matters, better and worse are said of in many ways. Speciﬁcally,
whether a position from which a perceiver may hear a sound affords the perceiver
with a better or worse perspective on that sound depends upon what is practically
at stake in describing the perspective as better or worse. That is to say, it may be an
occasion-sensitive matter in Travis’ (2008) sense. Smith’s own examples suggest as
much: “If we want to hear the ticking of a pocket-watch ‘properly,’ we put it close
to our ear; we behave very differently when it is a matter of hearing a cannon ﬁre.”
Allow me to offer an example of my own. I own an otherwise ﬁne recording of an
Anthony Braxton solo performance marred only by the ill-judged positioning of
the microphone. The microphone picked up the clacking of the keys while Brax-
ton played his instrument thus partially obscuring the sound of that playing. One
moral might be that one shouldn’t stand close enough to the saxophone to hear
the clacking of its keys. Sound aesthetic advice. But suppose one is moved, not
by aesthetic, but by academic concerns. A student of Braxton’s playing might gain
insight into Braxton’s technique by hearing the clacking of the keys. So whether a
given position counts as affording the perceiver with a better or worse perspective
on the audible events unfolding in the perceiver’s environment depends upon the
practical point and interest in evaluating that perspective.
The position from which a perceiver may hear the sound of a distant source
may provide a better or worse perspective, where better and worse is said of in
many ways. Sometimes, for certain practical purposes, what makes a perspective
better is that it potentially discloses previously hidden aspects of a sound, be it
the delicate play of overtones or just how loud that sound really is. Sometimes
what makes a perspective better is that it potentially discloses a previously hidden
aspect of the source, as when the watch is close enough to hear the workings of its
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mechanism.
Audition provides the perceiver with a partial perspective on the audible events
and processes unfolding in the natural environment. Like visual and haptic per-
spective, auditory perspective is not only partial but occurs in an ego-centrically
structured space. Sometimes it is difficult to make out the direction of a sound.
Sometimes hearing a sound provides us with only a general sense of its direction.
Still, it is possible for us to hear a sound from behind, or to the left. Like vision,
and unlike haptic touch, audible events are heard to transpire in an ego-centrically
structured extrapersonal space. Some of the distal events that we hear lie far be-
yond the limits of peripersonal space, the space within which we may immediately
act with our limbs. However, audition lacks vision’s rectilinear directionality. Un-
like vision, audition affords the perceiver 360 degree awareness of extrapersonal
space.
3.7 Phenomenological Objections
According to Pasnau (1999b), if The Wave Theory were true, then auditory expe-
rience would be illusory. Pasnau claims that we do not hear sounds pervading a
volume, at least not normally, rather we hear sounds as located at their sources:
We do not hear sounds as being in the air; we hear them as being at the
placewhere they are generated. Listening to the birds outside yourwin-
dow, the students outside your door, the cars going down your street,
in the vast majority of cases you will perceive those sounds as being
located at the place where they originate. At least, you will hear those
sounds as being located somewhere in the distance, in a certain general
direction. But if sounds are in the air, as the standard view holds, then
the cries of birds and of students are all around you. This is not how it
seems (except perhaps in special cases …). (Pasnau, 1999b, 311)
Other recent writers who have made similar claims about the distal character of
experienced sound include Casati and Dokic (1994) and O’Callaghan (2007).
Auditory experience, so conceived, lacks the emanative phenomenology that
Broad (1952) contrasts with the phenomenology of color vision. Rather, sounds
are heard to be conﬁned to the remote spatial region of their origin. Indeed, Pas-
nau (1999b) understands the distal senses of vision and audition, at least, as being
on a par. And since Pasnau follows Locke in treating sounds as sensible qualities
(though see Pasnau 2009), he is led to conceive of auditory experience as affording
the perceiver with awareness of auditory qualities conﬁned to the remote spatial
region of their source. In this way is the analogy of audition with vision, paceBroad,
completely reinstated (see also Kulvicki 2008).
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Allowme tomake a brief digression to highlight an important point of disagree-
ment. Despite O’Callaghan’s (2009) emphasis on Pasnau’s (1999b) commitment to
a Lockean metaphysics of sound, it is incidental to the aim of that paper which is
concerned, instead, with whether sound qualities inhere in the medium or in the
distal source. That question, or a version of it, can be posed without assuming the
Lockean metaphysics: Is sound located in the medium or at or near its source?
Though incidental to the aim of the paper, the Lockean metaphysics of sound was
not unmotivated. Rather, Pasnau is moved by the idea that sensible objects belong
to a common ontological category. This is a monism of the sensible. Speciﬁcally,
Pasnau seems attracted to a monism of at least the objects of the distal senses (as
does Kulvicki 2008). And since colors are conceived to be qualities, sounds must
also be. Later, Pasnau (2009) abandons the Lockeanmetaphysics of sound, coming
to conceive of sounds as particular events. However, given the monism of the sen-
sible, and the dynamic aspects of the physics of color generation, Pasnau suggests
that colors might themselves be events, the event of color. Allow me to register a
disagreement, though without offering a reason, it is perhaps merely the expres-
sion of a difference in intellectual temperament. The disagreement concerns less
Pasnau’s Heraclitean metaphysics of color, than the role that the monism of the
sensible plays in motivating it.
Rather than thinking of sensible objects as belonging to a common ontological
category, I am impressed by the heterogeneity of the sensible. Far from adhering
to the monism of the sensible, on Austinian grounds, I am attracted to a pluralism
of the sensible. Just consider the diversity of visibilia alone. We see opaque natural
bodies such asMoore’s (1903) blue bead or Price’s (1932) red tomato, but we also see
transluscent volumes, ﬂashes, reﬂections, mirror images, rainbows, mirages, shad-
ows, holes. Perhaps as Sorensen (2004, 2008, 2009) suggests, we can see darkness
and hear silence. And all these sensible objects seem to be of diverse categories
and degrees of being. I raise the issue without pursuing it. The important point is
whether there is unity or diversity in the metaphysics of sensible objects would be
relevant to the kind of explanatory role they could play.
Pasnau’s argument that sounds are heard to be at or near their sources raises a
couple of questions. The ﬁrst question concerns the metaphysical commitments
of The Wave Theory. If, according to The Wave Theory, sounds have locations,
where are the sounds, so conceived, located? After all, it is only if sounds, as The
Wave Theory conceives of them, could not be located at their sources is there an
alleged conﬂict, according to Pasnau, with the phenomenology of auditory experi-
ence. The second question concerns the phenomenology of auditory experience.
In cases where perceivers genuinely hear something in the distance are what they
hear sounds or some other audible object?
Begin with the second question, about the phenomenology of auditory experi-
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ence, ﬁrst. (Discussion of the location of sound according toTheWaveTheorywill
be postponed until we discussO’Callaghan’s 2007; 2009 objection to the purported
emanative phenomenology of auditory experience.) When one listens to the birds
outside one’s window, the students outside one’s door, and the cars going down
one’s street, what is it that one is listening to? A ﬂat-footed answer would be, well,
birds, students, and cars, or at least their audible activities. But birds, students,
and cars, or at least their activities, while audible, are not themselves sounds but
their sources, at least potentially. But the claim that the source of a sound is heard
to be conﬁned to a spatial region remote from the perceiver is not inconsistent
with the sound it generates pervading the surrounding medium. Pasnau moves too
quickly from cases involving hearing a distal source to concluding that the sound
itself is heard to be remote from the perceiver. Once we allow that we hear not
only sounds but their sources, a question naturally arises whether the audibly dis-
tal object that we hear is the sound or merely its source (see O’Shaughnessy, 2009,
123, for a development of this worry).
A similar issue affects Pasnau’s discussion of the precedence effect:
Even when there is a signiﬁcant reverberation in a room, we do not
hear it as such, as long as the reverberation comes to the ear between 1
and 35 milliseconds after the initial wave enters the ear. In such cases,
we hear the sound as being located at its initial source. Although the
reverberation affects the perceived loudness and quality of the sound,
it does not enter into our perception of its location. (If the reverber-
ation arrived more slowly than 35 milliseconds later, we would hear an
echo. If it were faster than 1 millisecond we would hear the sound as
centered between the source and the point of reverberation.) This is
known as the precedence eﬀect. On the standard view, this effect has to be
described as a defect in the system. For if the object of hearing is sound,
and if sound is a quality belonging to the surrounding air rather than
to its source, then the precedence effect would serve to ﬁlter out in-
formation about sound. The precedence effect, in other words, would
stand in the way of accurate detection of sound. Yet this seems ab-
surd, which points to another reason for giving up the standard view of
sound. (Pasnau, 1999b, 312–313)
Once we allow that we hear not only sounds but their sources, then Pasnau’s rea-
soning is undone from the beginning. If the object of hearing is the source of the
sound, and the function of the auditory system is to afford the perceiver with audi-
tory awareness of distal sources (see chapter 4.2 for further discussion), then there
is nothing particularly mysterious about the precedence effect.
Another criticism of The Wave Theory that potentially conﬂates sounds with
their sources is O’Callgahan’s (2007, 89) argument from timbre. O’Callaghan ar-
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gues that auditory constancies concerning timbre favor thinking of the sounds that
we hear as the causing of the propagation of a patterned disturbance, as opposed
to the propagation of the patterned disturbance, as The Wave Theory contends.
Drawing on the work ofHandel (1995), O’Callaghan argues that timbre depends, at
least in part, upon features of the source and the characteristic manner in which it
disturbs the medium. If timbre were an audible quality of sound, then this would
favor thinking of sound as the causing of the propagation of a patterned distur-
bance. Timbre is an audible quality, to be sure, but is it best thought of as an
audible quality of sound? The conclusion that O’Callaghan draws from Handel’s
research—that timbre depends, at least in part, upon features of the source and
the characteristic manner in which it disturbs themedium—suggests, instead, that
timbre is better understood as an audible quality of the sound’s source, the sound-
generating event or process. If we hear, not only sounds, but their sources, then
sources, pace Berkeley, have auditory qualities. If sources have audible qualities,
then perhaps the distal sound-generating event involving a material body as a par-
ticipant is the bearer or substratum of heard timbre. Timbre, so conceived, is an
audible quality of sound-generating events or processes that partially disclose ma-
terial properties of their participants that are relevant to the generation of sound.
On this conception, O’Callaghan’s claim that timbre favors thinking of sounds as
the causing of the propagation of a patterned disturbance, conﬂates sounds with
their sources.
In an intellectual context, such as our own, where it is controversial what sounds
are, how plausible is it to rely on the the distinction between sounds and their
sources? After all, if sounds are up for grabs, isn’t the distinction between sounds
and their sources up for grabs as well? And if it is, then the present criticisms
of Pasnau and O’Callaghan, relying as they do upon that distinction, are, for that
reason, unpersuasive. Or so goes the present worry. What ought not to be con-
troversial is that there are sound-generating events and processes. While it may
be controversial whether sound-generating events and processes are audible, some
Berkeleans such as Smith (2002) deny it, it should be uncontroversial that such
events and processes exist. Which events and processes they are will depend, of
course, upon what sounds are since these events and processes are the causes of
sound, but it should be uncontroversial that there are such sources. But even al-
lowing that the identiﬁcation of an event or process as the cause of sound will
depend upon the controversial issue of what sounds are, there are still things that
we can conclude about sources, for example, that they can be at a distance from the
perceiver, and that they have audible qualities if heard. Moreover, these conclu-
sions about sources, if warranted, together with the claim that sources are audible,
might legitimately ground the lines of criticism presently pursued.
Pasnau (1999b, section 6) claims that The Wave Theory invites us to envision
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sounds as ﬁlling the air around us. But if all sounds ﬁll the air around us, then
we should hear them pervading the dense and imperfectly elastic medium through
which they propagate. But in fact it is quite rare to experience sound as pervading
a volume: “Perhaps this is how we experience loud music in a disco, or a jack-
hammer in a narrow street” (Pasnau, 1999b, 312). But these are exceptional cases.
Does The Wave Theory have the consequence that sounds ﬁll the air around us
in a sense that is inconsistent with our auditory experience? In his description of
the emanative phenomenology of audition, Broad seemed to suggest that sounds
ﬁll the air. How are we to understand this? Two senses of audibility can be distin-
guished, and when they are, The Wave Theory can be seen to be consistent with
our auditory experience, despite Pasnau’s doubts.
Pasnau claims that most sounds do not audibly ﬁll the medium. So ﬁlling the
medium must be something audibly accessible. Consider a brief sound, a single
call of a feral parakeet, say, as opposed to the continuous sound of a waterfall.
According to The Wave Theory, the sound of the parakeet is the propagation,
in every direction, of a patterned disturbance through a medium, in the present
instance, the dense and imperfectly elastic air. In one clear sense, the only audible
aspect of this complex event is the patterned disturbance as it is through some
interval of time. The outer boundary of the sphere, the narrow band which is
the patterned disturbance, is audible in the sense of being a potential proximal
cause of the auditory experience of the sound. So while the complex event may be
envisioned as a growing sphere, since the sound is brief, the only audible aspect of
the sound is at the moving boundary of the sphere, the narrow band which is the
patterned disturbance. After all, if a perceiver is placed within the sphere between
the source of the sound and the narrow band at the sphere’s outer boundary, they
are no longer in a position to hear the call of the feral parakeet.
In one clear sense that may be so, but there are other, relevant senses of audibil-
ity. So, if circumstances are propitious, in hearing the feral parakeet’s call, we can
hear the direction of the sound’s propagation. We may even have a sense of how
far off the source is. So aspects of the complex sound event are in another relevant
sense audible and in this sense are not merely conﬁned to the patterned distur-
bance at the outer boundary of the sphere. Nor are these exceptional cases, like
loud music in a disco, or the sound of a jack-hammer in a narrow street. TheWave
Theory, as herein described, is only committed to sounds being heard to ﬁll the
air in this latter sense. In this sense, something is audible if it is heard in hearing
a sound. Of course, even on the ﬁrst sense of audible, understood as a potential
proximal cause of the perception of the sound, a continuous sound, such as the
roar of a waterfall, will audibly ﬁll the air—the continuously produced patterned
disturbances will pervade the space between the perceiver and the waterfall. But
as Pasnau observes, and The Wave Theory predicts, these are exceptional cases,
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like loud music in a disco, or the sound of a jack-hammer in a narrow street.
O’Callaghan (2007, chapter 3.4) criticizes The Wave Theory by attempting to
undermine its phenomenological motivations. The Wave Theory is motivated, in
no small part, by the purported emanative phenomenology of auditory experience.
Thus sounds are heard to come from their sources. O’Callaghan (2007, 2009) ar-
gues that, at least on a certain understanding of what hearing a sound coming from
its source could be, sounds are not heard to come from their sources, and thus that
auditory experience lacks the emanative phenomenology that would motivate The
Wave Theory, if veridical.
How arewe to understand hearing a sound coming from its source? O’Callaghan
writes:
It might be that sounds are heard to come from a particular place by
being heard ﬁrst to be at that place, and then to be at successively closer
intermediate locations. But this is not the case with ordinary hearing.
Sounds are not heard to travel through the air as scientists have taught
us that waves do. (O’Callaghan, 2007, 34)
And O’Callaghan likens hearing a sound coming from its source to hearing a sonic
missile. Audible emanation or propagation of a sound from its source is being
modeled on a speciﬁc kind of change, the locomotion of a body. Locomotion is a
change in location over time. So locomotion is a species of change that pertains
only to those entities, paradigmatically bodies, that possess location.
I concede that, on this understanding of what it is to hear a sound coming
from its source, ordinary auditory experience lacks an emanative phenomenology.
Hearing a sound coming from its source is not analogous with the locomotion of
an audible body. However, that is not the only available understanding of hearing
a sound coming from its source. Perhaps the audible emanation or propagation of
sound is better modeled on a different kind of change.
Prichard denies that waves and sounds, being what they are, are subject to lo-
comotion. Only bodies move, and waves and sounds are not bodies:
But … I also made the same remark (viz. that only a body could
move) to a mathematician here. What was in my mind was that it is
mere inaccuracy to say that a wave could move, and that where people
talk of a wave as moving, say with the velocity of a foot, or a mile, or
150,000 miles, a second, the real movement consisted of the oscilla-
tions of certain particles, each of which took place a little later than a
neighboring oscillation.
He scoffed for quite a different reason. He said that you could il-
lustrate a movement by a noise—that, for example, if an explosion oc-
curred in the middle of Oxford the noise would spread outwards, being
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heard at different times by people at varying distances from the centre,
so that at one moment the noise was at one place and that a little later
it was somewhere else, and in the interval it had moved from one place
to the other.
Now, of course, it was not in dispute that in the process imagined
people in different places each heard a noise at a rather different time.
The only questionwas, ‘Was the succession of noises amovement?’, and
I think that on considering the matter you will have to allow that it was
not, and that what happened was that he, being certain of the noises,
and wanting to limit the term ‘movement’ to something he was certain
of, used the term ‘movement’ to designate the succession of noises,
implying that this was the real thing of which we were both talking.
But if this is what happened, then he was using the term ‘movement’
in a sense of his own, and in saying that in the imagined case he was
certain of a movement, he was being certain of something other than
the opposite of what I was certain of. (Prichard, 1950a, 99)
(Caveat Lector: Burnyeat 1995, 430 n. 29, appendix, lampoons Aristotle for making
similar claims by citing Prichard echoing them here. I argue, that at least in this
instance, Burnyeat is hoisted by his own petard, Kalderon 2015, chapter 3.2.)
Prichard’s point about wave movement can be put this way. Consider a wave
propagating through a liquid mass. At any given moment, the liquid mass has a
certain spatial conﬁguration, and the wave-form is instanced in a certain part of
the liquid mass. At a later moment, the liquid mass will have a different spatial
conﬁguration, and the wave-form will be instanced in a different part of the liquid
mass. Prichard’s point is that it is not the wave-form that is moving in coming to
be instanced in differently located parts of the liquid mass. Rather, the liquid mass
is moving, or at least its parts, “the oscillation of certain particles”, with the effect
that the wave-form is progressively instantiated. The wave’s propagation is not a
body’s locomotion but the generation of the wave-form multiplied in the medium.
A change of state and travel are different (De sensu 6 446b28).
I want to take up Prichard’s suggestion that the propagation of patterned dis-
turbance through an elastic medium should not be understood on the model of
locomotion. At any rate, The Wave Theory, as herein described, naturally sug-
gests an alternative model based not on locomotion, but on growth. After all, on
The Wave Theory, the sound event was envisioned as an ever expanding sphere.
Growth, like locomotion, has direction. The emanative phenomenology of au-
ditory experience, our hearing sounds as coming from their sources, is the partial
disclose, in audition, of the direction of the growth of the sound event. As we shall
see, the growth of the sound event is consistent with the propagation of the pat-
terned disturbance being the generation of a wave-formmultiplied in the medium,
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and that the sound event has a dynamic principle of unity that suffices to distin-
guish it from the motion of the local parts of the in-formed medium.
In cases of growth, the parts of the whole may be in motion, without growth
reducing to such motion, but that does not mean that the whole is in motion,
at least not in the speciﬁc sense of locomotion, a change in location over time.
It is not in general true that motion in the parts of the whole involves motion,
understood as locomotion, of the whole. So consider a perfect sphere rotating
on a central axis. Since it is rotating, its parts are in motion. Indeed they are
in motion in the speciﬁc sense that the parts of the sphere are changing their
location over time. However, the sphere, while moving in some sense—it is, after
all, rotating—is not moving in the speciﬁc sense of locomotion. If the location
of the sphere is the bounded spatial region occupied by that body, then though
its parts are moving in rotating, it is rotating in place, and so not changing its
location over time. Similarly, while growth may involve the motion of the parts of
a whole, without reducing to such motion, there is a sense in which a whole may
grow without changing its location. In which case growth and travel are distinct.
In the 1966 ﬁlm, Fantastic Voyage, a submarine, The Proteus, and its crew, con-
sisting of a surgical team, the skipper, and a security agent are miniaturized and
injected into the blood stream of a defecting Russian scientist who has suffered
a blood clot in the brain, an injury sustained in his escape. Their mission is to
destroy the blood clot, inoperable by conventional means. Eventually, the surviv-
ing crew emerge from the tear duct of the patient and return to their normal size
in the medical laboratory. The surviving crew, in returning to their normal size,
grow. Wearily, and dramatically, they are standing in place. While their bound-
aries may be moving in returning to normal size—their boundaries are changing
location over time throughout this process—-the crew themselves are not engaged
in locomotion. They are standing in place.
As should be evident from the Prichard passage cited earlier, a qualiﬁcation
is needed. Speciﬁcally, it is not the claim that the crew are standing in place that
needs qualiﬁcation, but that their boundaries are moving. Initially this might seem
unproblematic since their boundaries are located and their locations are chang-
ing over time. However, as Derrida (2005, 103–4) reminds us, boundaries are ab-
stract, on some understanding of that notion. They are at least immaterial. And
as Prichard (1950a) reminds us, the only material things that are moving are the
parts of the bodies of the crew members. I believe that there is a way to retain
talk of the movement of boundaries consistent with Prichard’s insight. Aristotle
distinguishes two ways in which something may move:
There are two senses in which anythingmay bemoved either indirectly,
owing to something other than itself, or directly, owing to itself. Things
are indirectly moved which are moved as being contained in something
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which is moved, e.g. sailors, for they are moved in a different sense
from that in which the ship is moved; the ship is directly moved, they
are indirectly moved, because they are in a moving vessel. (Aristotle,
De anima i 3 406a3–8; Smith in Barnes 1984, 9)
Perhaps in cases of growth, without growth reducing to motion, what directly
moves, as Prichard insists, are parts of bodies, and what indirectly moves are their
boundaries. The change in the location of their boundaries, an indirect motion,
is consequent upon the direct motion of the parts of the bodies. Whereas an
appropriate body may be said to contain within itself the power of locomotion,
a boundary—an abstraction from the body—does not contain within itself the
power to change its location over time. Its motion is at best indirect, consequent
upon the direct motion of other things. Let a boundary be said to bind the body
whose boundary it is. Then, echoing Witt (1995, 174), we may say: “Here the rela-
tionship is not one of parts to wholes, or contents to containers, but rather” one
of binding of bodies.
Typically, at least for rigid bodies, at least some of the time, their location can
be understood as the spatial region encompassed by their boundaries. However,
what the example of the surviving crew of The Proteus reveals is that this principle
fails of bodies generally. If the locations of the surviving crew members are the
spatial regions encompassed by their boundaries, then since their boundaries are
moving, at least indirectly, somust the crew. But the crew is standing in place. This
last judgment must involve a different understanding of what it is for a person to
be located where they are.
Being a rigid, solid body may be sufficient, in certain practical circumstances,
to locate that body within the spatial region encompassed by its stable and deter-
minate boundaries. But not all bodies possess stable and determinate boundaries.
“Where and what exactly is the surface of a cat?” asks Austin (1962, lecture 9).
Even so, in cases where an entity possesses location but lacks stable and determi-
nate boundaries, its location must be understood in terms other than the space
encompassed by its stable and determinate boundaries, for it lacks such bound-
aries.
So far we have been discussing the location of bodies, but what of events? At
least some events have locations. Battles are named after the locations where
they transpired, or at least signiﬁcant sites nearby. Duke William ii’s victory over
Harold Godwinson in 1066 took place northwest of Hastings. And, sometimes at
least, the locations of events and processes can change even as they occur, which
is not to say that events and processes are themselves the subjects of change. The
ﬁght erupted in the bar and spilled out into the street. The conga line began in
the dining room and wound its way into the living room.
According to the Lemmon (1967) criterion, events are individuated by the spa-
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tiotemporal regions of their occurrence. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that
events always involve the activities of bodies that are their participants. (I doubt
very much that this principle is true on Nietzschean, and, ultimately, Heraclitean,
grounds—there is no lightning that ﬂashes, just the activity, the ﬂashing, Zur Ge-
nealogie der Moral 1 13.) Finite bodies are generated and destroyed, and while they
exist, they occupy space, so we can envision their careers as spacetimeworms. Now
consider the segment of a spacetime worm bounded by the beginning and end of
an event of which it is a participant. By the Lemmon criterion, the event itself is
individuated by the mereological sum of the segments of the spacetime worms of
its participants. If accepted, it would follow that events are located, indeed in the
spatial region of their occurrence understood as the total space occupied by their
participants at any given moment of the event’s occurrence. However, as David-
son observes, one can accept that events are spatiotemporal particulars, without
accepting the Lemmon criterion. “An explosion is an event to which we ﬁnd no
difficulty in assigning a location, although again we may be baffled by a request to
describe the total area” (Davidson, 1969, 304). Even if we accept that events are
located where they occur, the location of an event may be said of in many ways. It
may be an occasion-sensitive matter what counts as the location of an event.
Where is the sound event? An answer may depend upon what is practically
at stake in asking the question. On one natural understanding of the location of a
sound, sounds are where we hear them. On that understanding, sounds are located
at the intersection of the hearer and the propagation of the patterned disturbance.
That understanding emphasizes the actualization of sound in hearing (compareDe
anima 3 2 426a2–426a20). So on some occasions at least, sounds may be said to
be located where we hear them, and it is natural to do so when the actualization
of sound by hearing is practically salient in the given circumstances. On many
occasions, locating a sound where it is heard is both natural and serviceable. On
other occasions, governed by different practical concerns, the location of a sound
may be understood in a different way.
On occasions where a perceiver-dependent location of a sound would be inap-
propriate, and given that the sound event, as conceived by TheWave Theory, lacks
stable boundaries (they are in constant indirectmotion), wemight locate the sound
event at its epicenter, the point from which the patterned disturbance is propagat-
ing in every direction, at its source. That the boundaries of the sound event are in
constant indirect motion would suffice for bafflement at a request to describe its
total area. And given the neat symmetry of the event, its boundaries are moving
in every direction from its source, it is natural to assign its location at the point of
origin (compare Sorenson’s 2009, 138–9 discussion of the location of earthquakes).
If we locate the sound event at its source, being the epicenter of audible activity,
listening to the birds outside your window, the students outside your door, the
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cars going down your street, the sounds you hear would, on that understanding, be
located at the place where they originate. Sounds being located at their sources,
at least on this understanding, is, in this way, pace Pasnau (1999b), consistent with
The Wave Theory (see O’Shaughnessy, 2009, 123, for a partial anticipation of this
point). Not only does the occasion-sensitivity of sound undermine Pasnau’s ob-
jection, but it undermines, as well, a recent metaphysical taxonomy of sound as
distal, medial, and proximate (Casati and Dokic, 2014). If the location of sound is
an occasion-sensitive matter, then a metaphysical taxonomy based on the location
of sound is, to that extent, vitiated.
According to TheWave Theory, as developed herein, the propagation of a pat-
terned disturbance, in every direction, through a dense and elastic medium is the
progressive instantiation of a wave-form, a kind of dynamic in-formation, realized
by the motion of the local parts of the medium, “the oscillation of certain par-
ticles.” Though the sound event may be said to have location, the propagation
of the patterned disturbance through a dense and elastic medium is not best mod-
eled on the locomotion of a body, like a sonic missile. As O’Callaghan (2007, 2009)
observes, that is not how auditory experience presents sound as coming from its
source. Since the patterned disturbance at the boundary of the sound event is in-
directly moving in every direction, thus determining, under certain idealizations,
an ever expanding sphere, the propagation of a patterned disturbance is better
modeled on growth rather than locomotion. Sounds are heard to come from their
sources in the sense that the direction of the propagation of the patterned distur-
bance in the growth of the sound event is disclosed in auditory experience. On
that model, there are certain natural alternative understandings of the location of
a sound event. Locating the sound event in the space encompassed by stable and
determinate boundaries is not possible since these are in constant indirect mo-
tion. On certain occasions, for certain practical purposes, sounds may be said to
be where we hear them. On other occasions, for other purposes, sounds may be
said to be located at their epicenter, at or near their sources. And each alternative
is consistent with the sound event being the propagation, in every direction, of a
patterned disturbance through a dense and imperfectly elasticmedium understood
as the progressive instantiation of a wave-form realized by the motion of the local
parts of the medium.
As a dynamic in-formation, the sound event has a kind of unity irreducible to
themotion of the local parts of the in-formedmedium. Conceiving of the propaga-
tion of sound on themodel of the locomotion of a body—a sonicmissile—mistakes
the unity of the sound event for the unity of a body. Sound events may lack the
unity of a body. After all, events and bodies have different modes of being. But
sound events nevertheless possess sufficient unity to distinguish them from the
in-formed medium that they existentially depend upon. It is a dynamic unity as
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beﬁtting the double duration and spatial mutation of sound. Though the motion
involved in the dynamic unity is at best indirect, being the progressive instantia-
tion of a wave-form, it is the force with which it propagates in every direction that
explains the growth of the sound event. While the sound event may be realized by
the motion of the local parts of the medium, “the oscillation of certain particles”,
it is the force of its propagation, communicated from one part to the next, that
determines the dynamic in-formation. The sound event is realized by the motion
of the local parts of the medium without reducing to such motion because of its
dynamic unity, the force with which it grows in the dense and imperfectly elas-
tic medium (on dynamic principles of unity see Johnston, 2006a). And it is the
direction of this force that is disclosed, more or less clearly, in the emanative phe-
nomenology of auditory experience. What Prichard’s mathematician was certain
about was the unity of sound. In misconceiving the unity of a sound as the unity of
a body, he was misled into thinking that sounds travel like missiles. But in conceiv-
ing of the unity of the sound, or at least its principle, as the force of the dynamic
in-formation, sounds do not so much as travel as they grow.
We hear sounds. We also hear sources. What is the relation between the
sounds that we hear and their audible sources? Is our awareness of the sources
of sound mediated in the way that the neo-Berkelean suggests? Or is Heidegger
right in insisting that we can attend to the sources of sound without ﬁrst attending
to the sounds that they generate? In the next chapter I shall argue for the Heideg-
gerian alternative. In hearing the call of the feral parakeet I am explicitly aware of
the parakeet’s call and only implicitly aware of its sound. I do not, then, attend to
the parakeet’s call by attending to its sound. Rather, we hear the sources of sound
through, or in, the sounds they generate. And, as we shall see, the principle of
sympathy explains how this may be so.
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Chapter 4
Sources
4.1 TheHeideggerian Alternative
On one understanding, the source of a sound may be a body that possesses the
power of sounding, that is, the power to engage in a sound-generating activity, a
thing source in the terminology of Casati et al. (2013). On another understanding,
the source of a sound is simply the sound-generating activity, the event or process
that generates the sound, an event source. Indeed, there may be sound-generating
events or processes not involving the activity of bodies (though for the most part
we shall ignore this possibility). Audible sources, the sources disclosed in auditory
experience, are sound-generating events or processes. It is the audible activities
of bodies, or at least sound-generating events or processes, that we hear and not
the bodies themselves (though perhaps we may attend to these on the supposition
that their audible activities constitute a dynamic aural image of them, chapter 3.4).
We hear sounds, and we hear their sources. What role do sounds play in affording
the perceiver with auditory awareness of their sources?
The neo-Berkelean has an answer, ready to hand, that many ﬁnd nearly irre-
sistible. We hear the sources of sound by hearing the sounds they generate. We
hear a body’s audible activity by hearing the sound that activity generates. Hearing
sounds afford the perceiver with auditory awareness of their sources since the im-
mediate presentation of the sound in auditory experience constitutes, in a manner
yet to be explained, the mediate presentation of its source.
I do not accept the neo-Berkelean answer. I believe that its central claims are
at odds with the phenomenology of auditory experience. Instead, I shall reﬁne
and elaborate a Heideggerian account of the role that sounds play in affording the
perceiver with auditory awareness of their distal sources (see Leddington 2014 for
a different defence of the Heideggerian alternative and the replies by O’Callaghan
2014 and Nudds 2014). We do not hear sources by hearing their sounds as the neo-
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Berkelean would have it. Rather we hear the sources of sound directly. In cases
where a perceiver can hear the source of a sound, the call of a feral parakeet, say,
they are explicitly aware of the call and only implicitly aware of its sound. The
application of Fulkerson’s (2014) distinction between explicit and implicit aware-
ness to Heidegger’s (1935/2000) observation about audition is the ﬁrst of the re-
ﬁnements. There is a sense in which we hear a source through, or in (Ledding-
ton, 2014), the sound it produces. The sound they hear is a perceptual medium
through which the audible activities of distal bodies are disclosed. And sympathy
is the principle that makes possible the presentation of sources in auditory expe-
rience through the perceptual medium of sound. On the reﬁned and elaborated
Heideggerian account, the role of sounds in affording the perceiver with auditory
awareness of distal sources is limited to being an audible media through which, or
in which, their sources may be heard.
4.2 The Function of Audition
Begin with two claims recently defended by Nudds:
(1) The function of auditory perception is to afford the perceiver with awareness
of the distal sources of sound;
(2) In hearing a sound in a complex sonic environment withmultiple active sources
of sound, that the sound that the perceiver hears is segmented from all that
they hear is due, in part, to their auditory system identifying its source.
Concerning the ﬁrst claim Nudds writes:
It is uncontroversial to suggest that auditory perception tells us about
the sources of sounds as well as about sounds. The suggestion that I am
going to develop is that the function of auditory perception is to tell us
about the sources of sounds—that perceiving the sources of sounds is
what auditory perception is for and that what sounds we hear we hear
as a consequence of the particular way auditory perception functions
to tell us about the sources of sounds. (Nudds, 2010, 284)
The function of auditory perception is to afford the perceiver with awareness of
the distal sources of sound. This is a teleological claim. The end of auditory per-
ception, that for the sake of which perceivers are equipped with audition, is the
presentation, in audition, of distal events and processes in the natural environ-
ment. It is also an explanatory claim. The operation of audition adequate to its
function constitutes an explanatorily relevant kind. It is also objective. The opera-
tion of audition adequate to its function constitutes an explanatorily relevant kind
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independently of whether anyone accepts that it does. Moreover, this objective,
teleological, explanatory claim, seems naturalistically acceptable. It is, at any rate,
overwhelmingly plausible to suppose that an animal’s ability to hear distal events
and processes in the natural environment contributes to its ﬁtness. And if that is
right, that the function of audition is to present distal events and processes in the
natural environment is plausibly determined by evolutionary pressures.
Nudds’ claim about the function of audition generates a tension within the
Peripatetic framework. Consider the following two claims about the proper sen-
sibles:
(1) Proper sensibles are perceptible to one sensory modality alone (for example,
one can see colors, but not hear, smell, taste, or touch them)
(2) Proper sensibles are the ﬁnal cause of perception (for example, sight is for the
sake of seeing colors in the light and the luminous in the dark)
The difficulty is that, at least in the case of audition, these two claims cannot be
true together.
Consider the second claim ﬁrst, that the proper sensibles are the ﬁnal cause
of perception. The proper object of sight is the visible (De anima 2 7 418b27) and
there are two kinds of visibilia, color which is visible in light and the luminous,
such as bioluminescence or starlight, visible only in the dark (De anima 2 7 419a1–7;
the nice example of starlight is due to Philoponus In de anima 347 11). If sight is for
the sake of seeing colors in the light and the luminous in the dark (Metaphysica  8
1050a10), then is audition for the sake of hearing sounds? Nudds denies this, claim-
ing, instead, that the function of audition is to afford the perceiver with awareness
of distal events in the natural environment. Suppose, then, that audition is for
the sake of hearing distal sources. Arguably it is that in which audition’s selective
advantage lies. Hearing sounds would be incidental to audition, so conceived, at
least relative to its end, even if one can only ever hear sources through, or in, the
sounds they generate. The difficulty is that the ﬁnal cause, the distal sources, are
perceptible to more than one sense alone. Thus one might hear one of London’s
feral parakeets calling as one sees that parakeet calling. So there is no one thing
that is audible yet perceptible to no other sensory modality and that for the sake
of which we possess audition. (1) and (2) are generalizations that fail for the case of
audition if we accept Nudds’ claim. Perhaps sounds are audible and perceptible to
one sense alone and so would make (1) true but (2) would fail—audition is not for
the sake of hearing sounds but their sources. The audible sources of sound would
make (2) true but (1) would fail—audible sources may be available to more than one
sense.
That (1) and (2) fail to be jointly true of audition signals the breakdown of the
guiding explanatory framework of De anima 2:
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It is necessary for the student of these forms of soul ﬁrst to ﬁnd a deﬁni-
tion of each, expressive of what it is, and then to investigate its deriva-
tive properties, &c. But if we are to express what each is, viz. what
the thinking power is, or the perceptive, or the nutritive, we must go
farther back and ﬁrst give an account of thinking or perceiving; for ac-
tivities and actions are prior in deﬁnition to potentialities. If so, and
if, still prior to them, we should have reﬂected on their correlative ob-
jects, then for the same reason we must ﬁrst determine about them,
i.e. about food and the objects of perception and thought. (Aristotle,
De anima 2 4 415a14–22; Smith in Barnes 1984, 26)
Aristotle’s explanatory strategy has two parts.
First, Aristotle proposes to explain perceptual capacities in terms of what they
are the capacity for, perceiving. Speciﬁcally, perceptual activity is prior in account
to the potential for such activity, the relevant perceptual capacity. Possessing a
capacity is a way for things to be, and what it is to be that way depends upon what
it is to be its exercise. So possessing audition is a way for at least animals to be,
and what it is to be that way depends upon what it is to hear. Thus, if capacities
are powers or potentialities, as Aristotle conceives of them, then they ontologi-
cally depend upon what they are the potential for. (On ontological dependence
see Fine 1995. On this reading of priority in account see Peramatzis 2011. For a
contemporary defence of this claim see Kalderon forthcoming.)
Second, perceptual activities, the exercise of our perceptual capacities, are them-
selves partly explained in terms of their correlative objects. It will emerge that, at
least with respect to perception, Aristotle means, more speciﬁcally, proper ob-
jects, understood as sensible objects perceptible in themselves and perceptible to
that sense alone. So what it is to hear depends upon the presentation, in auditory
experience, of the proper object of audition, sound. Crucially, that is consistent
with auditory experience presenting more than just sound.
Thinking of perceptual capacities as individuated by that for the sake of which
they are a potential for allows Aristotle to think that there are exercises of our
perceptual capacities that are not the presentation of the proper sensibles, no-
tably, when they are the presentation of common or incidental sensibles. And
more besides—the difference between proper objects such as color and sound are
perceptible as well. In this way, Aristotle broadens the domain of the perceptible
(Sorabji, 1971, 2003). Sight may enable a perceiver to see colors in the light and
the luminous in the dark, but it enables the perceiver to see other visibilia such as
motion, a common sensible. But the presentation of motion in sight is incidental
to its operation. Sight is for the sake of seeing colors in the light and the luminous
in the dark. But, even liberalizing the domain of the perceptible as Plato conceives
of it, in continuing to understand the presentation of proper sensibles as that for
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the sake of which a perceiver possesses the relevant perceptual capacity, Aristotle
cleaves too closely to the Platonic tradition undone by audition whose function
is to afford the perceiver awareness of distal events and processes in the natural
environment that are perceptually available to other sensory modalities, such as a
storm whistling in the chimney or the call of a feral parakeet. One may feel the
storm whistling in the chimney and see the parakeet calling.
The case of audition undermines the second part of Aristotle’s explanatory
strategy but not the ﬁrst. Nothing about audition’s function is inconsistent with
perceptual activity being prior in account to the capacity for such activity, that
perceptual capacities are individuated by what they are the potential for, and so
ontologically depend upon their proper exercise. Rather, Nudds’ claim is a chal-
lenge to the second part of Aristotle’s explanatory strategy, inherited from Plato,
if liberalized, that perceptual activities are, in turn, to be explained in terms of the
presentation of their proper objects. Moreover, nothing about audition’s function
is inconsistent with the exercise of a perceptual capacity being explained in terms
of the objects that they present. It is not the claim that perceptual activities are
explained in terms of their correlative objects that is the difficulty here. It is the
restriction of correlative objects, in terms of which perceptual activities are ex-
plained, to proper objects that is the source of the difficulty. For at least with
respect to an animal’s capacity for audition, that power is not for the presentation
of objects disclosed through the exercise of that power alone, but for the presenta-
tion of objects potentially disclosed through the exercise of other sensory powers
and typically in concert with them.
4.3 Sources and theDiscrimination of Sound
Audition is for the sake of hearing the sources of sounds, understood as sound-
generating events or processes. If audition is for the sake of hearing, not sounds,
but their sources, then hearing sound is incidental to audition, relative to its end,
even if one can only ever hear sources through, or in, the sounds they generate.
Perhaps, in certain contexts, one may even say that one hears a source by hearing
its sound, but only in a sense unavailable to the neo-Berkelean (Nudds sometimes
writes this way). In Peripatetic terminology, this is an instance of hypothetical
necessity (Physica 2 9; for useful discussion see Charles 1988). The necessity is hy-
pothetical since the end of audition, to hear the sources of sounds, is presupposed.
Given the end of audition, to hear the distal sources of sounds, it is necessary to
hear the sounds that they generate.
Recall, according to the neo-Berkelean, sounds are distinguished from their
sources in auditory experience in that only the former are the immediate objects of
audition and that we hear the latter by hearing the former. For the neo-Berkelean,
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the preposition “by” is a place holder for the presentative function of sounds, their
presenting their sources in presenting themselves in audition. What is this presen-
tative function? One of the lessons we learned from Heidegger was that there is
more to the presentative function of sound than the sources we hear being neces-
sarily accompanied, in audition, by their sounds, since soundsmay lack this presen-
tative function and remain a necessary accompaniment of the sources that we hear.
Moreover, the mediate presentation of sources by the immediate presentation of
their sounds is unlike more ordinary cases of perceiving one thing by perceiving
another, so in what does this extraordinary case consist? Typically, neo-Berkeleans
are no more forthcoming than sense-datum theorists were in giving an account of
this presentative function.
According to the neo-Berkelean, sounds are the immediate objects of audition
in something like the following sense. Sounds are audible. Moreover, sounds are
audible in themselves. Sounds are audible in themselves in the sense that they con-
tain within themselves the power of their own audibility. So one can hear a sound
without hearing any other thing. In hearing a sound, auditory experience affords
the perceiver with explicit awareness of that sound independently of hearing any
other thing. In this sense are they at least among the immediate objects of audi-
tion. Though, of course, neo-Berkeleans typically follow Berkeley in maintaining,
as well, that sounds are the only immediate objects of audition. Sounds alone have
within themselves the power of their own audibility, even if neo-Berkeleans do
not go so far as Berkeley in maintaining that sounds are the sole objects of au-
dition. Pace Berkeley, sources too are audible. However, they are not audible in
themselves. They do not contain within themselves the power of their own audi-
bility but are only audible by hearing other objects that are audible in themselves,
namely the sounds that they generate. In this sense are they the mediate objects
of audition.
So understood, sound could not be the immediate object of audition. Bracket,
for the moment, worries about the, as of yet, unexplained presentative function of
sound in auditory experience. Focus, instead, on the prior claim that sounds are
audible in themselves, that sounds contain within themselves the power of their
own audibility with the implication that hearing a sound does not require hearing
any other audible object. Nudds’ second claim, if true, suffices to establish that
sounds are not audible in themselves in the way that the neo-Berkelean requires.
Speciﬁcally, Nudds claims that in hearing a sound in a complex sonic environment
with multiple active sources of sound, the sound the perceiver hears is segmented
from all that they hear due, in part, to their auditory system identifying its source.
And, as we shall see, that is inconsistent with sounds being audible in themselves.
If anything, something like the reverse is true. In such circumstances, sounds are
audible, but not audible in themselves, but audible only insofar as one hears the
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sources that generate them. There is then, I shall suggest, a sense in which sounds
are better thought of as audible media through which, or in which, sources may
be heard. At the very least, if sounds were audible media, in the intended sense,
they would be audible, but not audible in themselves, but owing their audibility to
other things—the sources heard through, or in, the sounds.
Audition, like vision and tactile perception, involves grouping, segmentation,
and recognition (Bregman, 1990). When, upon the hill in Greenwich Park near the
Royal Observatory, I witnessed the Ballardian spectacle of feral parakeets travers-
ing the mirrored towers of the City of London, the call of the feral parakeet was
not all that I heard. I could hear, as well, the trees rustling in the light breeze, the
occasional shouts of children playing, people conversing, a bicycle braking, dogs
barking. Like most public spaces, Greenwich Park is a complex sonic environment
with multiple active sources of sound, and the call of the feral parakeet was not all
that there was to hear. The patterned disturbance reaching my ears was not solely
caused by the parakeet’s calling. And yet I could hear it clearly.
A patterned disturbance, occurring in a given temporal interval, can be an-
alyzed into frequency components, component sine waves of a given frequency
and amplitude. When longitudinal pressure waves superimpose, their frequency
components additively combine to produce a new complex pressure wave. Given
the detected frequency components of the complex pressure wave are not solely
caused by the call of the feral parakeet, how does my auditory system afford me
the capacity to hear the sound of the feral parakeet? The auditory system would
need to somehow group together the frequency components that constitute the
sound of the feral parakeet’s call.
According to Nudds (2009, 2010), the auditory system groups frequency com-
ponents by exploiting clues as to the likely source of the sound. There are a variety
of different such clues, and many can be dominated by other clues.
Some clues are synchronic. That is, sometimes frequency components occur-
ring at a time are related in such a way that it is unlikely that they are the products
of distinct sources. For example, the vibration of a material object will determine
frequency components of the patterned disturbance that are harmonically related
to a fundamental frequency. So there is a tendency for the auditory system to group
together frequency components at a time that are harmonically related since it is
unlikely that they are produced by distinct sources.
Some clues are diachronic. That is, sometimes frequency components occur-
ring over time are related in such a way that it is unlikely that they are the products
of distinct sources. Thus, for example, the frequency components of a sound pro-
duced by a source will have the same onset time, and they will change over time
in similar ways. So there is a tendency for the auditory system to group together
frequency components that are diachronically related in important ways since it is
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unlikely that they are produced by distinct sources.
Nudds (2009, 74) observes that while the clues discussed so far are “bottom-up”
or stimulus driven groupings, there are, as well “top-down” groupings, especially of
sequences of frequency components. The idea is that certain frequency compo-
nents are grouped together because they ﬁt together to form a pattern recognized
by the auditory system to likely be produced by a single source. Thus, for example,
one might hear a bottle bouncing, as opposed to breaking, and this is likely to be
due to such a top-down grouping. See Bregman’s (1990, chapter 4) discussion of
what he calls schema-based segregation and integration.
Notice how the clues to grouping together frequency components constituting
a heard sound are all based on features of its material source. Thus, for example,
the size of an object will determine the lowest frequency at which it will vibrate.
This allows us to hear that one object dropped is larger than another object that
is also dropped. How exactly the auditory system extracts information about the
material source and what information it extracts from the grouped frequency com-
ponents is presently not well understood.
However, exactly, the auditory system performs this feat, the important point
is that in a sonically complex environment with multiple active sources of sound,
an individual sound is segmented from all that is heard, in part, by identifying
its source. If a likely source is not identiﬁed by the auditory system, then the
frequency components will not be grouped together and the sound will not be
segmented from all that is heard. If in hearing the products of multiple active
sources of sound, none of the sources are discriminated, all that would be heard is
a kind of undifferentiated noise. Hearing the sources of sound lends intelligibility
to what is heard. The audible accessibility of the source intelligibly differentiates,
in auditory experience, the sound it generates.
At least, then, in ordinary cases of hearing ecological sound, the sound is seg-
mented from all that is heard only by virtue of the auditory system identifying its
source. In such cases, sounds are not, in fact, audible in themselves. It is not pos-
sible to hear the sound segmented from all that is heard in and of itself quite apart
from hearing anything else. In such cases, one hears the sound only insofar as one
hears the event or process that generates the sound, only insofar as one hears its
audible source. At least in sonically complex environments with multiple active
sources of sound, sounds are not audible in themselves, they do not contain within
themselves the power of their own audibility, but are only audible insofar as one
hears their sources as well.
The neo-Berkelean shares with Berkeley the conviction that sounds are audible
in themselves. They depart from Berkeley in maintaining that we hear, in addition
to sounds, their sources. These latter are not audible in themselves but are only
audible insofar as we hear their sounds. But the sounds we hear in sonically com-
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plex environments are not audible in themselves as the neo-Berkelean conceives
of them. Nor, in such circumstances, is there an explicit experience of sound had
independently of hearing anything else. So there is no explicit experience of sound
to mediately present its source as the neo-Berkelean requires.
I do not claim that we always hear sounds by hearing the sources that pro-
duce them. I claim only that in a sonically complex environment with multiple
active sources of sound, we hear these sounds by hearing their sources. One case
is sufficient to defeat the neo-Berkelean claim that sounds, in general, are audi-
ble in themselves. Since I do not claim that we always hear sounds by hearing
their sources, it is thus consistent with the present argument that there be cases
where sounds are heard while their sources remain inaudible. Perhaps in listening
to stereo speakers, we hear the sounds they make and not their source. After all,
if you can hear the speaker when playing—say, if the cone is torn or it somehow
rattles—then it is a bad speaker.
4.4 Sympathy andAuditory Presentation
Sounds need not be audible in themselves. Rather, in some cases at least, they
are more like audible media. What does it mean to describe sounds as perceptual
media? Perceptual media need not be thought of as physical media, the movement
of whose local parts, “the oscillation of certain particles,” realize the progressive
instantiation of a wave form. While the idea of physical media merely answers
to the demands of being a causal intermediary, the idea of perceptual media an-
swers to the demands of perceptual accessibility. So consider the following. Just
as illumination makes the visible perceptually accessible, sound makes the activ-
ities of distal bodies perceptually accessible. Without illumination, the colors of
distal bodies remain unseen, without sound, the activities of distal bodies remain
unheard. (Absent the ring of Gyges, Republic 2 359 a–360 d, becoming invisible is
not possible for us, but becoming inaudible is easy enough—simply stop moving.)
One sees through, or in, illuminated media, such as air or water, and thereby per-
ceives the colors of distal bodies arrayed in the natural environment. One hears
through, or in, audible media, the sound, and thereby perceives the activities of
distal bodies arrayed in the natural environment.
By means of the propagation of light waves, the visible aspects of distal bodies
are seen. By means of the propagation, in every direction, of the patterned distur-
bance through a dense and imperfectly elastic medium, that is, by means of sound,
the audible activities of distal bodies are heard.
Sound, like the illuminant, is perceptible. Moreover, sound, like the illumi-
nant, is perceptible in a certain way. Concerning the perception of the illuminant,
Hilbert writes:
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Do we see how an object is illuminated or do we see the illumination
itself? On phenomenological grounds the ﬁrst option seems better to
me. What we see as changing with the illumination is an aspect of the
object itself, not the light source or the space surrounding the object.
(Hilbert, 2005, 150–151)
One sees the character of the illumination by seeing the way objects are illumi-
nated. When viewing a brightly lit pantry, one sees the brightness of the pantry
by seeing the brightly lit objects arranged in it. So the illuminant is visible, though
not visible in itself, but owes its visibility to the objects that it illuminates. (For a
comparison with Aristotle’s deﬁnition of transparency, De anima 2 7 418b4–6, see
Kalderon 2015, 41–42.)
Like the illuminant, sound is perceptible, though perceptible in a certain way.
In cases where one hears a sound and its source, one hears the character of a sound
by hearing the activities of its distal source. (Think of how difficult it is to describe
ecological sound without describing audible aspects of its source.) In such cases,
sound is audible, though not audible in itself, but owes its audibility to the distal
source that it discloses.
Bregman describes a game that provides a useful analogy:
The game is this. Your friend digs two narrow channels up from the
side of the lake. Each is a few feet long and a few inches wide and they
are spaced a few feet apart. Halfway up each one, your friend stretches
a handkerchief and fastens it to the side of the channel. As waves reach
the side of the lake they travel up the channels and cause the two hand-
kerchiefs to go into motion. You are allowed to look only at the hand-
kerchiefs and from their motions to answer a series of questions: How
many boats are there on the lake and where are they? Which is the
most powerful one? Which is the closer? Is the wind blowing? Has any
large object been dropped suddenly into the lake? Solving this problem
seems impossible, but it is a strict analogy to the problem faced by our
auditory systems. The lake represents the lake of air that surrounds us.
The two channels are our two ear canals, and the handkerchiefs are our
ear drums. The only information that the auditory system has available
to it, or ever will have, is the vibrations of these two ear drums. Yet it
seems able to answer questions very like the ones that were asked by the
side of the lake: How many people are talking? Which one is louder,
or closer? Is there a machine humming in the background? (Bregman,
1990, 5–6).
One striking aspect of Bregman’s analogy is how it presupposes that the func-
tion of the auditory system is to afford awareness of distal events and processes in
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the natural environment. The game is to ﬁgure out how such awareness is afforded
by sensitivity to proximal perturbations in the surrounding medium, be it air or
water. The proximal perturbations in the surrounding medium, the patterned dis-
turbances impinging upon the perceiver, while there to be sensed, considered in
and of themselves, are relatively unimportant features of the natural environment.
Indeed, in Bregman’s proposed game, he takes such sensitivity for granted. What
is important is not the sensitivity to proximal perturbations in the medium, but
sensitivity to the information they carry about distal events and processes in the
natural environment, for it is in virtue of this latter sensitivity that the auditory
system affords the perceiver with auditory awareness of the distal environment.
The ear channels the longitudinal pressure waves into its canal where they come
into conﬂict with the tympanic membrane. The potential pattern of activation of
local receptors constitutes the sensitivity to such proximal perturbations. As Breg-
man’s analogy brings out, the task of the auditory system is to somehow extract
information about the distal sources of the proximal perturbations. Neverthe-
less, quite apart from this central role, the end of audition, to afford the perceiver
with auditory awareness of the distal environment, the proximal perturbations, the
force of the patterned disturbance coming into conﬂict with the tympanic mem-
brane, are there to be sensed, even if, as Heidegger insists, they are rarely if at all
attended to, in familiar every day instances of hearing ecological sound.
Suppose, hypothetically, there could be an auditory experience that arose from
this sensitivity to proximal perturbations, quite apart from what information they
could provide about distal sources, so that the experience was conﬁned to only
what was proximately impinging upon the perceiver. Perhaps auditory experience
upon ﬁrst regaining consciousness may approximate what we are presently suppos-
ing. And perhaps the earliest forms of audition, in the evolution of animals with
auditory capacities, were similar. What would be experienced would be a kind of
undifferentiated noise. Upon ﬁrst coming to consciousness the perceiver hears a
sound but cannot make out its source. As things come into focus for the perceiver,
they come to hear the source of the sound. In hearing the sound, there is a marked
increase in the intelligibility of what is heard. Even in the case where the patterned
disturbance was produced by a single source, there is a difference in audible intelli-
gibility between hearing the sound as produced by that audible source and hearing
the sound and being unaware of its source. What is heard is no longer mere noise
but the storm whistling in the chimney or the call of a feral parakeet, say.
But even hearing a noise, like the case of grasping or enclosure, understood as
a mode of haptic perception, would involve the presentation of something extra-
somatic. The longitudinal pressure waves may be impinging upon the perceiver,
but they are extra-somatic for all that. This hypothetical limited auditory experi-
ence is no mere auditory sensation but a mode of auditory perception, the presen-
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tation, in auditory experience, of an extra-somatic event or process. And like the
case of grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, it is sym-
pathy that makes the presentation in conscious experience of the extra-somatic
possible. The force of the propagation of the patterned disturbance comes into
conﬂict with the force of the tympanic membrane and this gives rise to the hypo-
thetical limited auditory experience. Moreover, this limited auditory experience
is no mere auditory sensation, a conscious modiﬁcation of the perceiving subject
brought about by impingement from without, but the perception of extra-somatic
events or processes. Even supposing that the impingement of proximal perturba-
tions occasioned in the perceiver intensive auditory sensation, such sensation is
only the presentation of this noise insofar as it is experienced as a sympathetic re-
sponse to an extra-somatic event. Sympathy is what makes for this difference. The
hypothetical limited experience that auditory sensitivity to proximal perturbations
gives rise to involves the sympathetic presentation of those perturbations.
One important difference between this hypothetical limited form of auditory
experience and grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception,
is the relative passivity of the former compared to the latter. In the conﬂict be-
tween the force of the propagation of the sound, the dynamic principle of unity of
the sound event, and the countervailing force determined by the tension and elas-
ticity of the tympanic membrane, the former acts upon the latter and the latter
merely resists the former insofar as it can (there are limits, of course, one can blow
an ear drum). In grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception,
by contrast, the hand, unlike the tympanic membrane, is active. Indeed, it is the
active wax of haptic perception.
The limited auditory experience is hypothetical, even if actual auditory experi-
ences, such as those undergone when coming to consciousness, may approximate
it. However, when we consider more ordinary cases of auditory perception, such
as hearing the storm whistling in the chimney, the three motored plane, the Mer-
cedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen, not only does sympathy play
an expanded role in the presentation, in audition, of the activities of distal bodies,
but, moreover, this sympathetic presentation is made possible by the perceiver lis-
tening out for distal events or processes, thus reinstating the analogy with haptic
perception.
The perceiver hears the distal source in the sound that it generates. Moreover
the perceiver hears in conformity with the sound that the distal source generates.
And it is the principle of sympathy that governs the disclosure, over time, of the
distal sound-generating events and processes.
The perceiver hears the distal source in the sound that it generates. On one
construal of Bregman’s analogy, perhaps not the only one, hearing the sources
of sound through, or in, the sounds that they generate is not unlike the quasi-
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visual perception induced by Bach-y-Rita’s tactile-visual substitution system (for
an overview see Bach-y Rita and Kercel 2002). Bach-y-Rita’s tactile-visual substi-
tution system involved a head mounted camera wired to electrodes attached to the
perceiver’s body. The idea was to map the visual information captured by the cam-
era onto a pattern of tactile activations. Perceivers that were able to control the
camera by “looking” around could, within a day, make quasi-visual reports about
the number, size, and relative distance of objects arrayed in their environments. At
this point, perceivers were explicitly aware, in a quasi-visual mode of awareness, of
distal objects in the natural environment and merely implicitly aware of any tactile
sensation. In contrast, at the beginning of this procedure, when the apparatus was
ﬁrst mounted and used, the perceiver was only explicitly aware of the electrodes’
stimulation. Their experience only came to quasi-visually present distal objects
and their spatial properties when they learned to sympathetically respond to the
electrodes’ stimulation. In so doing, they learn to “see” distal objects through,
or in, what they feel. Moreover, if sympathy is indeed the principle governing
this quasi-visual presentation, then that would explain the pattern of attention de-
scribed above. If the perceiver, having mastered the tactile-visual substitution sys-
tem, were to explicitly attend to the electrodes’ stimulation, this would erode the
sympathetic presentation of the distal objects and their spatial properties. Simi-
larly, in hearing a distal event or process, such as hearing the storm whistling in the
chimney, the three-motored plane, the Mercedes in immediate distinction from
the Volkswagen, the perceiver is explicitly aware of the source and only implicitly
aware of the sound it generates. They hear the source through, or in, the sound it
generates. Moreover, if sympathy were the principle of the disclosure, in audition,
of distal events and processes, this would explain this pattern of attention. If the
perceiver could indeed listen away from the source, listen abstractly, and attend
only to the sound it generates, this would erode the sympathetic presentation of
the distal source.
The perceiver hears in conformity with the sound that the distal source gener-
ates. In hearing distal events and processes in the natural environment, the per-
ceiver is explicitly aware of these sources. However, reﬂection on perceptual con-
stancy reveals that the phenomenological character of auditory experience is not
exhausted by the object of explicit awareness. An implicit awareness of the sound
they generate contributes, as well, to the phenomenology of the perceiver’s audi-
tory experience. Speciﬁcally, an implicit awareness of sound contributes to the
way in which the explicit object of the auditory experience is presented therein.
So consider approaching a continuous source of sound, such as a waterfall. The
waterfall, heard from different distances, sounds different. Heard from afar, the
waterfall sounds quieter than it does when heard from nearby. As the perceiver ap-
proaches the waterfall, the sound of waterfall increases in volume. But throughout
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the perceiver’s approach, the perceiver heard the constant ﬂowing of the waterfall.
The ﬂowing of the waterfall is not experienced as getting louder so much as the
perceiver is getting in a better position to hear just how loud the waterfall really
is. The ﬂowing of the waterfall, the constant object of explicit auditory aware-
ness is not experienced as changing in the way that it would have to if it were in
fact getting louder, only its auditory appearance is changing with a change in audi-
tory perspective. The ﬂowing of the waterfall, the object of explicit awareness and
the constant element in the phenomenology of stability and ﬂux, sounds different
when heard from different auditory perspectives. Hearing the sound of the wa-
terfall, from a given auditory perspective, may be implicit, it may be recessive and
in the background, so that it does not compete for attentive resources directed
towards the ﬂowing of the waterfall, but it contributes to the conscious character
of the perceiver’s auditory experience by being the way in which the distal process
is presented in that experience. The auditory disclosure of a distal source just is
hearing that source in the sound that it generates and hearing in conformity with
that sound. And that just is the exercise of a sympathetic capacity.
In sympathetically disclosing the distal sources of sound, auditory experience
is constitutively shaped by the distal events and processes that it discloses. The
conscious character of hearing a watch ticking is constituted, in part, by the au-
dible ticking of the watch. And the conscious character of hearing the call of a
feral parakeet is constituted, in part, by the feral parakeet’s call. What it is like
for the perceiver to hear the ticking of the watch depends upon and derives from
what the ticking of the watch is like—how loud it is, its distinctive timbre, what
the mechanism sounds like. And what it is like for the perceiver to hear the call of
the feral parakeet depends upon and derives from what the call of the parakeet is
like—how loud it is, its distinctive timbre, its sharpness and urgency. Moreover,
what it is like for the perceiver to hear these events and processes depends, as well,
upon the perceiver’s perspective. There are better and worse perspectives, even if
better and worse is said of in many ways. Auditory experience formally assimi-
lates to its object, relative the perceiver’s partial perspective, as a consequence of
being constitutively shaped by that object as presented to that perspective, a con-
stitutive shaping made possible by the sympathetic presentation of that object in
auditory experience. Constitutive shaping of auditory experience by its object is
a “communion” with that object—in undergoing that experience the perceiver is
united, in a way, with the object of their perception. Moreover, as with Plotinus
(chapter 2.8), this unity explains in part, the similarity between the auditory expe-
rience and its audible object. The formal assimilation of auditory perception to
its object, at least relative to the perceiver’s auditory perspective, is the effect of
constitutive shaping, and thus its conscious character depends upon and derives
from, at least in part, the audible character of the object heard.
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Recall, we are generalizing from Plotinus in taking the unity of auditory pre-
sentation to be explanatorily prior to the operation of sympathy (chapter 2.8).
Auditory presentation of distal sources is not being constructed from elements
and principles understood independently of their auditory presentation, rather the
unity of the perceiver and the distal events and processes is presupposed, and sym-
pathy merely analytically explicates the intelligible structure of this presupposed
unity. Not only does sympathy only operate within a unity, but that unity is re-
ducible to no other thing.
Auditory presentation is an irreducible unity. If sensory presentation is a dis-
tinctive kind of unity, a “communion” with its object, then auditory presentation
is more distinctive still. Insofar as auditory presentation, like haptic presentation,
is governed by the principle of sympathy, it is a mode of being with. Hearing the
call of the feral parakeet is a way of being with that bird at least insofar as it is en-
gaged in audible activity. Whereas haptic presentation is corporeal, it is a way for
a conscious animate body to be with another body, auditory presentation, while
involving a conscious animate body, is not completely corporeal, since it involves
a conscious animate body, the perceiver, being with an event or process (which
may or may not involve bodies as participants). Distal bodies are never present
in auditory experience qua bodies, but only as audible participants of an unfolding
audible event or process. Auditory presentation, like haptic presentation, is a kind
of disclosure with duration. However, whereas the substrata of audible qualities are
not wholly present at any given moment, the objects of haptic perception may
be, as when one feels relatively static features of bodies such as their texture or
temperature. The substrata of audible qualities, on the other hand, are essentially
dynamic entities not wholly present at any given moment. They unfold through
the temporal interval of their sounding. If heard, they are disclosed, in audition,
over time. In hearing something, we listen along with it.
4.5 Listening
Let us return to the Protagorean model (chapter 1.2) and the challenges it faces in
applying to audition (chapter 3.1). According to the Protagoreanmodel, perception
is the joint upshot of forces in conﬂict. Grasping or enclosure, understood as a
mode of haptic perception, is itself naturally understood on this model. On the
one hand, there is the force of the activity of the grasping hand. On the other hand,
there are the self-maintaining forces of the rigid, solid body. Making an effort to
more precisely mold the hand to the body’s contours and the resistance of the self-
maintaining forces that determine that body’s rigidity and solidity together give
rise to an experience of that body’s overall shape and volume.
Can auditory perception be understood on the Protagorean model, as the joint
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upshot of forces in conﬂict? Consider, again, the hypothetical auditory experience
whose content is limited only to the proximal perturbations in the local medium.
On the one hand, there is the force of the tympanic membrane, determined by its
tension and elasticity. On the other hand, there is the force with which the pat-
terned disturbance propagates in the dense and elastic medium, the dynamic prin-
ciple of unity of the sound event. The force of the patterned disturbance coming
into conﬂict with the force of the tympanic membrane gives rise to the percep-
tion of an extra-somatic event, the proximal perturbations, the force of the sound
event impinging upon the perceiver, even if it is only heard as a mere noise.
In the previous section, we noted a crucial disanalogy with the case of grasping
or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception. Speciﬁcally, the present
application of the Protagorean model to the hypothetical limited auditory experi-
ence is entirely passive. The force of the growth of the sound event acts upon the
tympanic membrane causing a pattern of local activations that give rise, after sub-
sequent processing, to an auditory perception. In contrast, the hand, in grasping
or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, is not merely acted upon
by the object grasped but actively grasps that object. The hand actively assimilates
to its object. The hand is, in this way, the active wax of haptic perception.
I believe that there is a conception of listening more active than the passive
power of the tympanic membrane to receive stimulation, and that this more active
conception of listening will partially restore the analogy with grasping. We may
distinguish three moments in grasping an object. First there is the preparatory
reach, a reaching out for an object. Thismay be donewith the end of grasping some
particular object or the end may simply be to grasp what there is to grasp. The
second moment is enclosure. This involves the hand’s maintaining simultaneous
contact with as much of its overall surface as possible. The third moment sustains
this enclosure. It is not as if, once an object is grasped, no more effort is required.
If the activity of the hand relaxes, the object will slip from its grasp. So not only
is activity required to enclose the object in the hand’s grasp, but it is also required
to sustain that grasp. These three moments shall ﬁnd parallels in the advertised
active conception of listening. First, just as a perceiver may reach out, they may
listen out as well. They may be listening out for something in particular or just to
hear what there is to hear. In listening out, should the perceiver come to audibly
attend to something, they listen to it. Moreover, listening is required to sustain
that audible attention. Should the perceiver listen away, selectively attending to
some other audible event in a sonically complex environment, they would cease
to listen to what they were initially listening to. But before I explain further the
advertised active conception of listening, allow me to brieﬂy discuss an important,
historically salient variant of the present difficulty.
“In order to hear well,” Maine de Biran observes, “it is necessary to listen” (Inﬂu-
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ence de l’habitude sur la faculté de penser; Boehm 1929, 63–4). Listening—like grasping,
feeling weighing, and looking—is active. It is something that the perceiver does.
Grasping, feeling, weighing, looking, and listening are not voluntary intentional
movements, though they may involve these. Rather, each are a kind of psycholog-
ical stance, sustained by a characteristic activity, where the perceiver opens them-
selves up, in a directed manner, to experiencing different aspects of the natural
environment.
Listening, for Maine de Biran, is “the putting into action the muscles destined
to communicate different degrees of tension to the membrane of the tympanum,
etc” (Boehm, 1929, 64). Maine de Biran is engaging in speculative anatomy, here,
that is to say, he is relying on a convenient empirical falsehood. Just as muscles
attached to the eye can expand or contract the pupil in order to better see, Maine
de Biran’s thought is that muscles attached to the tympanic membrane tighten
or loosen it in order to better hear. However, the efforts involved in such motor
activity are “imperceptible” and “do not manifest themselves at all as expressions
of the will” (Boehm, 1929, 64). Compare the distinction that Smith (2002) draws
between saccadic eyemovement and deliberately moving the eye in its socket. The
former is involuntary and so does not manifest itself as the expression of the will
theway the latter does. How, then, is the analogywith haptic perception sustained?
Maine de Biran provides a providential response:
But nature herself has taken care to supplement these faults; she has re-
stored equilibrium by associating in the most intimate way her passive
impressions with the activity of an organ essentially motor. (Inﬂuence
de l’habitude sur la faculté de penser; Boehm 1929, 63–4)
The “organ essentially motor” is, more speciﬁcally, the vocal organ. Through the
effects of natural sympathy rendered insensible by habit, the vocal organ engages
in a kind of subvocalized echoing of heard sound. So sounds impinging upon the
perceiver cause passive auditory impressions, and the vocal organ “repeats them,
imitates them, turns them back, if one might say so, towards their source, and
afterwards makes these ﬂeeting modiﬁcations enter the sphere of the individual’s
activity, establishes them and incorporates them there” (Boehm, 1929, 64). It is the
habitual sympathetic activity of the vocal organ, echoing the auditory character of
the passive impression caused by the sound, that presents the sound to conscious-
ness. Moreover, the presentation in auditory experience of sound is described as
a kind of incorporation, an image at the center of the semantic ﬁeld of metaphors
loosely organized as modes of assimilation (chapter 1.1). With this active echoing
of passive impressions, Maine de Biran claims to restore the analogy with haptic
touch.
It is easy to be suspicious of this providential natural supplement (for criticism
see Derrida 2005, chapter 7). However, if conﬁned to the special case of speech
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perception, the natural supplement is more plausible. Indeed, Maine de Biran’s
principle example is following along under our breath in hearing the song or speech
of another. The natural supplement is charitably understood as an overgeneraliza-
tion from the special case of speech perception, on a particular understanding of
speech perception, where our capacity to perceive speech draws upon our capac-
ity to produce speech (compare Bergson 1912a, chapter 2, Liberman andMattingly
1985, Mole 2009).
What motivated the Biranian doubling of passive impression with vocal activ-
ity was the thought that to fully restore the analogy with haptic touch an actual
activity must be found. The temptation to overgeneralize from the special case of
speech perception may be avoided if we relax this demand. Perhaps, listening is
a psychological stance sustained by the potential for activity that will make for a
better or worse perspective from which the audible object may be heard. Thus, for
example, our hominid ancestor, in hunting tapir, may pause to listen out for move-
ment in the bush. In listening out for movement, our hominid ancestor may be
prepared to turn in the direction of the heard movement, to better attend, in au-
dition, to such movement. They are prepared to turn, and listen, and hear. While
many forms of listening involve actual activity on the part of the perceiver, listen-
ing, understood as a psychological stance, may be sustained by the potential for
such activity.
This last claim needs qualiﬁcation. It is not the bare possibility of the perceiver
responding in ways that will alter their auditory perspective to better hear what
there is to be heard that sustains the relevant psychological stance. In one sense,
that much is possible even should the perceiver be unconscious. In another sense,
being unconscious, it is not possible for them to respond in an appropriate way to
auditory stimuli. Not only must the perceiver be conscious, in order for it to be
possible, in the relevant sense, for them to engage in the relevant activity, but more
stringently still, the psychological stance must be sustained by the preparedness to
act in these ways should the circumstances warrant it, given the practical ends in
play in those circumstances. That the relevant sense of potential activity involves
the preparedness to act is more stringent still since the preparedness to act would
involve changes to the perceiver not present when a perceiver, though conscious,
is not so prepared.
With this qualiﬁcation in place, the analogy with haptic touch is partially, if not
fully, restored. Grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception,
is sustained by the activity of the hand, while listening merely requires a prepared-
ness to act in auditorily relevant ways. Nevertheless listening, the psychological
stance, sustained by a characteristic activity, where the perceiver opens themselves
up, in a directed manner, to auditorily experience distal events and processes oc-
curring in the natural environment, is itself an activity. Listening is something that
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the perceiver does. Listening is a kind of listening out for, an outer-directed open-
ing up to the audible. In turning, listening, and hearing, it is I that hear the call of
the feral parakeet. Listening to the feral parakeet, or at least its audible activity, is
something that I do, even if in hearing the parakeet’s call I undergo an experience
caused in me, at least in part, by the calling of the parakeet.
While we have found a role for activity in hearing aspects of the distal envi-
ronment, listening merely requires the potential for such activity, understood as a
preparedness to act in auditorily relevant ways, in order to be sustained. Audition
remains not as active as the exemplar, grasping, but it is not merely passive the way
the registering of movement by the tympanic membrane is. Listening requires the
perceiver’s vigilance. But the perceiver’s auditory vigilance over the distal envi-
ronment, their being prepared to act in auditorily relevant ways to bring aspects
of the distal environment into earshot, remains a stance actively sustained by the
perceiver.
In the traditional, post-Aristotelian vocabulary, the distinction between lis-
tening and grasping can be described in terms of ﬁrst and second actuality. The
distinction is traditionally introduced in terms of Aristotle’s discussion of knowl-
edge in De anima 2 3 (417a22–417b1). Thus an educable person may be ignorant of
some point of grammar. But since they are educable, learning that point of gram-
mar is not beyond their ken, and so they may be said to, in this sense, potentially
know that point of grammar. Suppose the ignorant if educable person comes to
learn it. In learning the relevant point of grammar, they come to actually know it.
But, Aristotle observes, the knowledge of the now learned person is itself a kind
of potentiality. It is the capacity to apply that knowledge in a reasonable man-
ner given the practical circumstances. Thus the learned person might reasonably
apply their knowledge of grammar in interpreting the speech of another. In rea-
sonably applying their knowledge, in the given circumstances, the learned person
actualizes their knowledge. Learning is the actualization of the educable person’s
capacity for knowledge. In the traditional post-Aristotelian vocabulary, it is the
ﬁrst actuality. But since what is learned, knowledge of the relevant point of gram-
mar, is itself a kind of potentiality—it is the capacity to apply that knowledge in a
reasonable manner given the practical circumstances—its exercise is itself a kind
of actualization. It is the second actuality.
Grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of haptic perception, requires
the second actuality of the hand’s activity in order to be sustained. Whereas as lis-
tening merely requires a ﬁrst actuality, or equivalently, a second potentiality, the
capacity to act in auditorily relevant ways, in order to be sustained. Nevertheless,
this second potentiality, required by listening, involves the preparedness to act, a
kind of perceptual vigilance, which itself requires activity on the part of the per-
ceiver to sustain. Consider the following mechanical analogy: The operation of
136 CHAPTER 4. SOURCES
the clutch will only set the vehicle in motion if the drive shaft is already in motion.
The ﬁrst actuality, or, equivalently, second potentiality, is the vehicle’s capacity
for motion partly constituted by the motion of the drive shaft, and the second ac-
tuality is the motion of the vehicle when the clutch is in operation. Like the drive
shaft, the perceiver must be active in sustaining the second potentiality. More-
over, listening, the psychological stance, sustained by this activity, whereby the
perceiver opens themselves up to auditorily experience distal events and processes
occurring in the natural environment, is itself a kind of activity directed towards
its object.
I turn, and listen, and hear the call of the feral parakeet. What I hear is the au-
dible activity of a distal body, the animate body of the feral bird. Audition affords
me explicit awareness of the parakeet’s call. I hear how loud it is, its distinctive
timbre, and its sharpness and urgency. I hear the parakeet’s call through, or in,
the sound that it makes. The parakeet’s calling generates a patterned disturbance
that propagates, in every direction, through the dense and imperfectly elastic air.
It is through, or in, this audible media, the sound it makes, that the call of the
feral parakeet is heard. In turning, and listening, and hearing, I alter my auditory
perspective on the natural environment to bring an aspect of that environment,
the audible activity of the feral parakeet, into earshot. Turning, and listening, and
hearing—actively changing my auditory perspective on the natural environment—
is itself a sympathetic response towhat is heard. Changingmy auditory perspective
to increase the acuity with which the feral parakeet is heard is to sympathetically
respond to the call of the feral parakeet. Preparedness to act in certain ways so that
the impingement of the force of the propagation of the patterned disturbance, the
dynamic principle of unity of the sound event, carries information about its dis-
tal source, sensitivity to which constitutes, in propitious circumstances, explicit
auditory awareness of that source, is what makes possible the sympathetic presen-
tation, in auditory experience, of the source of the sound. The power to receive
auditory stimulation from proximal perturbations may be purely passive, but it is
the perceiver’s perceptual vigilance, their preparedness to alter the circumstances
in which such stimulation is received with the end of hearing its distal source, and
the psychological stance that activity makes possible, the perceiver’s listening out
for, their outer-directed openness to the audible, that makes for the sympathetic
presentation, in audition, of the source of the sound.
Chapter 5
Vision
5.1 The Biranian Principle
So far we have discussed grasping and listening and how they make sympathetic
presentation possible in haptic and auditory experience respectively. We turn now
to looking. I shall argue that looking makes possible sympathetic presentation in
visual experience. Our guiding idea, echoing Maine de Biran, is that in order to
see well, one must look. Our task is to describe a conception of looking that could
plausibly make this principle true.
Such a conception must satisfy two conditions. A conception of looking that
stands a chance of making true the Biranian principle must at once be something
that the perceiver does and that makes the distal environment perceptually acces-
sible.
First, looking must be something the perceiver does. Only in this way is the
analogy with grasping, enshrined in the Protagorean model, sustained. However,
like the case of audition, this psychological stance may be sustained, in the Peri-
patetic fashion, by a capacity to act. Looking, like listening, while not a passive
power, may be less than fully active. In the traditional, post-Aristotelian vocab-
ulary, that stance may be sustained by a ﬁrst actuality if a second potentiality.
Looking may be a psychological stance sustained, at a minimum, by the poten-
tial to act in visually relevant ways, on some appropriate understanding of that
potentiality. While looking and listening may fall short of the exemplar, grasp-
ing, since haptic perception requires the second actuality of the hand’s activity to
sustain it, still, they are not something done to the perceiver but something that
the perceiver does. What the perceiver does in looking may be sustained, in cer-
tain circumstances, by nothing further than a preparedness to act in perceptually
relevant ways. At a minimum, then, looking merely requires vigilance (perhaps
fortuitously, “vigilance” derives from the Latin vigilaremeaning to watch). But the
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perceiver’s perceptual vigilance over the distal environment, their being prepared
to act in visually relevant ways to bring aspects of the distal environment into view
or at least increase the acuity with which they are seen, remains a stance actively
sustained by the perceiver. Moreover, the stance sustained is itself a kind of ac-
tivity. Looking is something the perceiver does. The perceiver, in maintaining
vigilance, looks outward. Looking is a kind of outer-directed opening up to the
visible. Looking is something the perceiver does, even if in seeing what they do in
looking they undergo an experience caused in them, at least in part, by what they
perceive.
Second, looking is an activity of the perceiver whose end is to bring distal as-
pects of the natural environment into view. Looking makes aspects of the distal
environment perceptually accessible. For the perceiver to act in visually relevant
ways is for them to alter their visual perspective on the natural environment so as
to present distal aspects of that environment, or, at least, increase the acuity with
which those aspects are seen.
A conception of looking answering to the truth of the Biranian principle—that
in order to see well, one must look—would most likely exceed the conception of
looking enshrined in ordinary usage, though, perhaps, in the manner of a conser-
vative extension. This might count against describing such a conception as an
instance of “looking.” However, other alternatives fare less well. “Gaze” is, by
now, perhaps too ethically fraught (especially after Mulvey 1975, see also Jay 1994).
Olivi’s aspectus, while a historically important antecedent, is too technical sound-
ing and is bound up with Olivi’s Augustinian dualism. Thus, for example, Olivi
distinguishes the physical aspectus of the sense organ, the eye pointed in a certain
direction, say, from the spiritual aspectus of the soul. (ThoughOlivi’s notion of aspec-
tusmay owe as much to Alhazen’sDe aspectibus as to Augustine, see Tachau 1988, 41
especially n. 43; on Olivi on perception see Tachau 1988, 3–26, 39–54, Spruit 1994,
215–224, Pasnau 1997, 121–124, 130–134, 168–181, Toivanen 2009, part 1, Silva and
Toivanen 2010, Toivanen 2013, part 2). In the absence of an adequate alternative,
we shall persist with talk of looking, mindful of the ways that the demands of mak-
ing true the Biranian principle might exceed the conception of looking enshrined
in ordinary usage.
Not only shall I defend the Biranian principle, but I shall offer an explanation
for it in terms of the operation of sympathy. Looking makes aspects of the distal
environment perceptually accessibly by making possible their sympathetic presen-
tation in visual experience. We shall begin our search for a conception of looking
that makes true the Biranian principle in an unlikely place, in what historians de-
scribe as extramission theories of perception. Extramission theories provide a false
causal model of distal perception, where a part of the perceiver extends through
space so that it is in contact with the perceived object such that the perceiver, or
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at least a part of them, is substantially located where the perceived object is. Thus
Nemesius Bishop of Emesa attributes such a view toHipparchus, a second century
bce astronomer:
Hipparchus says that rays extend from the eyes and with their extrem-
ities lay hold on external bodies like the touch of hands … (De natura
hominis 7, Sharples and van der Eijk 2008, 104)
This conception of perception spontaneously arises for many, outside of explicitly
theoretical contexts, and is surprisingly resilient to empirical counter-evidence.
As we shall see this is because there is a phenomenological insight enshrined in ex-
tramission theories, a phenomenological insight thatmay be preserved even should
we abandon the false causalmodel that it provides of distal perception. Developing
that phenomenological insight will result in the advertised conception of looking
that makes true the Biranian principle.
5.2 The Persistence of Extramission
Piaget (1929, 48) observed that there is a the tendency for children to understand
vision in terms of an active, outward inﬂuence of the eyes. This tendency was
manifest in reports of looks mixing and in “a confusion between vision and light”.
Concerning the latter Piaget reports:
Pat (10) stated that a box makes a shadow “because the clouds (Pat
believes it to be the clouds which give light when there is no sun) can’t
pass through it” (i.e. because the light cannot pass through the box).
But immediately after Pat said of a portfolio that it made a shadow
“because the clouds can’t see that side.—Are to see and to give light the same
thing?—Yes.—Tell me the things which give light?—The sun, the moon, the
stars, the clouds and God.—Can you give light?—No … Yes.—How?—With
the eyes.—Why?—Because if you hadn’t eyes you wouldn’t see properly.”
Duc (6 1/2) also stated that the light cannot see through a hand,
alike confusing “seeing” with “giving light.”
Sci (6) said that dreams come “with the light.”—“How?—You are in
the street. The lights (street-lamps) can see there … they see on the ground.”
“Tell me some things that give light.—Lights, candles, matches, thunder, ﬁre,
cigarettes.—Do eyes give light or not?—Yes, they give light.—Do they give
light at night?—No?—Why not?—Because they are shut.—When they are
open do they give light?—Yes.—Do they give light like lamps?—Yes, a
little bit.” (Piaget, 1929, 48)
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And Piaget (1929, 48–49) goes on to compare these reports with Empedocles’
lantern analogy. (On the lantern analogy, see Wright 1981, 240–243; on Empedo-
cles’ theory of vision see Sedley 1992, Ierodiakonou 2005, Kalderon 2015, chapter
1.)
Winer and Cottrell (1996, 138), prompted by Piaget’s observations, were “sur-
prised—indeed shocked” by the degree and resilience of belief in extramissive per-
ception. Not only do children hold extramission beliefs but so do adults, though
such beliefs tend to decline during adulthood. To the simple question that required
a “yes” or “no” response:
When we look at someone or something, does anything such as rays,
waves, or energy go out of our eyes?
49% of the ﬁrst graders, 70% of the third graders, 51% of the ﬁfth graders, and 33%
of the college students affirmed extramission. Moreover, these extramission be-
liefs proved “highly resistant to experimental intervention designed to alter them”
(Winer and Cottrell, 1996, 138).
Winer and Cottrell (1996) augmented their use of verbal questions with graphic
displays:
The computer graphics portrayed various interpretations of the pro-
cess of vision by displaying one or more renditions of a person looking
at a rectangle, with visual input and output depicted by lines that ap-
peared to move between the person’s eye and the rectangle. Thus, in
one graphic, lines, presumably representing rays, appeared to move in-
ward from the rectangle to the eye of the ﬁgure on the screen, demon-
strating the process of intromission. In another graphic, lines appeared
to move outward from the eye toward the rectangle, demonstrating
pure extramission. (Winer and Cottrell, 1996, 139)
They did so for two reasons. First, the graphic displays were used to ﬁlter out
any misinterpretations that might have been suggested by the verbal questions.
Second, they predicted that, given a hypothesized source of extramission belief,
exposure to the graphic displays would increase the affirmation of extramission.
What is this hypothesized source? Winer and Cottrell (1996) hypothesize that
both the tendency for extramission beliefs to persist into adulthood and their re-
sistance to experimental intervention is partly explained by a phenomenological
truth enshrined in extramission models:
We assume that core aspects of the phenomenology of vision underlie
extramission interpretations. Consider one phenomenologically salient
aspect of vision, namely, its orientational or outer-directed quality. When
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people see, they are generally oriented toward an external visual refer-
ent, that is, they direct their eyes and attention to an object in order to
see it. In fact, this quality of vision is reﬂected in language. People talk
about “looking at” things, and English has expressions such as “looking
out of a window” and “looking out of binoculars.” Even notions such as
“piercing glances” and “cutting looks” suggest and outer directionality
… (Winer and Cottrell, 1996, 140)
On this basis, they predicted an increase in the affirmation of extramission because
of the way that the graphics “present representations that are suggestive of the
orientational aspects of vision.” And subsequent studies conﬁrmed this.
It is unclear, at least to me, what to make of this increased affirmation of ex-
tramission in response to the use of graphic displays. The displays do not unam-
biguously represent the intended interpretations of the process of vision. Speciﬁ-
cally, they do not unambiguously represent lines of causal inﬂuence. AsWiner and
Cottrell (1996) observe, they are at least suggestive of the orientational aspects of
vision. But given the iconic nature of the pictorial representation, moving lines
might represent lines of causal inﬂuence, but they might just as easily represent
lines of sight. Perhaps, the increased affirmation of extramission is less an ex-
pression of belief in extramission than an expression of the active, outer-directed
phenomenology of vision. Perhaps, the affirmation of extramission involved belief
in, not a scientiﬁc misconception, but a phenomenological truth misleading ex-
pressed (see Robbin 2003 for a similar worry). Winer and Cottrell (1996) claim to
control for this, but whether they did so successfully is difficult to independently
assess.
Whatever the genuine extent of extramission belief, it is the phenomenological
diagnosis for it that we shall focus upon. In the next section, we shall examine the
active, outer-directed phenomenology of vision thatWiner andCottrell (1996) take
to underly belief in extramission.
5.3 The Truth in Extramission
Merleau-Ponty provides a description of the active, outer-directed phenomenology
of vision that would make talk of extramission apt:
If I adhere to what immediate consciousness tells me, the desk which
I see in front of me and on which I am writing, the room in which I
am and whose walls enclose me beyond the sensible ﬁeld, the garden,
the street, the city and, ﬁnally, the whole of my spatial horizon do not
appear to me to be causes of the perception which I have of them,
causes which would impress their mark on me and produce an image
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of themselves by a transitive action. It seems to me rather that my
perception is like a beam of light which reveals the objects there where
they are and manifests their presence, latent until then. Whether I
myself perceive or consider another subject perceiving, it seems to me
that the gaze “is posed” on objects and reaches them from a distance—
as is well expressed by the use of the Latin lumina for designating the
gaze. (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, 185)
Merleau-Ponty is not endorsing the extramission theory as a causal model of per-
ception. He is not denying that the object of perception is the ultimate efficient
cause of that perception. Rather, in seeing the desk before him, Merleau-Ponty
claims only that his experience does not present itself as the exercise of a passive
power, a sensory impression caused in him by the mediate causal action of the dis-
tal object. Theremay be an active element to outwardly attending, in vision, to dis-
tal aspects of the natural environment, and this may be phenomenologically vivid,
but that is consistent with the object of visual perception being among its causal
antecedents. “My present experience of this desk is not complete, … it shows me
only some of its aspects” (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, 186). Merleau-Ponty’s experience
may be incomplete in that it reveals only some aspects of its object, but once we
allow that perception is partial in this way, it is at least open that experience is
incomplete, as well, in that it only manifests some aspects of its nature. The ac-
tive, outer-directed nature of vision may be phenomenologically vivid, but vision
may still require that the distal object mediately act upon the perceiver. A visual
experience may be undergone, but seeing is not something done to the perceiver,
but something the perceiver does.
Nor is Merleau-Ponty claiming that it appears from within that seeing involves
the emission of a ﬁery effluence akin to light. Rather Merleau-Ponty is pressing an
analogy. He is describing what visual experience, from within, is like. And not only
from within but from without as well. The analogy holds not only when Merleau-
Ponty considers his own experience but also when he considers the experience
of another perceiving subject. Consider another’s piercing glance or cutting look
(Winer and Cottrell, 1996, 140). Piaget’s reports of looks mixing are cases where
the analogy would hold, as well, of other perceiving subjects:
From a boy of 5 years old: “Papa,why don’t our looksmixwhen theymeet.”
From one of our collaborators: “When Iwas a little girl I used towonder
how itwas thatwhen two looks met they did not somewhere hit one another. I used
to imagine the point to be half-way between the two people. I used also to wonder
why it was one did not feel someone else’s look, on the cheek for instance if theywere
looking at one’s cheek.” (Piaget, 1929, 48)
Merleau-Ponty, then, is describing that aspect of our visual phenomenology, con-
sidered from within and without, that Winer and Cottrell (1996) claim to underlie
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extramission beliefs.
More explicitly, the awareness afforded by visual experience is like a beam of
light that manifests the latent presence of its object. Vision, like illumination,
has direction. Light is emitted outward from its source upon the scene that it il-
luminates. Vision too is outer-directed. In seeing, the perceiver looks out upon
the scene before them. Not only do vision and light have direction but they are
both rectilinear as well. Moreover, just as illumination manifests the latent vis-
ibility of an object, seeing an illuminated object manifests its latent presence to
the perceiver revealing it to be where it is. The explicit awareness of the natural
environment afforded by visual experience is akin to light not only in its rectilin-
ear directionality and its power to manifest latent presence, but in the manner in
which it discloses distal aspects of that environment. Just as a beam of light may
“pose” on an object that it illuminates and that it reaches from a distance, the per-
ceiver’s gaze may “pose” on the object that it presents and that it reaches from a
distance. The illumination alights upon the object it illuminates at a distance from
its source, the perceiver’s gaze alights upon the object of perception at a distance
from the perceiver. The imagery here not only emphasizes that vision is a kind of
perception at a distance but invokes an active outward extension, as in Kilwardby’s
wax actively pushing against the seal (chapter 1.6).
Accepting the aptness of the analogy is not tantamount to accepting the ex-
tramission theory. Consider a similar analogy of Olivi’s:
an object, to the extent that the gaze (aspectus) and the act of a power are
terminated at it, co-operates in their speciﬁc production […] Namely,
the cognitive act—and the gaze—is ﬁxed (ﬁgitur) to the object and it
absorbs the object intentionally to itself. This is why a cognitive act is
called the apprehension of, and the apprehensive extension to, the ob-
ject. In this extension and absorption the act becomes intimately con-
formed and assimilated into the object. The object presents itself or
appears as being present to the cognitive gaze, and the object is a kind
of representation of itself by an act which is assimilated to it. As an
actual illumination of a spherical or quadrangular vase becomes spher-
ical or quadrangular only because the light source generates the illumi-
nation in conformity with the ﬁgure of the object which receives and
conﬁnes it; so also, because a cognitive force generates a cognitive act
with a certain formative absorption of the act towards the object, and
with a certain signet-like and inward (sigillari et viscerali) extension of
the object, therefore—because it is generated thus—the act becomes
a similitude and signet-like expression of the object. (Peter John Olivi,
Questiones in secundum librumSententiarum q. 72 35–36; Toivanen 2013, 146–
147)
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The passage is complex and is replete with suggestive detail. But to begin with,
focus on the analogy with illumination.
Despite his play with neo-Platonic imagery, no doubt an Augustinian heritage
(Kent, 1984, 198), Olivi is not endorsing an extramission theory of perception.
Olivi explicitly denies that extension involves any real emission (Questiones in se-
cundum librum Sententiarum q. 58 ad 14.8). Perceptual apprehension may be a form
of apprehensive extension to its object, but this apprehensive extension is not cor-
poreal. Though likened to illumination directed upon the object it illuminates,
the perceptual act, the apprehensive extension by which that act assimilates to its
object, does not consist in, or otherwise involve, the emission of a ﬁery substance,
no matter how rariﬁed. Nor does the apprehensive extension involve the emis-
sion of any spiritual matter. Perception is a simple, spiritual act that takes place
in the soul, and the soul can only be in the body, at least when alive. So no part
of the soul is substantially located where the perceived object is as would be the
case if extramission were true. Likening the seeing of an object to light directed
upon an object that it illuminates, by itself, carries with it no commitment to the
metaphysics of extramission. Rather, Olivi, like Merleau-Ponty after him, is em-
phasizing the active, outer-directed nature of vision.
Moreover, like Merleau-Ponty, Olivi is presenting a conception of perception
that contrasts with a mere passive reception of sensible form. Olivi, however,
working in the same broadly Augustinian metaphysical framework as Kilwardby,
is less concessive to Peripatetic accounts of perception.
Recall (chapter 1.6), according to the Peripatetic account, at least as understood
by the late Scholastics, the perceived object acts upon the transparent medium
such that its sensible form, its species exists, in some sense, in it, and that the
medium, in turn, affects the sense organ such that the species comes to, in some
sense, exist in it as well (De spiritu fantastico 69, 97). So understood, the eye’s recep-
tion of a color species, while not a literal coloration, is the exercise of a passive
power, like the power to be heated. The distal object mediately acting upon the
perceiver’s sense organ posited by the Peripatetic account was understood, by Kil-
wardby, as a necessary if insufficient condition for perception. In order for per-
ception to occur, the perceptive soul must assimilate the species, but this requires
the soul’s activity.
According to Olivi, however, the affection of the sense organ by a species orig-
inating from the distal object is not even a necessary condition for its perception.
Echoing Plotinus (Plotinus, On Diﬃculties about the Soul iii, or On Sight, Ennead 4 5
2 50–55, chapter 2.7), Olivi maintains that if perception were mediated by a cor-
poreal species, the species would be the object of perception thus screening off
the distal object in the natural environment (on Plotinus’ argument, see Emilsson
1988, chapter 3, on Olivi’s argument see Tachau 1988, 43–45, especially n. 53 and
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Pasnau 1997, chapter 7.3). The object of perception is not an efficient cause of that
perception, no matter how mediate.
Like Kilwardby, Olivi is moved, in part, by the Augustinian doctrine of the
ontological superiority of the soul over the body, though perhaps Olivi interprets
that doctrine more stringently than Kilwardby. The way in which the soul and its
powers and acts are superior to the body is inconsistent with a body ever acting
upon the soul. So an extended corporeal species could not activate the percep-
tual power, the power and its act being simple and spiritual (Questiones in secundum
librum Sententiarum q. 73 83–4). Silva and Toivanen (2010, 263) observe how Olivi
anticipates, here, the Cartesian distinction between res extensa and res cogitans (see
also Tachau, 1988, 46). The powers of the soul, even perceptual powers, are not
the passive recipients of external stimuli but are active. Like Merleau-Ponty, Olivi
thinks that the active character of our perceptual powers is phenomenologically
evident (Tachau 1988, 3–26, 39—54, Pasnau 1997, 236–47, Toivanen 2013, 143).
While Olivi does not deny that perception presupposes the presence of its ob-
ject in the natural environment, he does deny that it is, or even among, the efficient
causes of perception. In Olivi’s technical vocabulary, the object of perception is a
terminative cause. It is controversial how to understand Olivi’s terminative causes.
Are terminative causes a species of ﬁnal cause, as Kent (1984, 192–195) and Pasnau
(1999a) maintain? Or are they a kind of cause not classiﬁed by the traditional
Peripatetic four causes (Physica 2 3, Metaphysica E 2), as Toivanen (2013, chapter 6)
maintains? While it is difficult to form a clear, positive conception of terminative
causes, the negative contrast with efficient causes is clear. The actualization of
a perceptual power may require the presence of its object in the natural environ-
ment but that object acting upon the power is not required for its actualization.
The efficient cause of the perceptual act is the power and not the object of percep-
tion. The presence of that object merely cooperates by being the terminus of the
perceptual act, that which it is directed upon, like light directed upon a spherical
vase.
So Olivi maintains that the active, outer-directed phenomenology of vision is
inconsistent with the object seen being the efficient cause of that perception.
Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, merely claims that the object of perception acting
upon the perceiver, however mediately, is not manifest in our experience, not that
it is inconsistent with it. Perhaps this more cautious attitude is, in the end, war-
ranted. I do not recommend this more cautious attitude merely as a beneﬁciary
of optical knowledge unavailable to Olivi but on philosophical grounds as well.
To bring this out, ﬁrst consider an element of the Olivi passage that goes be-
yond what Merleau-Ponty explicitly describes. Olivi, like Merleau-Ponty, uses the
neo-Platonic imagery of illumination to emphasize the active outward extension
involved in the visual apprehension of the distal environment, and where this ac-
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tive, outward extension is no kind of extramission. Olivi goes further thanMerleau-
Ponty, however, in coupling the active, outward extension of the illumination with
being shaped by its terminus, the circular or quadrangular vase, say. In illuminating
a circular vase, the area illuminated is itself circular. The shape of the area illumi-
nated is constituted by the shape of the object illuminated. The illumination is “in
conformity with the ﬁgure of the object which receives it and conﬁnes it.” This is
meant to be an analogy for how the perceptual act formally assimilates to its object.
Extension and absorption are linked. In neo-Platonic vocabulary, extension and
absorption are a kind of procession and return. Like Kilwardby before him, Olivi
thinks that the perceptual act only assimilates to its object thanks to the activity
of the perceptual soul. Indeed, the passage ends with Olivi echoing Kilwardby’s
ﬁgure of the active wax pressing against the seal. (It is unclear whether Olivi read
Kilwardby. Perhaps similar paths were laid out for them by their shared Augus-
tinian heritage. For a comparison of Kilwardby and Olivi see Silva and Toivanen
2010.)
Extension and absorption, a kind of procession and return, is important, so
it is perhaps worth a brief digression on a detail of the passage that we have so
far glossed over. The perceiver’s gaze, in being ﬁxed on its object, a circular vase,
say, absorbs the object intentionally to itself. It is only in intentionally absorbing
the object of perception that the perceptual act assimilates to its object. Moderns
should resist the temptation to understand the qualiﬁer “intentionally” in terms
of the notion of intentionality derived from Brentano (1874) (on the historical de-
velopment of the concept of intentionality see Sorabji 2003; on Olivi’s role in the
development of intentionality in late Scholasticism see Pasnau 1997, chapter 2). A
sensible form inhering in a body, the whiteness inhering in a circular vase, say, has
natural existence in that body. Part of the point of the qualiﬁer is to deny that
the perceived sensible form has natural existence in the perceptual act. In part,
then, the point of the qualiﬁer is to rule out a position like the one Crathorn will
later endorse where perception becomes colored in seeing a colored object and
so avoid Theophrastus’ aporia (chapter 1.4). However, not only does Olivi deny
natural existence to the sensible form in the perceptual act, he denies, as well, its
real existence. This prompts Pasnau (1997, 67) to remark that with Olivi, there is
“movement toward making intentionality mysterious.”
Moreover, according to Olivi, the intentional existence of the object in the
perceptual act—in virtue of which it assimilates to that object and so becomes
like it, if not naturally like, in the manner of Crathorn—involves the perceptual
power’s virtual presence to that object (on the meaning of virtualis in late Latin and
Olivi speciﬁcally see Pasnau 1997, 172–173). Speciﬁcally, it is because the power is
virtually present to its object that that object comes to exist intentionally in the
actualization of that power:
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A power can be present to something either essentially or virtually.
This is to say that it can be present to something in such a way that
its essence really is beside that thing, or in such a way that the gaze
(aspectus) of its power is so efficaciously directed to the thing that it,
as it were, really touches the thing. If the power is not present to its
object or recipient (patienti) in this second way, it cannot act, even if
it were present to it by its essence or according to the ﬁrst way. The
visual power is present to a thing that is seen from a distance in this
[second] way. … This [kind of] presence suffices for an act of seeing.
(Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 58 486–487; Toiva-
nen 2013, 151–152)
In speaking of a power’s presence to its object as opposed to the object’s presence
to the power, Olivi is emphasizing the active, outer-directed nature of that power.
If a power is essentially present to an object, then the power and the object are
contiguous, “its essence really is beside that thing,” and there is a real connection
between them akin to the perception by contact involved in touch. In contrast,
if a power is virtually present to an object, then the object and the power are not
contiguous but are at a distance from one another. Moreover, there is no real con-
nection between the object and the power whose act contains it. Virtual presence
is a necessary condition for visual perception. It is only by the visual power being
virtually present to an object that seeing that object may formally assimilate to it.
Virtual presence is also a sufficient condition. The virtual presence of the visual
power to an object suffices for its extensive apprehension.
The virtual presence of a power to its object precludes the need for any real
connection between them. A visible object need not be palpable to vision the
way in which a corporeal body must be palpable to touch if it is to be felt (though
contrast the account of vision that Socrates attributes to Empedocles in theMeno
76 a–d; see Kalderon 2015, chapter 1.2 for discussion). There need be no contact
between sight and its object in order for the latter to be seen, not even mediate
contact. And, at least by Olivi’s lights, contact is required for a real connection.
Olivi’s notion of a terminative cause is meant to explain how a sensory power may
be the total efficient cause of its act and yet its content be determined by an object
in the distal environment to which that power is merely virtually present.
Like intentional existence, the virtual presence of a power to an object con-
trasts with, not only the natural existence of that object in that power’s act, but
its real existence as well. Moreover, while the presence of the object in the natu-
ral environment may be required for its perception, it is not among the efficient
causes of perception. But if what is intentionally absorbed by the perceptual act
lacks both natural and real existence, and the object of perception in no way acts
upon the perceiver, one may well wonder how, exactly, it may shape that act such
148 CHAPTER 5. VISION
that the perceptual act formally assimilates to its object.
Contrast Olivi’s position with the neo-Platonically inspired account of percep-
tion developed herein. Recall, sympathy played two roles in Plotinus’ account of
vision (chapter 2.7). First, it was meant to explain the action at a distance involved
in visual perception. Speciﬁcally, sympathy was the principle by which the dis-
tal object may affect the sense organ without affecting anything in between. For
Plotinus, at least, this was a real connection. Plotinus denies that a real connec-
tion requires contact. There is action at a distance, and sympathy is its principle.
Second, sympathy was meant to explain how the distal object, and not sensible
aspects of the medium, is present in the perceiver’s visual experience of it. It is
this second suggestion that we have taken up and generalized. In taking the visual
power to be merely virtually present to its object, Olivi overlooks the possibility
of sympathetic presentation.
Linked to this is contrasting attitudes to the location of the perceptual act.
Though Olivi may have inherited the neo-Platonic imagery from Augustine, one
thing that he does not inherit is the neo-Platonic tendency to locate the perceptual
act in its object. Thus in the Sermones 277 10 Augustine writes “to have opened the
eye is to have arrived” at the object seen (O’Daly, 1987, 82). We have seen an
example of this already in a passage of Plotinus cited earlier (chapter 2.8), though
it passed by uncommented:
It is clear in presumably every case that when we have a perception
of anything through the sense of sight, we look where it is and direct
our gaze where the visible object is situated in a straight line from us;
obviously it is there that the apprehension takes place [my emphasis] and the
soul looks outwards. (Plotinus, On Sense-Perception andMemory, Ennead 4
6 1 14–18; Armstrong 1984, 321)
Toward the end of a passage emphasizing the active nature of visual perception,
Plotinus makes, at least to our post-Cartesian ears, a startling pronouncement:
That the apprehension of the visible object takes place in the object seen. Olivi,
by contrast, denies that the perceptual act takes place in its object (at least if this is
understood non-metaphorically Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum q. 37 obj.
13, ad. 13). Rather, it is a simple, spiritual act of the immaterial soul, and the soul
is located where the body it animates is, at least when alive (for a comparison of
Olivi’s conception of perception with the neo-Platonic conception see Toivanen
2013, 151). Olivi, in making this denial, overlooks the possibility of sympathetic
presentation. When I look where the ancient chestnut tree is and direct my gaze
at that tree situated in a straight line from me, sympathy places me in the very
heart of things, and it is there, where the tree grows too slowly to be perceptible,
that my visual apprehension of it takes place.
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There is nothing virtual about the sympathetic presence of the ancient chest-
nut tree in my perception of it. Even allowing that presence may be said of in
many ways, virtual presence is no presence at all. If I were merely virtually present
to the tree in seeing it, it is hard to understand how my visual experience could be
shaped by that tree. And if my visual experience is not shaped by that tree, then it
is not present in my experience. (Similar remarks apply to Noë’s 2012 more recent
account of perception in terms of virtual presence.)
To bring this out, consider the way the neo-Platonic analogy fails to support
Olivi’s extreme position. Indeed, attending to its details, reveals a striking aporia.
The object of illumination, the illuminated circular vase, say, receives and conﬁnes
that illumination. In receiving and conﬁning the illumination the illuminated area
takes on the shape that it does. In receiving and conﬁning the illumination the
circular vase resists that illumination. It obstructs that illumination and so casts
a shadow. It is hard to understand how the spherical vase may conﬁne, resist,
and obstruct the activity of the illuminant without being a cause, or, at least, a
countervailing force. Of course, it is the source of the illuminant that generates
the illumination, but the illuminated area takes on the shape that it does because
the illuminated object resists the activity of the illumination insofar as it can. Kil-
wardby’s doctrine that the soul’s use of a body is limited by the passivities of matter
(De spiritu fantastico 99–100) was meant to address this kind of difficulty. However,
the invocation of the neo-Platonic analogy just is Olivi’s response. Olivi is drawing
our attention to the fact that it is the source that generates the illumination and not
the object illuminated. But that does not suffice to make the analogy consistent
with taking the object of perception to be a terminative cause with all that that
entails. Visual consciousness may extend to its object, but it must somehow come
into conﬂict with it, as on the Protagorean model, if the subsequent absorption is
to be so much as possible.
How is the Peripatetic analogy, the ancient ﬁgure of the wax and seal, meant
to be understood by Olivi’s lights? It occurs at the point where Olivi spells out the
consequences of the neo-Platonic analogy for perception. One curious feature of
Olivi’s treatment is the way that way that extension and absorption are transposed
at this point. Whereas earlier in the passage Olivi speaks of the act’s extension
to its object, he now speaks of the “formative absorption of the act towards the
object”. And whereas earlier in the passage Olivi speaks of the act’s absorption of
the object by which the act assimilates to it, he now speaks of “a certain signet-
like and inward extension of the object”. I am uncertain of the signiﬁcance of
this transposition, if it is not, indeed, a slip on Olivi’s part. If intentional, per-
haps it is meant to emphasize the unity of extension and absorption. Extension
is at once a formative absorption to the object, just as absorption is at once an
inward extension of the object. Notice, on this hypothesis, the unity of extension
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and absorption only holds for extensive apprehension, the kind of extensive activ-
ity characteristic of perception, as opposed to a non-perceptual visual experience,
such as a hallucination. In cases of hallucination, there is nothing to absorb. And
so while such experiences may involve extensive activity, there is no subsequent
absorption, merely the illusion of such.
The aporia involved in Olivi’s use of the neo-Platonic imagery affects his treat-
ment of the ancient ﬁgure of the wax and seal. Even if, in line with the neo-Platonic
analogy, the visual power generates the perceptual act in conformity with the ﬁg-
ure of the object which receives it and conﬁnes it, how are we to understand this
reception and conﬁnement? “Because it is generated thus the act becomes a simil-
itude and signet-like expression of the object.” Perception formally assimilates to
its object because it is generated thus. It only conforms with its object by being
received and conﬁned. But reception and conﬁnement is naturally understood as
arising in the face of a countervailing force, the upshot of a conﬂict between the
perceptual act and its object that resists it insofar as it can. It is hard to understand
how the presence in the natural environment of an object which is the terminus of
the perceptual act could determine the content of that act, even if the act is di-
rected upon it, like a beam of light, without somehow coming into conﬂict with it,
as on the Protagorean model. Somehow the terminus must determine the content
of the perceptual act without itself being a determinant. But how could that be?
The present worry is anticipated by Duns Scotus. Scotus at least presses a par-
allel point about the intellect in his Ordinatio and on the same general grounds.
Though Scotus does not name names, Olivi is clearly a target as he reproduces a
number of arguments from Olivi’s Sentences commentary (Pasnau, 1997, 148). Sco-
tus concedes to Olivi that the object of the intellect could not be the complete
cause of the intellectual act. However, Scotus insists that the object must play
some causal role if the act of intellect is to be a likeness of it (Ordinatio 1 3 3 4 n.
486). Generalizing, Scotus’ idea is that the demands of formally assimilating to
the object require that the object play an explanatory role inconsistent with be-
ing a terminative cause. And it is the application of this general idea to the case
of perception that constitutes the present worry (on Scotus on Olivi see Pasnau
1997, chapter 4.4, on Scotus on cognitive powers, both sensory and intellectual,
see Tachau 1988, chapter 3, Spruit 1994, 257–266, and Cross 2014, for a related
worry see Pasnau 1997, 174–175).
The worry reveals the way in which Olivi’s view is a step along the way toward
adverbialism (see Ducasse, 1942). Moreover, this is due, in part, to proto-Cartesian
aspects of Olivi’s view, an effect of their shared Augustinian heritage, such asOlivi’s
anticipation of the Cartesian distinction between res extensa and res cogitans, mani-
fest, for example, in his denial that an extended, corporeal species may actualize
the soul’s perceptual power (on Descartes’s Augustinianism see Menn 1998, not to
5.3. THE TRUTH IN EXTRAMISSION 151
mention Malebranche’s testimony in Recherche de la Vérité). The perceptual power
is the total efficient cause of the perceptual act. Though the act is directed upon
its terminus, the object is not among the efficient causes of the perception. The
perceptual power is merely virtually present to the object and so has no real con-
nection with it. Though the presence of its object in the natural environment may
occasion it, perception is a simple, spiritual act of the immaterial soul. To the ex-
tent to which the object present in the natural environment is a terminative cause,
and so no determinant of the simple, spiritual act, that act is independent of its
object in a way that anticipates more modern adverbialist theories. According to
adverbialism, seeing blue is not a matter of being presented with an instance of
blue in sight but rather seeing bluely. On adverbialist theories, then, the percep-
tual act is not constitutively shaped by its object but has its conscious character
independently of that object. Olivi, of course, is no modern adverbialist. The sim-
ple, spiritual act may be determined independently of its object, but it is meant to
be an intentional absorption of and assimilation to that object. The problem, of
course, is to understand how Olivi could coherently maintain this.
Even if Olivi is wrong to deny that an object plays a causal role in its perception,
he may be right in claiming that extension and absorption are linked. If extension
and absorption are linked, if the wax only takes on the form of the seal by actively
pressing against it, then the active extensive element in Merleau-Ponty’s descrip-
tion is the basis for a subsequent absorption. The light is posed on the circular
vase and is ﬁxed there, and so the illuminated area is shaped by that vase. Merleau-
Ponty’s gaze is posed on his desk and is ﬁxed there, and so his visual experience
is shaped by that desk. Indeed, Olivi was criticized precisely by holding fast to
the link between extension and absorption, a kind of procession and return, and
drawing out what that entails, namely, that the active, outward extension’s com-
ing into conﬂict with the object is what explains, in part, that object’s subsequent
absorption. The grasping hand only conforms to rigid, solid body by grasping it.
The grasping hand extends its grip until it can no more, consistent with its ends,
and so conforms to the body’s contours. It is only thanks to the activity of the
hand and the resistance that it encounters that the perceiver’s haptic experience
formally assimilates to the tangible qualities of the object grasped. In this way is
the hand the active wax of haptic perception. It is the force of the hand’s activity
coming into conﬂict with the self-maintaining forces of the object grasped that
makes possible the sympathetic presentation of that object in haptic experience
and its formal assimilation to that object, understood as a mode of constitutive
shaping. The grasped object plays an explanatory role, inconsistent with being a
mere terminative cause, in the conﬂict with the hand’s grasp that discloses it. If
perception’s formal assimilation to its object, understood as a mode of constitutive
shaping, is the basis of its objectivity, that is only so because of the explanatory
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priority of its object, an explanatory priority inconsistent with being a terminative
cause. There is a connection, then, between perceptual objectivity and explana-
tory priority (chapter 1.2).
5.4 Looking
We have been discussing the active, outward, extensive character of visual phe-
nomenology that underlies persistent belief in extramission in some children and
adults and is plausibly the font of classical extramission theories. We have done so
in aid of honing in on a conception of looking that stands a chance of make true
the Biranian principle—in order to see well, one must look. Such a conception
must involve the active, outer-directed extension of visual awareness where this
involves the emission of nothing, no matter how rariﬁed and akin to light.
Like grasping and listening, there are three distinguishablemoments in looking.
The ﬁrst moment corresponds to the preparatory reach in grasping, and might be
performed for the end of grasping some particular object or for the end of grasp-
ing what there is to be grasped. Just as someone may reach out for something, and
listen out for something (chapter 4.5), they may look out for something as well. A
perceiver may look out with the end of seeing some particular object or with the
end of seeing what there is to be seen. The second moment corresponds to the
enclosure of the object grasped. Just as the hand, in reaching out, may come to
conform to the contours of the object grasped, in listening out the perceiver may
come to audibly attend to something and so listen to it. Similarly, in looking out
for something the perceiver may come to look at something and so see it. In look-
ing out an object is sighted. The third moment corresponds to the sustaining of
enclosure. If the activity of the hand relaxes, the object will slip from its grasp. So
not only is activity required to enclose the object in the hand’s grasp, but it is also
required to sustain that grasp. Moreover, listening is required to sustain audible
attention. Should the perceiver listen away, attending to some other audible event
in a sonically complex environment, they would cease to listen to what they were
initially listening to. Similarly, looking is required to sustain the explicit awareness
afforded by visual experience. Should the perceiver look away, attending to some
other visible aspect of the natural environment, they would cease to look at, and
so visually attend to, the object of perception.
I turn, and look, and see an ancient chestnut tree. It is one of the ancient chest-
nut trees replanted in Greenwich Park when Charles ii had the park redesigned in
the 1660s. An organism of impressive size and age presents itself. The majority of
its burrs remain on the tree and are brighter green than the surrounding foliage.
It is early evening, and the light is long and golden. The light both articulates the
ﬁne texture of the bark and sets off the overall ﬂow of the trunk in dramatic relief.
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Despite its manifest strength and solidity, the twisted trunk appears to be ﬂowing
in a wave-like form. I come to realize that I am witnessing an organic process,
the growth of the trunk, occurring so slowly as to appear, from within my limited
temporal perspective, to be frozen, static. The difference in the scale of our lives
is striking. For a moment, it induces in me a kind of temporal vertigo. Just as a
radical difference in spatial scale can be vertiginous—think of how small one can
feel when viewing the Milky Way—a radical difference in temporal scale can be
vertiginous as well. The scale of its life and the strength manifest in centuries of
growth make the sweet chestnut tree a ﬁt object of awe. I ﬁnd myself musing that
in a different cultural context, perhaps one more prone to animism, the tree might
reasonably be reckoned a god.
In looking at the ancient chestnut tree, I do so from across the park. I look
at the tree by peering through the intervening space. My gaze perceptually pene-
trates that space until it encounters the ancient tree. The tree’s surface is the site
of visual resistance. Perceptually impenetrable, it determines a visual boundary
through which, and in which, nothing further may appear. The tree is opaque to
a signiﬁcant degree. Its opacity consists in its resistance to my gaze. The illumi-
nated air between, by contrast, being transparent, is perceptually penetrable. One
can see in it and through it. Thus a scrub brush can appear in the water of a bath,
and a cherry tree can appear through a window. Appearing through a medium
does not require that the object be embedded in that medium the way appearing
in does, though it is consistent with the object being so embedded at least if the
perceiver is as well. Thus, it is through the illuminated air that the ancient chest-
nut tree is disclosed to me in sight. Looking, at least in the potentially extended
sense that makes true the Biranian principle, involves the perceiver’s gaze coming
into conﬂict with what is perceptually impenetrable. (Compare the phenomeno-
logical interpretation I give of the bounded and unbounded in De sensu, Kalderon
2015, chapter 3.3.)
Broad (1952) describes vision as prehensive and saltatory. It is prehensive in-
sofar as vision involves the presentation of its object in the explicit awareness af-
forded by visual experience. It is saltatory insofar as this awareness seems to leap
the spatial gap between the perceiver and the object. There are two separable
elements to Broad’s conception of saltitoriness. The ﬁrst is simply the frank ad-
mission that vision is a kind of perception at a distance, that the objects of visual
awareness are located at a distance from the perceiver. That much is unexcep-
tional. The second is a phenomenological claim, that visual awareness seems to
leap the spatial gap between the perceiver and the object of perception. For visual
awareness to leap the spatial gap would be for the objects of visual awareness to
be conﬁned to a remote location and so not to have traversed the space between.
However, I am visually aware not only of the coloring of the ancient chestnut tree
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and the wave-like form of its trunk, but of the intervening space as well. We not
only see the colors of distant particulars and their shapes, but we do so by seeing
through intervening illuminated media.
Two years after the appearance of “Some elementary reﬂections on sense-per-
ception”, Jonas (1954, 518) will deny that vision is saltatory in Broad’s sense, and
it is the second element of Broad’s conception that he takes exception to and not
the ﬁrst: “in sight the object faces me across the intervening distance, which in all
its potential ‘steps’ is included in the perception”. Broad is right to emphasize the
distal character of the objects of vision, but his description of vision as saltatory is
inapt since it fails to heed the perceptual penetrability of the intervening medium.
Vision would leap the gap between the perceiver and the distal color if the object
of visual awareness were conﬁned to the remote spatial region where that color is
instantiated. Vision, so conceived, would be a kind of “remote viewing”. However,
vision is not so conﬁned and so does not leap the gap between the perceiver and
distal color. Rather, by means of it, the perceiver may peer through the intervening
medium, in all its potential steps, and encounter objects facing them across the
intervening distance, if the medium is transparent at least to some degree. In the
course of an otherwise astute and insightful comparative phenomenology of the
senses, Broad is misled, at this point, by overlooking the active, outer-directed
phenomenology of vision. Broad, in effect, overlooks the truth in extramission.
As in the case of audition, this psychological stance may be sustained, in the
Peripatetic fashion, by a capacity to act. Looking, like listening, while not a passive
power, may be less than fully active. In the traditional, post-Aristotelian vocabu-
lary, looking, a psychological stance, may be sustained by a ﬁrst actuality if a second
potentiality. Looking may be a psychological stance sustained, at a minimum, by
the potential to act in visually relevant ways, to alter one’s visual perspective on
the natural environment to better bring into view distal aspects of that environ-
ment, but only on a particular understanding of that potentiality. While looking
and listening may fall short of the exemplar, grasping—haptic perception requires
the second actuality of the hand’s activity in order to sustain it—still, they are not
something done to the perceiver but something the perceiver does. What the per-
ceiver does in looking may may be sustained, in certain circumstances, by nothing
further than a preparedness to act in perceptually relevant ways. Perhaps to get
better sense of the trunk’s ﬂowing pattern, I must follow that pattern along with
my gaze, at least to a certain degree, or in a certain way. Perhaps, I need to move
closer, or perhaps further away. Looking at the ancient chestnut tree may involve,
at a minimum, a preparedness to act in such visually relevant ways, but such pre-
paredness requires vigilance. In looking at the ancient chestnut tree, I maintain
vigilance over the tree and its visually manifest aspects. Being thus vigilant, be-
ing prepared to act in visually relevant ways, remains a stance that I must actively
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sustain. So the characteristic activity that sustains the psychological stance may
be a ﬁrst actuality if second potentiality, but the relevant sense of potentiality in-
volves a preparedness to act in a way that itself requires activity to sustain, a kind
of perceptual vigilance.
Looking may be a psychological stance, sustained by a characteristic activity,
where the perceiver opens themselves up, in a directed manner, to visually experi-
ence distal aspects of the natural environment, but that stance is itself an activity.
In maintaining perceptual vigilance, I open myself up to the visible. My gaze, that
the tree resists insofar as it can, is something I direct at the tree. Looking through
a window, or into a ﬁsh tank, or across a park is something that the perceiver does.
Looking at the tree, gazing upon it, remains something that I do, even if in seeing
the tree I undergo an experience caused in me, at least in part, by the tree itself.
Looking, so conceived, may not be a simple, spiritual act of the immaterial soul
as Olivi maintains, but its outward, extensive activity remains something that the
perceiver does independently of any visible object it may encounter. In opening
their eyes, the perceiver opens themselves up to visually experiencing the natural
environment, and that is something they do independently of whatever they en-
counter in so doing. However, accommodating this insight, if it is one, does not
require the object of perception to be a terminative cause. In openning themselves
up, in a directed manner, to visually experiencing distal aspects of the natural en-
vironment, the content of their perception is determined by what they encounter
in so looking in a manner inconsistent with the object of perception being a mere
terminative cause.
Looking, understood as a psychological stance sustained by characteristic ac-
tivity, is an outward gaze, a looking into the distance, an outer-directed opening
up to the visible. It can sometimes happen, if circumstances are propitious, that
in looking outward, aspects of the natural environment, facing us from across the
intervening distance, are presented to us in our visual experience. The next section
shall discuss how looking, so conceived, helps make possible the sympathetic pre-
sentation of distal objects in the natural environment. If looking, understood as an
outer-directed opening up to the visible, makes possible the sympathetic presen-
tation of distal aspects of the natural environment, then looking, so understood,
suffices for the truth of the Biranian principle—in order to see well, one must
look. A conception of looking that would make true the Biranian principle must
at once be something that the perceiver does and that makes the distal environ-
ment perceptually accessible. Looking outward is something the perceiver does.
And looking outward, in so far as it makes possible the sympathetic presentation of
the distal environment in visual experience, makes that environment perceptually
accessible.
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5.5 Sympathy andVisual Presentation
I look where the ancient chestnut tree is and direct my gaze at that tree situated
in a straight line from me. My gaze is ﬁxed upon the tree. My gaze reaches it from
a distance and is posed on it. The visual awareness afforded me by my perceptual
experience is not merely conﬁned to the remote spatial region where the tree is
located. I peer through the intervening space, in all its potential steps, and en-
counter an ancient chestnut tree facing me from across the intervening distance.
Being opaque to a signiﬁcant degree, the tree is a site of visual resistance. The an-
cient chestnut tree determines a perceptually impenetrable boundary that resists
my gaze. In resisting my gaze, the ancient chestnut tree facing me is present in
my visual experience. In looking at the ancient chestnut tree in the early evening,
my experience assimilates to that tree and that tree shapes my experience of it.
In looking, my visual awareness extends to the tree and absorbs it. And it is the
resistance that the tree offers to my visual extension that explains, in part, its sub-
sequent absorption and formal assimilation.
In order to see well, one must look. Looking makes aspects of the distal en-
vironment perceptually accessible by making possible their sympathetic presenta-
tion in visual experience. It is the role that looking plays in making possible the
sympathetic presentation of the visible that makes true the Biranian principle.
I turn, and look, and see an ancient chestnut tree. In so doing, I direct my
gaze across the park. I look through the illuminated space, a space perceptually
penetrated by my gaze, until I can no more. It is the resistance to my looking, my
visual encounter with the perceptually impenetrable, that presents opaque objects
arrayed in the distal environment. The ancient chestnut tree resistsmy visual activ-
ity. The ancient chestnut tree prevents me from seeing further. I can see nothing
in it or through it. However, not all limits to my gaze are external. There are in-
ternal limits to how far I may look into the distance. Other perceivers posses the
capacity to look further than I can. So how is it possible for an experienced limit
to my visual activity to disclose the perceptually impenetrable tree? If the visual
presentation of the perceptually impenetrable is due to the operation of sympathy,
then we have the basis of an answer. It is only when I experience the tree’s limit
to my visual activity, its resistance to my gaze, its perceptual impenetrability, as
a sympathetic response to a countervailing force, my gaze encountering an alien
force that resists it, one force in conﬂict with another, like it yet distinct from it,
that the perceptually impenetrable body discloses itself to visual awareness.
In De sensu, Aristotle distinguishes between the limit of the transparent, and
the limit of a body. The limit of the transparent is a perceptually impenetrable
visual boundary. The limit of a body is its spatial boundaries. These are distinct
limits. Whereas the former is qualitative, the latter is quantitative. However,
importantly, they can coincide. A bounded body, in being perceptually impen-
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etrable, determines a visual boundary that coincides with the limit of the body.
Moreover, Aristotle’s claim that color is the limit of the transparent in a determi-
nately bounded body (De sensu 3 439b11) gives expression to just this coincidence
(or so I argue, Kalderon 2015, chapter 3.3). Color, that is, surface color, is the
limit of the transparent in being the terminal qualitative state in a progression of
qualitative states ordered by decreasing perceptual penetrability. A determinately
bounded body is one such that, being perceptual impenetrable, determines a vi-
sual boundary through which nothing further may appear. This visual boundary
is spatially coincident with the limit of the body and is where the body’s surface
color is seen to inhere. In experiencing the visual resistance of the colored body as
a sympathetic response to a countervailing force that resists the perceiver’s gaze,
the perceptually impenetrable chromatic body discloses itself in visual awareness.
To get a sense of this, compare David Katz’s description of the way that the
appearance of surface color contrasts with the appearance of spectral color:
The paper has a surface in which the colour lies. The plane on which
the spectral color is extended in space before the observer does not
in the same sense possess a surface. One feels that one can penetrate
more of less deeply into the spectral color, whereas when one looks
at the colour of a paper the surface presents a barrier beyond which
the eye cannot pass. It is as though the colour of the paper offered
resistance to the eye. We have here a phenomenon of visual resistance
which in its way contributes to the structure of the perceptual world
as something existing in actuality. (Katz, 1935, 8)
The phenomenon of visual resistance contributes to the structure of the percep-
tual world as something existing in actuality. And it does so, or so I claim, by
being a necessary precondition for the sympathetic presentation of what resists
the perceiver’s gaze. Katz’s discussion also nicely brings out how, from among the
many determinate forms of visual resistance, there is a distinctly chromatic form
of visual resistance at work in the contrasting appearances of surface and spectral
color.
Despite philosophers’ penchant for limiting their visual examples to opaque
bodies, such asMoore’s (1903) blue bead or Price’s (1932) red tomato, not all visibilia
are opaque and not all are bodies, as Katz’s example of spectral colors illustrates.
Can the account of the sympathetic presentation in vision of opaque bodies be
extended to, at least, non-opaque things? Is the principle of sympathy operative
in the presentation of the visible more generally?
InDe sensu, Aristotle observes that transparency comes in degrees. By the trans-
parent, Aristotle means what is actually transparent, what is illuminated by the
contingent presence and activity of the ﬁery substance. The transparent offers
insufficient visual resistance to determine a perceptually impenetrable boundary.
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But offering insufficient visual resistance to determine a perceptually impenetra-
ble boundary is consistent with offering visual resistance nonetheless. Something
is perfectly transparent if it offers no visual resistance to sight. Something is im-
perfectly transparent if it offers visual resistance to sight but not sufficient to de-
termine a perceptually impenetrable boundary. From perfect transparency, as we
approach the limit of perceptual penetrability, the perceptually impenetrable that
determines a visual boundary through which and in which nothing further may
be seen, there is a range of states of imperfect transparency ordered by declining
degrees of perceptual penetrability.
The illuminant is a perceptual medium in the way that I claimed sounds to be
(chapter 4.4). Sounds make the audible activities of distal objects perceptually ac-
cessible and are in that sense audible media. We hear the distal source through or
in the sound it generates. Similarly, we may see an opaque body through or in the
illumination. Whereas physical media answer to the demands of being a causal
intermediary, perceptual media answer to the demands of perceptual accessibil-
ity. Light does not require physical media in which to propagate in the way that
sound waves do. As the Michelson–Morley experiment of 1887 went some way to-
ward showing, there is no Luminiferous aether. But the illuminated air may be a
perceptual medium, nonetheless. Moreover, not only are perceptual media them-
selves perceptible, but they are perceptible in a certain way. Speciﬁcally, they are
not perceptible in themselves, but owe their perceptibility to other things which
are perceptible in themselves, the objects the perceptual media make perceptually
accessible. So the illuminant is visible, though not visible in itself, but owes its
visibility to the objects that it illuminates. One sees the brightness of a pantry,
not in itself, but by seeing the brightly lit objects arranged in it. This is the way in
which the perceptually penetrable presents itself to the perceiver’s gaze.
The more the perceptually penetrable resists the perceiver’s gaze, the more
visible in its own right it becomes and so loses, to that degree, the capacity for
other things to be perceived in it, or through it. Visual resistance can take many
forms. For example, the determinate kind of visual resistance offered by a per-
ceptually penetrable thing, such as a liquid mass, may consist in its possessing a
volume color. A volume color pervades the perceptually penetrable mass, and that
liquid mass has that color, independently of the colors of the things arrayed in it,
or seen through it (though see Mizrahi, 2010). If the liquid mass is sufficiently
perceptually penetrable, seeing the colors of things arrayed in it may be within the
bounds of normal human color constancy. That is, one may see a red bead in a
yellow liquid and that bead may be seen to be red, though, of course, looking the
way a red thing would when seen through a yellow liquid. The red bead will look
to be red, and the same shade of red, when seen through a clear liquid, though,
of course, it will look another way. In moving from the yellow liquid to the clear,
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the red bead’s appearance changes but the bead does not appear to change color.
There are limits, however, to the normal human color constancy. If the liquid is
strongly enough colored, if it offers sufficient visual resistance in that way, this
will erode the perceiver’s ability to visually recognize the determinate shade of the
bead, or even that it is red. Volume color is not the only form of visual resistance
offered by otherwise perceptually penetrable media. As Katz observed, spectral
color also offers visual resistance. And refractions, reﬂections, specular highlights,
shadows, all contribute, in determinate ways, to the visual resistance of the imper-
fectly transparent.
The perfectly transparent, insofar as it can be seen at all, is visually presented
by the objects seen in it or through it. Its visibility is entirely parasitic on the
visibility of the objects it enables. Insofar as the perceptually impenetrable is pre-
sented in sight as a sympathetic response to the experienced limit to the perceiver’s
gaze, and the perfectly transparent medium is thereby presented, the principle of
sympathy makes possible the presentation, in vision, of the perfectly transparent.
The imperfectly transparent, by contrast, offers visual resistance at least to some
degree, but not to a degree sufficient to determine a perceptually impenetrable
boundary. To the degree that it manifestly resists perceptual penetration, it is
possible to sympathetically present it in visual experience. Think of the way in
which the volume color or refraction of an imperfectly transparent medium may
present that medium in our visual experience of it. However, the more visible in
its own right the imperfectly transparent becomes, the more it erodes the sympa-
thetic presentation of objects arrayed in that medium. The more we hear audible
features of the sound had independently of the source that generates it, the less
capable we are of hearing that source through or in that sound. The more we see
visible features of the illuminated media had independently of the objects that it
illuminates, the less capable we are of seeing through it or in it. Illumination may
reveal the latent visibility of things, but if it is sufficiently strong, it may blind
us to the scene. Perceptual media, in calling attention to themselves, erode the
sympathetic presentation of distal objects they otherwise make possible.
We have explained the visual presentation of the perceptually impenetrable in
terms of the operation of sympathy. The perceptually impenetrable is presented
in sight when the limit to the perceivers gaze is experienced as a sympathetic re-
action to a countervailing force that resists that gaze. However, the operation of
sympathy is not conﬁned to the presentation, in vision, of the perceptually impen-
etrable. We see perceptually penetrable things as well. The visual presentation
of the perfectly transparent, if that is so much as possible, entirely derives from
the sympathetic presentation of objects seen in it. So sympathy would suffice to
explain the visual presentation of the perfectly transparent, if it can genuinely be
said to be visible at all (whether it can, may depend upon the practical point of
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so saying in the given circumstances). Sympathy played an additional role in the
visual perception of the imperfectly transparent. Insofar as it is perceptually pen-
etrable to some degree, it makes possible the sympathetic presentation of percep-
tually impenetrable objects seen in it or through it. It is only because the gaze
may penetrate to the site of visual resistance, facing it from across a distance, that
the perceptually impenetrable is sympathetically presented in visual experience.
However, insofar as the imperfectly transparent is visible in its own right, the re-
sistance it offers becomes the means of sympathetically responding to it, and this
erodes the sympathetic presentation of distal objects otherwise made possible.
So we have the following argument by cases. The visible exhaustively divides
into the perceptually impenetrable and the perceptually penetrable. The percep-
tually penetrable is either perfectly perceptually penetrable, offering no visual re-
sistance, or imperfectly penetrable, offering visual resistance to some degree. The
operation of sympathy suffices to explain the visual presentation of the perceptu-
ally impenetrable. Moreover this explanation suffices, as well, for the visual pre-
sentation of the perfectly penetrable, as we have explained. Sympathy explained
as well not only the presentation of the imperfectly penetrable insofar as other
objects may be sympathetically presented in it, or through it, but also the respects
in which it is visible in its own right and the way that this erodes the sympathetic
presentation of objects seen in it, or through it. So the operation of sympathy
suffices for the presentation of the visible, in sight, quite generally.
We began by explaining the visual presentation of an opaque body in terms
of sympathy. Since the objects of sight are not limited to opaque bodies, this
raised the question whether sympathy operates in visual presentation quite gener-
ally. The following worry might arise about the argument so far: While we have
explicitly addressed the visual presentation of non-opaque things, we have failed
to explicitly address the visual presentation of non-corporeal things, such as events
and processes. However, perceptual impenetrability does notmerely pertain to the
surfaces of opaque bodies. A ﬂame, should the ﬁre be burning intensely enough,
may be perceptually impenetrable, obstructing the view of other visibilia. Thus
Herbert Mason reports that as he waited to take his iconic photograph of St Paul’s
on 29 December 1940, “glares of many ﬁres and sweeping clouds of smoke” ob-
scured the dome of St Paul’s. It is not just the sweeping clouds of smoke, masses
of particulate matter, that obscured the dome of St Paul’s but the glares of many
ﬁres. The general point is that the way in which we have characterized the visible,
in terms of degrees of perceptual penetrability, is equally applicable to visible ob-
jects of distinct ontological categories. Perceptual penetrability applies equally to
corporeal and non-corporeal things and so does not preclude the visual presenta-
tion of events and processes.
There may be further doubts about whether the taxonomy of the visible pro-
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vided by degrees of perceptual penetrability is, in fact, complete. On a clear day,
the sky is blue. And the sky, at night, when unobstructed by cloud cover or light
pollution, is black, albeit speckled with points of irradiation that vary chromati-
cally. Is the blue of the day sky, or the black of the night sky, qualities of something
perceptually penetrable or perceptually impenetrable? And if we feel uncomfort-
able answering, doesn’t this show that the proposed taxonomy of the visible is
incomplete? The puzzlement is resolved, however, once we realize the sense in
which each of these responses is at least partly right consistent with one another.
And if the puzzlement is resolved in this way, the completeness of the taxonomy
of the visible is not thereby challenged.
We have accepted Aristotle’s claim that transparency comes in degrees, degrees
to which it resists perceptual penetration. Aristotle also claims that the blue ap-
pearance of the day sky can be explained in terms of the imperfect transparency
of the illuminated air (De sensu 3 439b1–3). In this way, it is like water. From a cliff
overhanging the sea, the sea may appear blue. But, if enticed by the sea, one were
to descend to the beach and examine a handful of sea water, it would not be blue
at all but transparent. Similarly, looking up at the sky on a clear autumn afternoon,
one sees an expanse of blue. But if one were to travel to that region of the sky, by
helicopter, say, nothing blue would be found. The visual resistance of an imper-
fectly transparent medium increases with an increase in volume. The further one
sees into a transparent medium, the more resistance that medium offers to sight.
In the case of a clear sky, its scattering of light is what offers progressive resistance
to our gaze. And its blue appearance is the effect of this resistance. Aristotle is ex-
plicit about the effects of such resistance inMeteorologica: “For a weak light shining
through a dense medium … will cause all kinds of colours to appear, but especially
crimson and purple” (Meteorologica i 5 342b5–8; Webster in Barnes 1984, 8–9).
When I look into the blue of the clear autumn sky, I see as far as I can see.
Other people and animals may see further than I do, but the power of sight of all
ﬁnite creatures is limited in this way. So while the blue appearance of day sky is
due to the degree to which it resists perceptual penetration, its scattering of light
offering progressive resistance to my gaze, there is a limit to how far I may peer
in it or through it. This perceptual limitation is manifest in our experience of the
dome of the heavens. In a clear blue sky, in any direction Imay look, there is a limit
to how far I may see. The ﬁnite lines of sight extending in every direction from
the perceiver’s vantage point determines a sphere. This is what we experience
as the dome of the heavens. I confess to recoiling somewhat from the impiety
of this expression. The dome of the heavens, construed literally, is not only a
reiﬁcation of a perceptual limitation but is misattributed to the heavens as well.
Its impiety consists in giving expression to an anthropomorphic conceit of cosmic
proportions.
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Our experience of the dome of the heavens is relevant to our initial puzzlement.
Recall we wondered whether the blue of the sky inhered in something perceptually
penetrable or in something perceptually impenetrable. We are now in a position
to see how each response is at least partly right consistent with one another. The
blue of the sky inheres in the perceptually penetrable illuminated air, the resistance
it offers by the scattering of light resulting in a blue appearance should one peer
deeply enough into it. However, there is a limit to how far one may see, and this is
reﬂected in our experience of the blue sky, speciﬁcally, in its apparent dome shape.
The surface of the dome represents the limits of visibility, and is, to that extent,
perceptually impenetrable. But the blue of the sky is not seen to inhere in the
dome of the heavens. It is a volume color not a surface color. A blue inhering in
the surface of the dome would be a vulgar simulacra of the voluminous blue of the
sky, its appearance more akin to the interior design of a Vegas casino than the clear
autumn sky that it apes.
In sympathetically disclosing the ancient chestnut tree, my visual experience
absorbs that tree and is constitutively shaped by it. The conscious character of
seeing the tree is constituted, in part, by its bright green burs and the wave-like
form of its trunk sympathetically presented to my partial perspective on that tree
in the given circumstances of perception. What it is like for me to see the tree
depends upon and derives from, at least in part, what the tree is like, at least in
visible respects. Visual experience formally assimilates to its object, relative to the
perceiver’s partial perspective, as a consequence of being constitutively shaped by
that object as presented to that perspective, a constitutive shaping made possible
by the sympathetic presentation of that object in visual experience. Constitutive
shaping of visual experience by its object is a “communion” with that object—in
undergoing that experience the perceiver is united, in a way, with the object of their
perception. Moreover, as with Plotinus (chapter 2.8), this unity explains in part, the
similarity between the visual experience and its object. The formal assimilation of
visual perception to its object, at least relative to the perceiver’s partial perspective,
is the effect of constitutive shaping, and thus its conscious character depends upon
and derives from, at least in part, the visible character of the object seen.
Recall, we are generalizing from Plotinus in taking the unity of visual presen-
tation to be explanatorily prior to the operation of sympathy (chapter 2.8). The
visual presentation of distal aspects of the natural environment is not being con-
structed from elements and principles understood independently of their visual
presentation, rather the unity of the perceiver and the distal aspects of the natural
environment is presupposed, and sympathymerely analytically explicates the intel-
ligible structure of this presupposed unity. Not only does sympathy only operate
within a unity, but that unity is reducible to no other thing.
Visual presentation is an irreducible unity. If sensory presentation is a distinc-
5.5. SYMPATHYANDVISUAL PRESENTATION 163
tive kind of unity, a “communion” with its object, then visual presentation is more
distinctive still. Insofar as visual presentation, like haptic and auditory presenta-
tion, is governed by the principle of sympathy, it is a mode of being with. Turning,
and looking, and seeing the ancient chestnut tree is a way of being with that tree.
Sartre’s overly aggressive conception of the look, in L’Être et le néant, blinds him
to this possibility. Sartre fails to see how the look’s coming into conﬂict with its
object may be the means of the latter’s sympathetic presentation to the former.
(See Jay 1994, chapter 5, especially 287 where he remarks that Heidegger’s concep-
tion of mitsein was, perhaps, too irenic for Sartre.) Like auditory presentation, and
unlike haptic presentation, visual presentation is incompletely corporeal. Haptic
presentation involves a conscious animate body, the perceiver, being with another
corporeal body. It is a way for one body to be with another body. Auditory presen-
tation, by contrast, is incompletely corporeal since it involves a conscious animate
body, the perceiver, being with an event or process, even events or processes that
do not have bodies as participants. Events and processes may be seen as well as
heard and so visual presentation is to that extent incorporeal as well. Visual pre-
sentation may, at least in certain circumstances, be a disclosure with duration but
the objects disclosed are not essentially dynamic as are the substrata of audible qual-
ities. Like haptic perception, vision may disclose relatively static features of the
distal environment. But even seeing relatively static features of body, such as their
color, may only be disclosed over time. A color is wholly present in a body at ev-
ery moment of its instantiation. Nevertheless, the unchanging color of a body may
only be disclosed in the distinctive manner it interacts with changes to its relations
to the perceiver, the illuminant, and the circumstances of perception (Broackes,
1997; Noë, 2004; Matthen, 2005). And that is compatible with, if circumstances
are propitious, with the perceiver being able to recognize at a glance the color of
a thing.
The unity presupposed by sensory presentation generally, being partial, is a
lesser unity than the unity presupposed by intelligible presentation. The intelligi-
bly differentiated image of the hyperontic One is wholly present to the Intellect.
An intelligible object is wholly present in the act of intellection in the way that a
sensible object never is in perception since sensory presentation is invariably rel-
ative to the perceiver’s partial perspective. Though a lesser unity, being partial,
it is a kind of unity nonetheless. Being the kind of unity it is, a mode of being
with whose principle is sympathy, there is a sense in which, sensory presentation,
despite its partial character, places the perceiver in the object perceived. As we
observed earlier (chapter 5.3), this is a neo-Platonic heritage.
In chapter 1.4, we stopped just short of embracing that heritage. We consid-
ered, instead, a related but weaker claim about haptic experience. Beginning with
the prima facie absurdity of supposing that haptic experience is in the perceiver’s
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head (an absurdity mitigated, somewhat, in a philosophical milieu in which “Carte-
sianism cum Materialism” is the reigning metaphysical orthodoxy, Putnam 1993,
1994, 1999), we claimed, instead, that it is more natural to suppose, at least ini-
tially, that haptic experience is closer to where its object is at, in our handling
of that object. The Plotinian claim, if made on behalf of haptic presentation, is
stronger still. It would be the claim that haptic experience places us within the
object of haptic experience. In grasping or enclosure, the haptic experience is in
the perceived overall shape and volume of the object that the perceiver is handling.
The earlier, weaker claim hedged at the boundary between the apparent body, the
region wherein bodily sensation is potentially felt (Martin, 1992), and extrapersonal
space. However, if haptic perception involves a mode of sympathetic presentation,
then the haptic variant of the Plotinian claim, that haptic perception places us in
the object of haptic investigation, must be true, at least on a certain interpretation
of that claim.
The next chapter will explore whether good sense can be made of this neo-
Platonic heritage. I shall argue that the neo-Platonic heritage is best understood
as articulating an aspect of the phenomenology of explicit awarenessmade possible
by sympathetic presentation. The overall aim of the next chapter is to explicate
the conception of perceptual objectivity that sympathetic presentation affords us.
It will turn out that this conception of objectivity is the basis of a strong form of
perceptual realism, a form of realism on which the distinction between the phe-
nomenal and the noumenal collapses. Things in themselves are perceptible, albeit
partially and imperfectly. That perception, via the operation of sympathy, places
us into the very heart of things, explains how this may be so.
Chapter 6
Realism
6.1 Grasping and the Rhetoric of Objectivity
Haptic perception plays a privileged role in the rhetoric of objectivity. In chap-
ter 1.7, we discussed two historical exemplars of this rhetorical impulse, the Giants
shaking trees and boulders at the Friends of the Forms as they affirm their cor-
porealism, and Dr Johnson’s kicking the stone outside of the church in Harwich
as an exasperated affirmation of its material existence independent of our ideas.
While by no means dead, this rhetorical trope has, perhaps, lost some of its sheen
in giving birth to the late twentieth-century cliché of the table-pounding realist.
Being a cliché is no proof against existence. I once attended a lecture where
the speaker pounded on the podium at each mention of an objective worldly cor-
relate of our conceptual scheme. Through this performance, the philosopher was
expressing the objectivity of the worldly correlate, and, in a rather bullying fashion,
demanding our assent to it. LikeDr Johnson’s performance, it was amultimodal af-
fair (chapter 1.7, Campbell and Cassam 2014, 71). The audience, in sympathetically
responding to the philosopher’s tactile experience, is meant to vividly experience
the tangible resistance of the podium, revealed, in part, in the loud, sharp sound
it produced when pounded. It is this resistance to touch that is meant to disclose
the podium to be objectively there, independently of the speaker’s pounding, just
as the worldly correlate is meant to be there, independently of our conceptual
scheme.
Haptic perception plays a privileged role in the rhetoric of objectivity. It does
so, in part, because the experience of felt resistance to touch is phenomenolog-
ically vivid and primitively compelling. Though in no doubt about the presence
or solidity of a thing, we may, nevertheless, be drawn to touch it. Thus we must
endeavour to teach children to keep their hands to themselves, and even in matu-
rity, polite notices are required to remind adults to not touch the display cabinet.
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Aristotle discerns an existential concern in touch. While the distal senses, such as
sight and audition, are for the well-being of an animal equipped with locomotion,
touch is for that animal’s very existence. The tangible may be of vital concern,
be it predator or prey. Perhaps this existential dimension is part of what makes
touch so primitively compelling. Haptic perception plays a privileged role in the
rhetoric of objectivity, in part, because the experience of felt resistance to touch is
phenomenologically vivid and primitively compelling. Moreover, and for our pur-
posesmore importantly, it plays a privileged role, as well, because grasping provides
a model for perceptual objectivity quite generally, in the assimilation of the hand,
and the haptic experience it gives rise to, to the object of haptic investigation.
6.2 Perceptual Objectivity
That perception assimilates to its object is the manifestation of its objectivity.
Perceptual assimilation is formal rather than material. The conscious qualitative
character of the perceptual experience becomes like, if not exactly like, the pre-
sented object without materially absorbing it. Moreover, the formal assimilation
of perception to its object is not exact in the way that would entail the sharing of
qualities. The experience of our hominid ancestor, in seeing the alien obelisk, does
not itself become black. The qualitative character of their visual experience in see-
ing the obelisk may be like, in some sense, the blackness presented in it. But that
blackness enjoys no natural existence in our hominid ancestor’s perception of it
the way it enjoys natural existence in the alien obelisk. Perception may be a capac-
ity to become like, as Aristotle contends, but it is not chameleon-like, as Crathorn
imagined, and Holcot complained of (chapter 1.4), thus avoiding Theophrastus’
aporia.
An ineliminable source of the inexactness of perception’s formal assimilation to
its object consists in its perspectival relativity. Perception only formally assimilates
to its object relative to the perceiver’s partial perspective (chapter 1.4, chapter 3.6).
I have not done enough to defend the general claim that all sensory experience is
perspectival. I have not, for example, argued that olfaction is perspectival. I have,
however, argued that, in addition to visual perspectives, there are, as well, haptic
and auditory perspectives. Each allows for better or worse perspectives, and each
involves the potential disclosure of previously hidden aspects of a sensible object.
Moreover, each does so in an ego-centrically structured space. Finally, each is such
that the perceptual appearance of an object can vary between its presentation to
distinct perspectives. While there are similarities among them in virtue of which
they each count as perspectives, haptic, auditory, and visual perspectives are also,
importantly, distinct. While each structures a space, not only may the space differ,
be it peripersonal or extrapersonal space, but the manner of its structuring may
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differ as well. Vision is rectilinear in a way that audition, in providing the perceiver
with 360 degree awareness of the natural environment, is not.
Perception only provides a partial perspective on the natural environment. The
object of perception may not be wholly present to the perceiver’s partial perspec-
tive on it. To that extent, their perception is imperfect in the sense of being incom-
plete—there are perceptible aspects of the object not disclosed to the perceiver’s
perspective. As Merleau-Ponty stresses, however, perception is not imperfect in a
further, normative sense:
But in immediate consciousness this perspectival character ofmy knowl-
edge is not conceived as an accident in its regard, as an imperfection
relative to the existence of my body and its proper point of view; and
knowledge by “proﬁles” is not treated as the degradation of a true knowl-
edge which would grasp the totality of the possible aspects of the ob-
ject all at once. Perspective does not appear to me to be a subjective
deformation of things but, on the contrary, to be one of their proper-
ties, perhaps their essential property. It is precisely because of it that
the perceived possesses in itself a hidden and inexhaustible richness,
that it is a “thing.” … Far from introducing a coefficient of subjectivity
into perception, it provides it on the contrary with the assurance of
communicating with a world which is richer than what we know of it,
that is, of communicating with a real world. The proﬁles of my desk
are not given to direct knowledge as appearances without value, but as
“manifestations” of the desk. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 186)
In most cases, the object of perception, in all its particularity, exceeds what is dis-
closed of it in perceptual experience. Touch provides a vivid example of this in
what I earlier described as the allure of the tangible (chapter 1.2). The allure of the
tangible is the sense, or premonition, that, at any given moment, the body exceeds
what is disclosed to us by touch. We have the sense, when touching an object,
that it is tangibly determined in ways that we have yet to feel. Our tactile sense
of a body’s “thingness”—its concrete particularity—consists, in part, in this allure.
While, perhaps, particularly vivid in tactile phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty main-
tains that something like this is true of perceptual phenomenology more generally,
that perception’s partial disclosure is an objective manifestation of an object that
exceeds what is disclosed of it in experience. Far from being an obstacle to per-
ception’s objectivity by introducing a coefficient of subjectivity into perception,
the perspectival character of perception is what makes possible its objective dis-
closure of the natural environment. Objectivity and the parochial are linked (for
an insightful exploration of this theme, though not within the philosophy of per-
ception, see Travis 2011).
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To bring out one way in which objectivity and the parochial may be linked in
perception consider the limits to normal human color constancy. Human color
constancy is imperfect. Not only does human color vision display constancy for
only some scenes and some conditions of illumination, but human color vision dis-
plays different degrees of constancy in different kinds of scenes in different ranges
of illumination. Human color constancy is imperfect in that it displays these var-
ious kinds of incompleteness. Hilbert explains how human color constancy is im-
perfect in a further important sense:
Many theories of color constancy take the form of explaining how it
is that the visual system manages to extract information about the re-
ﬂectance of the objects in a scene from the color signal from those ob-
jects. Since this involves separating the contributions of the reﬂectance
and the illuminant to the color signal these theories are often character-
ized as “discounting the illuminant”. Perfect color constancy in these
terms would involve accurate recovery of reﬂectance for any scene un-
der any lighting conditions. The perceived color of objects would be
perfectly correlated with their reﬂecting characteristics and not vary at
all with changes in the illuminant of the composition and arrangement
of objects in view. This type of perfect color constancy is not possible.
(Hilbert, 2005, 143)
Human color constancy is imperfect. As Merleau-Ponty emphasizes, this should
not be thought of as a deﬁcit. Suppose there could be a perceiver whose percep-
tion displayed perfect color constancy in Hilbert’s sense. What would perfectly
color constancy, so conceived, be like? If we bracket Hilbert’s reﬂectance phys-
icalism, apparent color would be perfectly correlated with real color and would
not vary with a change in the illuminant nor with a change in the composition
and arrangement of the other elements of the scene. What would it be like for
a perceiver with perfect color constancy, so conceived, to see a ﬁeld of grass set
against a blue summer sky? The ﬁeld would appear uniformly green and the sky
uniformly blue. Moreover, no difference in color appearance would differentiate
any portion of the uniformly green ﬁeld. The experience of the scene would be not
unlike a young child’s drawing of the scene. The grass would be uniformly green
and lack the golden cast that we might observe in viewing the same scene, nor
would it be dappled, as we observe the scene to be, by sunlight and shadow, for
these variations in appearance are due to variations in illumination. Furthermore,
no difference in color appearance would differentiate any portion of the uniformly
blue sky. The sky would be uniformly blue and would manifest no deepening azure
to the east, for, again, these variations in appearance are due to variations in illu-
mination. Children’s drawings also intimate what perfect size constancy might be
like—they will draw a car as larger than an adult even if the car is at a great distance
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from that person. Just as with perfect size constancy we would lose information
about distance, so with perfect color constancy we would lose information about
the illuminant. So the partial and variable character of human color constancy is no
deﬁcit. And not merely because it lacks the garish character of children’s crayon
drawings, but because we would be insensitive to important aspects of our envi-
ronment. Our environment is only objectively disclosed in sensory experience to
the partial perspective we have on it.
Not only does perception formally assimilate to its object, relative to the per-
ceiver’s partial perspective, but this formal assimilation is a kind of constitutive
shaping. The object present in perceptual experience constitutively shapes that
experience, the way that St Paul’s constitutively shapes the London skyline. What
that skyline is like is determined, in part, by what St Paul’s is like. St Paul’s deter-
mines what the London skyline is like, at least in part, by virtue of being a part
or contour of that skyline. Similarly, what the perceiver’s experience of an object
is like is determined, in part, by what that object is like. The object of percep-
tion determines what the perceiver’s experience of it is like, at least in part, by
virtue of being a constituent of that experience. Constitutive shaping entails for-
mal assimilation, though formal assimilation need not involve constitutive shaping.
Consider Locke on primary quality perception. In perceiving a primary quality,
the perceiver’s experience resembles its object, but not by having that object as a
constituent. The object constitutively shaping the perceiver’s perceptual experi-
ence of it, is, as Ardley (1958), stressed, the result of the perceiver’s “communion”
with that object. It is the unity of the perception with its object that ultimately
explains the similarity between the conscious qualitative character of perceptual
experience and the qualitative character of the object presented to the perceiver’s
partial perspective. (Recall, according to Plotinus, it is because of the unity pro-
vided by the World-Soul that potentially distant parts of the sensible cosmos that
are suitably disposed to become like or unlike may sympathetically interact. See
chapter 2.7. For the generalization and application of this point to the case of
haptic perception see chapter 2.8.) Perception, so conceived, is a kind of incor-
poration in a metaphorical and anti-Cartesian sense (chapter 1.5). Perception is a
kind of incorporation insofar as its formal assimilation to its object, relative to the
perceiver’s partial perspective, is understood on the model of constitutive shaping.
It is because this feature of grasping or enclosure, understood as a mode of
haptic perception, generalizes to other forms of perception, such as vision and au-
dition, that grasping is an apt metaphor for perception, more generally. If this fea-
ture carries over to perception generally, if the object of perception constitutively
shapes the perceiver’s perceptual experience, then it is easy to see its epistemic
signiﬁcance. If perception involves becoming like the perceived object actually is,
then it is a genuine mode of awareness. One can only perceptually assimilate what
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is there to be assimilated. If perceptual experience is a formal mode of assimila-
tion understood as a mode of constitutive shaping, then one could not undergo
such an experience consistent with a Cartesian demon eliminating the object of
that experience. If there is no external object, then there is nothing to which the
perceiver, or perhaps their experience, could assimilate to. If the phenomenologi-
cal character of perception is constitutively shaped by the object presented to the
perceiver’s partial perspective, then we can begin to see the epistemic signiﬁcance
of perceptual phenomenology. If the phenomenological character of perception
is constitutively shaped by the object presented to the perceiver’s partial perspec-
tive, then it is the grounds for an epistemic warrant for the range of propositions
whose truth turns on what is presented in that perceptual experience (Johnston,
2006b, 2011; Kalderon, 2011c).
The warrant, here, should be understood as an entitlement to judge (in the or-
dinary sense of “entitlement” and not in Burge’s 2003 technical sense of the term;
compare McDowell 2009b, 132n). Entitlements may be possessed without being
exercised. In being aware of some aspect of the natural environment, the perceiver
may possess an epistemic warrant that entitles them to know various things with-
out the perceiver, in fact, coming to know these things. The perceiver is knowl-
edgeable of the object of perception in the sense that knowledge is available to
the subject in perceiving the object, whether or not such knowledge is in fact “ac-
tivated” (in Williamson’s 1990 terminology). The epistemic warrant grounded in
perceptual awareness is not a factor in terms of which knowledge could be analyzed
or otherwise explained. Moreover, it is an epistemic entitlement: The object of
awareness is an epistemic warrant for the range of propositions whose truth turns
on what the perceiver is aware of. Perception confers this epistemic entitlement
given the alethic connection between the particular that is the object of percep-
tual awareness and the proposition potentially known. Awareness of the sensible
particulars affords the subject with a reason that is in this way akin to proof—it is
logically impossible for the particular to exist and the proposition to be false (see
Cook Wilson, 1926; Kalderon and Travis, 2013; Travis, 2005). Because in seeing
the bright green burrs of the ancient chestnut tree, I possess a reason that would,
in the given circumstance, warrant my coming to know that the burrs are bright
green, I am authoritative about the color of the chestnut tree’s burrs. My seeing
the bright green of the burrs can stand proxy for any inquiry on your part about the
color of the burrs. If in coming to know that the burrs are bright green, I express
my knowledge by stating it, I extend to you an offer to take it on my authority that
the burrs are the color that I see them to be.
The present metaphysics of perception, while inconsistent with a Cartesian
demon eliminating the object of experience, is not, by itself, sufficient to refute
skepticism. Even conceding the conception of perceptual experience as a kind of
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formal assimilation understood as a mode of constitutive shaping, that conception
is nevertheless consistent with the possibility of ringers. This possibility can arise
in two ways. The objects of perception, what we perceive, may have ringers. I
may see Castor and shake his hand, but his twin, Pollux, is a dead ringer. More-
over, not only do the objects of perception, those sensible aspects of the natural
environment that we encounter in experience, admit of ringers, but our perceptual
episodes, our experiences, may themselves admit of ringers. A perception of Pol-
lux is a ringer for a perception of Castor, as is a perfectly matching hallucination
of Castor. And a skeptic might try to exploit this latter possibility to undermine
the epistemic warrant afforded by perception, a warrant not shared with its expe-
riential ringers. The mere existence of experiential ringers is, by itself, insufficient
for the skeptic’s conclusion. The skeptic would need, in addition, the claim that
if a perceptual episode affords the perceiver with epistemic warrant, it must not
admit of ringers that do not. So conceived, epistemic warrant requires ringerless
proof. Though this is not the place to go into it, I doubt very much that these
further skeptical maneovers could succeed. They rely on an overdemanding con-
ception of epistemic warrant that is difficult to coherently maintain. (For a sense
of this, see how these ideas work themselves out in the tradition of Oxford realism
as discussed in Kalderon and Travis 2013, especially their discussion of “the accre-
tion”. See also Williamson’s Williamson 2000 discussion of luminosity. For more
on Oxford realism, see Marion 2000a,b.)
Perception is a fundamental form of objectivity in our cognitive economy since
it affords us explicit awareness of sensible aspects of the natural environment. It is
not a fundamental form of objectivity, however, by being a primitive form of ob-
jective representation as Burge (2010) contends. Sensory awareness is a mode of
assimilation, and something can only assimilate to what is there to be assimilated.
Consider the following analogy. Knowledge is factive, let us suppose. If the per-
ceiver knows something, then there is some fact that they know. If there is no fact
that they know, then there is nothing that they know. Similarly we might say that
perception is objective. If the perceiver perceives something, then there some ob-
ject that they perceive (“object”, here, is not the ontological category, but percep-
tion’s terminus, namely, what is perceived). If there is no object that they perceive,
then there is nothing that they perceive. Perception involves the objective pre-
sentation of its object in the explicit awareness afforded by that experience. That
object, of which the perceiver is explicitly aware, is only subsequently re-presented,
if at all, in imagination and memory. Pace Burge, I favor, instead, the Peripatetic
doctrine that imagination and memory, and not perception, are the basic forms of
intentional or representational capacities in our cognitive economy. That is, we
are presented aspects of the natural environment in our perceptual experience of
it, and these aspects are only subsequently re-presented, if at all, in imagination
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and memory. Such re-presentations are the primitive forms of objective empirical
representation, in Burge’s sense, not perception. Though the explicit awareness
afforded by perceptual experience makes objective empirical representation pos-
sible, such awareness has no veridicality or accuracy conditions, its object being
presented not re-presented. Perception is the basis of an epistemic warrant not
by making the perceiver aware of a truth, though recognition of what one is per-
ceiving may afford such awareness. Rather perception affords awareness of those
aspects of the natural environment upon which the truth of a variety of proposi-
tions depend.
Moreover, sensory awareness, the explicit awareness afford by perception of
the natural environment, as opposed to awareness of truths about that environ-
ment, is epistemically distinctive. Information can go stale. What once passed for
knowledge may accrete into dogma if the world changes without a corresponding
change in cognitive state. The explicit awareness afforded by perceptual experi-
ence, in contrast, keeps the perceiver au courant with their environment (Travis,
2013, 173–174). In disclosing, partially and imperfectly, that environment, their
perceptual experience will change with every change of what is presented in it. If
timeliness is important in your practical circumstances, perception offers a dis-
tinct advantage over, not only belief, but what passes for knowledge. If you value
timeliness, given your practical circumstances, if being au courant with some aspect
of the natural environment is of particular practical signiﬁcance, then you should
keep an eye on it or, at the very least, be perceptually vigilant, more generally.
That perception assimilates to its object, in the sense that it does, is due, in
part, to the activity of the perceiver. Perhaps that is why Olivi describes the out-
ward extensive activity of perception as being, at the same time, a formative ab-
sorption toward its object. The haptic experience of our hominid ancestor only
assimilates to the stone thanks to the activity of their hand’s grasp and the resis-
tance it encounters. It is when the limit to the hand’s activity is experienced as a
sympathetic response to an alien force, like it yet distinct from it, that the stone is
presented in their grasp. Haptic touch discloses the overall shape and volume of
the stone by grasping it. Its roughness is disclosed by feeling it. Its heft, by weigh-
ing it. Grasping, feeling, weighing, listening, and looking are all outward extensive
activities by which the perceiver opens themselves up, in a directed manner, to the
sensible, in all its varieties. The activity of the perceiver is a necessary precondi-
tion for the objective disclosure of the perceived object. For it is the resistance
that such activity encounters in the natural environment that makes possible the
sympathetic presentation of the sensible world without.
I have been discussing perceptual objectivity and its epistemic signiﬁcance.
Speciﬁcally, I have been spelling out the conception of perceptual objectivity that
one arrives at once one conceives of perception, in the hylomorphic fashion, in
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terms of the assimilation of form without matter, as sustained by the perceiver’s
activity, and the epistemic signiﬁcance of the resulting conception of objectiv-
ity. However, much of what was claimed would remain true on any conception of
perception that merely postulates an indispensable presentational element. Thus,
for example, McDowell (2008) believes that perception affords the perceiver with
a non-propositional mode of awareness that grounds an epistemic warrant, un-
derstood as an epistemic entitlement. McDowell neither endorses a hylomorphic
conception of sensory presentation (though he does help himself to the Peripatetic
metaphor of shaping, McDowell 1998) nor even entertains its neo-Platonic elab-
oration in terms of sympathy with the natural environment that resists the force
of the perceiver’s activity. However, the metaphysics of sensory presentation that
I have defended offers not only an explanation of the epistemic signiﬁcance of
perceptual phenomenology in the form of an analytic explication of its intelligible
structure (chapter 2.4), but it also offers a further, distinct possibility.
If perceptual presentation is sympathetic presentation, then perception places
us into the very heart of things, thus allowing us to experience them from within.
Perhaps the sympathy at work in fellow-feeling would provide the most vivid and
suggestive example. Fellow-feeling involves feeling along with the object of sympa-
thy. One experiences their plight from within. The sympathetic presentation of
an object in perceptual experience involves the perceiver placing themselves in the
object, coinciding with it, and so experiencing it fromwithin. The present account
of sensory presentation in terms of sympathy naturally belongs to the broader neo-
Platonic heritage of thinking of perception as placing the perceiver in its object.
There is a way in which the present account, where sensory presentation is gov-
erned by the principle of sympathy, can make sense of this neo-Platonic heritage,
though perhaps it is not the only way. On the understanding of this neo-Platonic
heritage afforded by sympathy, perception presents how things are from within.
Sympathy makes possible the presentation of a thing’s inner nature, and thus one
may perceive how a thing is in itself. Echoing Johann Friedrich Herbart, we may
say that the world is a world of things in themselves and things in themselves are
perceptible. Things in themselves are what appear in our perceptual experience.
They are the objects of sensory awareness. If perceptual presentation is governed
by the principle of sympathy, then the distinction between the phenomenal and
the noumenal collapses.
6.3 KantianHumility
Sympathy allows the perceiver to experience the presented object from within.
In sympathetically presenting that object in their experience of it, the perceiver
coincides with that object and experiences how that thing is in itself, its inner na-
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ture, albeit imperfectly, from a partial perspective. We can begin to make sense of
these claims through a critical examination of Langton’s (1998) defense of Kantian
Humility.
Consider the following puzzle for Kant’s position, ﬁrst raised by Jacobi. Ac-
cording to Kant, things in themselves exist and are the cause of phenomenal ap-
pearances. But if Kant’s critical philosophy is correct, then it would seem that we
can have no knowledge of things in themselves. But if we have no knowledge of
things in themselves, then how could we know that they exist and are the cause
of phenomenal appearances? This puzzle prompts Jacobi (1815, 304) to remark of
the ﬁrst edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft that without the presupposition of
the thing in itself I “cannot enter into the system, yet with this presupposition I
cannot remain in it” (Guyer 1987, 335; for discussion of Jacobi’s puzzle see Allison
1983, 247–54, Guyer 1987, chapter 15, Langton 1998, chapter 1).
Langton’s interpretation of Kant provides a straightforward solution by qual-
ifying our ignorance of things in themselves. The qualiﬁcation proceeds on the
back of a metaphysical interpretation of the distinction between phenomena and
things in themselves. Things in themselves are substances that have intrinsic prop-
erties whereas phenomena are relational properties of substances (Langton, 1998,
20). Our ignorance pertains not to the existence of things in themselves, nor to
their relational effects, such as their causing in us of phenomenal appearances, but
to their inner natures. We cannot know how things are in themselves. We cannot
know, speciﬁcally, their intrinsic properties (Langton, 1998, 13).
Kantian Humility is the name that Langton bestows upon the doctrine that
we cannot know how things are in themselves, that we are irredeemably ignorant
of the intrinsic natures of things in themselves. Part of the interest of Langton’s
book is not just the interpretation of Kant she provides, but her conviction that
Kant, so interpreted, might just be right. The case Langton makes for Kantian
Humility inspired Lewis (2009) to construct aRamseyan variant. (For discussion of
Ramseyan andKantianHumility, from a standpoint that similarly takes perception
to have an indispensable and irreducible presentational element, see Brewer 2011.)
What case for Kantian Humility does Langton claim that we can ﬁnd in Kant’s
writing?
In the Bounds of Sense, Strawson doubts that there is any such case to be found:
Knowledge through perception of things existing independently of per-
ception, as they are in themselves, is impossible. For the only percep-
tion which could yield us any knowledge at all of such things must be
the outcome of our being affected by those things; and for this reason
such knowlege can be knowledge only of those things as they appear—
of the appearances of those things—and not of those things as they
really are or are in themselves. The above is a fundamental and unar-
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gued complex premise of the Critique. (Strawson, 1966, 250)
Strawson, however, hints at potential grounds for Kantian Humility in the recep-
tivity of human sensibility, its propensity to be affected from without. Indeed it
is partly on these grounds that Langton herself sees a case for Kantian Humility.
According to Langton, Kant’s case for Kantian Humility rests upon another
doctrine of Kant’s:
the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so
far as it is in any way affected, is called sensibility … Our nature is so
constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible, that it
contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. (Kant, Kritik
der reinen Vernunft, A51/B75; Smith 1965, 93)
From this and other passages, Langton attributes to Kant the thesis she describes
as Receptivity:
Human knowledge depends on sensibility, and sensibility is receptive:
we can have knowledge of an object only in so far as it affects us. (Lang-
ton, 1998, 125)
Langton’s Kant is driven to embrace Kantian Humility, in part, by working out the
consequences of Receptivity for human knowledge. Speciﬁcally, Langton sees the
case for Kantian Humility as resting upon the distinction between the phenom-
enal and the noumenal (on its metaphysical interpretation), the irreducibility of
relational properties to intrinsic properties (an issue she sees as at stake between
Leibniz and Kant, Langton 1998, chapters 4 and 5), and Receptivity as formulated
above.
That things in themselves cause in human subjects phenomenal appearances
is a phenomenal, that is to say, relational feature of these substances. These phe-
nomenal appearances might yet acquaint human subjects with how things are in
themselves if relations somehow reduced to intrinsic properties. But no such re-
duction is in the offing (Langton, 1998, chapter 5). So it would seem that percep-
tion, being essentially receptive, only affords human subjects with knowledge of
the phenomenal features of the world, of the relational properties of substances
whose intrinsic nature remains forever hidden from us.
I must confess to a lingering Strawsonian worry. Langton’s argument only
works on the assumption that the object of perception is relational in character.
Without that assumption, the argument simply has no grip. To see how there may
be a further issue here, look closely at the difference between Langton’s official
formulation of Receptivity and the passage from A51/B75. According to Receptiv-
ity, we can perceive an object only insofar as it affects us. That is a relatively weak
claim. Perhaps only Olivi, Malebranche, and Leibniz deny it. However, among our
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predecessors who accept that claim, many would deny that the content of percep-
tion is restricted to the relational properties of substances. Notice, however, how
the claim in A51/B75 is stronger. Kant claims that our nature is such that sensible
intuition “contains only the way in which we are affected”. If sensible intuition
contains only the way in which we are affected, then the content of a sensible in-
tuition is restricted to the subject being affected from without. The way in which
we are affected is a causal, relational feature. So the content of sensible intuition
would be relational in the way required. The lingering Strawsonian worry con-
cerns what grounds there could be for this stronger Kantian claim, for without it,
Langton’s case for Kantian Humility collapses.
Why assume that the content of perception is restricted to relational prop-
erties of substances? It does not follow from the mere fact that perception re-
quires being affected from without. So what grounds this restriction? The linger-
ing Strawsonian worry is that this is a fundamental and unargued assumption of
Langton’s case for Kantian Humility. Notice Langton could not legitimately re-
formulate Receptivity in terms of the stronger Kantian language of A51/B75. That
would have “the advantages of theft over honest toil” (Russell, 1919, 71). For sup-
pose she did. Then since the content of perception is restricted to the relational
properties of substances, the content of perception would exclude the intrinsic
properties of substances. A perception, so conceived, would not be a way of be-
coming knowledgeable of the intrinsic properties of substances since these do not
ﬁgure in its content. And given a minimal empiricism, that is tantamount to Kan-
tian Humility.
Suppose that Kant and Langton in fact provide no further grounds for this
assumption. Perhaps the claim that the content of perception is restricted to rela-
tional properties of substances is grounded, not in an argument, but in an inability
to conceive of the alternative. Perhaps in thinking about the passive reception
of sensory impressions they could frame for themselves no positive conception of
how, being affected thus, perception could present how things are in themselves.
I shall not here speculate on the source of this inability. (Though a more complete
anti-Kantian polemic, of a similar scale and ambition as Prichard’s 1909, would
provide a diagnosis of this.) Rather, I shall try to provide the wanted positive
conception. Interestingly, doing so in the terms argued for in the present essay
parallels, in certain respects, an anti-Kantian argument of Bergson’s.
6.4 Bergson contraKant
In Introduction à la métaphysique Bergson (1903) marks a distinction between rela-
tive and absolute knowledge. Surprisingly, at least to readers ofMatière et Mémoire,
Bergson counts perceptual knowledge as relative knowledge. It is hard to under-
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stand how perceptual knowledge being relative could be consistent with the con-
ception of pure perception developed in chapter 1 of Matière et Mémoire, for there
Bergson rejects indirect realism, arguing, instead, that pure perception, at least, di-
rectly acquaints us with its object (though see Moore, 1996, for a reconciliationist
reading, 39–41). That perceptual knowledge is relative is, perhaps, merely a dialec-
tical concession to a Kantian opponent and not a claim that Bergson is himself
endorsing. We shall not resolve this exegetical matter here, for our focus is not
on relative knowlege, but on absolute knowledge and what, according to Bergson,
makes that possible.
What is the distinction between relative and absolute knowledge? Bergson
introduces the distinction this way:
philosophers, in spite of their apparent divergencies, agree in distin-
guishing two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The ﬁrst
implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter into
it. The ﬁrst depends on the point of view at which we are placed and
on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither
depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The ﬁrst kind of
knowledge may be said to stop at the relative; the second, in those cases
where it is possible, to attain the absolute. (Bergson, 1912b, 1)
Absolute knowledge, whatever else it might be (for discussion see Lacey, 1989,
chapter 6), involves knowledge of things in themselves precluded by Kantian Hu-
mility. How is such knowledge obtained? How may we enter into the object of
knowledge and so know it absolutely?
It is impossible to obtain absolute knowledge of an object merely by integrating
partial perspectives on that object into a harmonious, uniﬁed whole. “Were all the
photographs of a town, taken from all possible points of view, to go on indeﬁnitely
completing one another, they would never be equivalent to the solid town in which
we walk about” (Bergson, 1912b, 5). According to Bergson, one may come, instead,
to have absolute knowledge by means of the faculty of intuition whose principle is
sympathy:
By intuition ismeant the kind of intellectual sympathy bywhich one places
oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it
and consequently inexpressible. (Bergson, 1912b, 7)
Intuition, here, is intellectual as opposed to sensible. Intuition involves a kind of
intimate unity between the act of intuition and its object (and presumably, it dis-
plays a greater degree of unity then that at work in perception which yields only
relative knowledge). Sympathy, as the principle of intuition, allows the thinker
to enter into or coincide with the object of absolute knowledge. In this passage,
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Bergson makes the rather strong claim that one places oneself within the object
in order to coincide with what is unique in it. And this, Bergson, claims, has the
consequence that the content of that intuition is inexpressible. Bergson obviously
thinks that what is expressible is a kind of generality. But intuition, in presenting
what is unique in its object, lacks the kind of generality that would otherwise make
it expressible (compare Aristotle De Interpretatione 7 17a37–38, Categoriae 2 1a20–1b9,
Frege 1882, 4, Prichard 1909, 44, Lewis 1929, 52). That the content of the intu-
ition is inexpressible might seem incompatible with its being intellectual (hence
Russell’s 1912 charge of anti-intellectualism). But notice that there is precedent
for this. According to Plotinus, the image of the hyperontic One intuited by the
Intellect is a higher form of intelligibility than what can be expressed in discursive
rationality. The intuition that apprehends the image is intellectual, but its content
is inexpressible by ﬁnite discursive means. Similarly, Bergson’s thought is that the
intuition that yields the absolute knowledge of metaphysics is at once intellectual
and its content inexpressible. Notice how Bergson, in this passage, is cleaving
to what I earlier described as a neo-Platonic heritage—in intuiting an object one
places oneself within that object. This is, perhaps, no accident. Bergson regularly
lectured on Plotinus. The important point for us is that Bergson took intellectual
sympathy to explain the way intuition places one within its object. Thanks to the
operation of sympathy, in intuition one experiences the object from within and so
may gain absolute knowledge of it.
So, Bergson maintains, as against Kant, that absolute knowlege, knowledge of
how things are in themselves, is possible on the basis of intuition and that sympa-
thy makes this so. Some, admittedly, have been unimpressed. And not only Russell
(1912), who was writing as a polemicist, as was Stebbing (1914). Jay (1994, 202), by
no means a polemicist working on behalf of an emerging analytic philosophy, for
one, pronounces it lame. However, I suspect such judgments are not informed by
an appreciation of the role of sympathy in neo-Platonic physics. Bergson’s thought
was so informed, and his work is best appreciated when read in light of these an-
cient sources. We have endeavoured to understand haptic, auditory, and visual
perception in terms of the operation of sympathy. If sensible intuition, though a
lesser unity than intellectual intuition, if such there be, operates too by means of
sympathy, could it not also disclose how things are in themselves, if partially and
imperfectly, despite its perspectival character? Could not perception, so under-
stood, make the perceiver knowledgeable about how things are in themselves?
6.5 Perceiving Things in Themselves
Throughout this essay I have argued that sensory presentation—at least as it oc-
curs in haptic, auditory, and visual perception—is governed by the principle of
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sympathy. So sympathy has a broader domain of application than in an intel-
lectual intuition that makes the absolute knowledge of metaphysics available as
Bergson contends. Moreover, the operation of sympathy in sensory presentation
is perspective-relative. An object is only sympathetically presented to the per-
ceiver from their partial perspective on the natural environment. However, the
perspectival relativity of sensory presentation is no obstacle to its objectivity. As
Merleau-Ponty (1967) stresses, it is, rather, a precondition of perceptual objectivity
(chapter 6.2). Objectivity and the parochial are linked.
There may be a higher degree of unity involved in an act of intellectual intu-
ition, if such there be, than in a perceptual act. And this may be reﬂected in the
fact that the content of intellectual intuition is more than just what would be dis-
closed in the totality of potential perspectives on its object. But that is not yet
grounds for maintaining that perception discloses only the relations the perceiver
bares to its object. All that really follows from the perspectival relativity of sensory
presentation is that it is partial and imperfect, in the sense of being incomplete, if
not in a normative sense that implies a kind of deﬁcit. A world independent of our
awareness of it may exceed our perception of it. Sensory presentationmay disclose
how things are in themselves, but being partial and imperfect, it may disclose only
some of these and with different degrees of acuity in different circumstances of
perception.
Just as sympathy, as it operates in fellow-feeling, allows us to experience from
within what another undergoes, sympathy, as it operates in perception, allows us
to experience from within what something external to us is like. It is this aspect
of sympathetic sensory presentation that vindicates what I earlier described as a
neo-Platonic heritage, that perception places us in the object perceived. If sensory
presentation operates by means of sympathy, then the sensory presentation of an
object in perceptual experience is a way of entering into or coinciding with that
object, albeit partially and imperfectly. Perception places us into the very heart
of things and reveals their inner natures. This remains a metaphor, but we may
unpack two aspects of it. The ﬁrst aspect is a claim about the phenomenology
of explicit awareness, and the second is a claim about the object of that explicit
awareness.
Begin with the ﬁrst aspect, the claim about the phenomenology of explicit
awareness. Consider again Olivi’s and Merleau-Ponty’s claim that in looking at
a distal object, the perceiver’s gaze is posed on that object. The active, outer-
directed, opening up to the visible comes to rest on a distal body that resists this
activity insofar as it can. It is only in experiencing the body’s limit to the perceiver’s
visual activity, its resistance to the perceiver’s gaze, its perceptual impenetrability,
as a sympathetic response to a countervailing force, the perceiver’s gaze encounter-
ing an alien force that resists it, that the perceptually impenetrably body discloses
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itself to visual awareness. If the visual resistance of the body is the means by which
conﬂicting forces are sympathetically presented in visual experience, then in being
sympathetically presented with a distal body, the perceiver is naturally attending
to the distal body, the object of visual perception. The perceiver’s gaze is posed
on the body. This is the effect of the body’s sympathetic presentation in visual
experience that arises when the perceiver looks to that body. Perception places
us in the body. That is where the perceiver’s explicit awareness is. In selectively
attending to an object of your experience, where is your attention? On the object
selectively attended to, of course. The query, “Where’s your head at?”, gives ex-
pression to this. Your “head” is where the object of your attention is. In general,
an act or episode of attention is where its object is. Attention is not the kind of
thing that has location in itself. Insofar as it can be said to have location, it must
inherit this location from the location of its object. This, then, is the ﬁrst aspect,
the claim about the phenomenology of explicit awareness, that attention is located
where its object is.
Consider now the second aspect. Whereas the ﬁrst aspect, unpacked from
the metaphor, concerned the phenomenology of explicit awareness, the second
aspect concerns its object. The perceiver’s gaze is posed on the body located at
a distance from it. And the perceiver’s explicit awareness, in alighting upon the
distal body, may disclose how that body is in itself. A body’s shape, for example,
is an aspect of its corporeal nature. A body’s shape is part of what it is to be a
body and the particular body that it is. A body’s shape is not only in this way an
aspect of its corporeal nature but it is perceptible as well. It may be felt and seen.
So at least some aspects of how the body is in itself are within the range of the
explicit awareness afforded by the perceiver’s sensory experience. This, then, is
the second aspect, the claim about the objects of explicit awareness, that how a
thing is in itself may be an object of the explicit awareness afforded by perception.
Putting these two aspects together we arrive at what the neo-Platonic heritage
amounts to in the present account: Perception places us in the very heart of things
in the sense that the explicit awareness afforded by perceptual experience is di-
rected upon the body, and so located where its object is, in such a way as to disclose
how that body is in itself, apart from other things, in that awareness. And it is the
principle of sympathy that makes this possible. Sympathy, in this way, allows us
to experience, from within, what an external body is like, in and of itself.
That we must be affected in some way by the object of perception is no obsta-
cle to the sympathetic presentation of a thing’s inner nature. Rather, as the Pro-
tagoreanmodel reveals, at least as herein elaborated, the force of the perceiver’s ac-
tivity coming into conﬂict with the self-maintaining forces of the object perceived
is what makes its sympathetic presentation possible. It is only when the perceiver
experiences the limit to their perceptual activity as a sympathetic response to a
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countervailing force from without that sympathy may disclose what is external to
us. What appears to us in perceptual experience are things in themselves, both in
their relational and intrinsic aspects. The fallen burr resting upon the grass may
be to the left of a foraging squirrel and bright green. Vision discloses such things
to us. But if things in themselves are what appear to us in perceptual experience,
then the phenomenal–noumenal distinction collapses. A thing may at once be a
thing in itself, a substance if you like, and appear in perceptual experience. More
than that, how that thing is in itself may itself be disclosed, partially and imper-
fectly, in perceptual experience. What is disclosed is an aspect of the substance’s
inner nature, how that thing is in itself apart from other things, how it is intrin-
sically. We confront the burr’s greenness in seeing it. Sympathy is what presents
the world without the mind in sensory experience and discloses how things are in
themselves, at least partially and imperfectly.
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